In the Interest Of: A.R. v. R.R. (putative Father)

• Decision Date: 01 February 2011
• Docket Number: No. WD 73107.,WD 73107.
• Citation: 330 S.W.3d 858
• Parties: In the Interest of: A.R.,Juvenile Officer, Respondent,v.R.R. (Putative Father), Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

330 S.W.3d 858

In the Interest of: A.R.,Juvenile Officer, Respondent,

v.R.R. (Putative Father), Appellant.

No. WD 73107.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Feb. 1, 2011.

Daniel G. Barry, for Respondent.Connor J. Sears, for Appellant.Before Division Two: KAREN KING MITCHELL, Presiding Judge, JOSEPH M. ELLIS, Judge and VICTOR C. HOWARD, Judge.VICTOR C. HOWARD, Judge.

R.R. (Father) appeals the juvenile court's disposition judgment committing his son, A.R., to the custody of the Children's Division for placement with his grandmother.¹ On appeal, Father contends that in denying him custody of A.R., the juvenile court exceeded the bounds of its limited jurisdiction, violated procedural and substantive due process, and failed to apply section 211.037, RSMo Cum.Supp.2009.² Father also argues that even if section 211.037 was applied, the statute is unconstitutional. The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

Factual and Procedural Background

A.R. was born on August 28, 2009, out of wedlock. The Children's Division received a Newborn Crisis Assessment advising that the child's mother (Mother) tested positive for cocaine and marijuana at the time of the birth. The infant tested positive for marijuana only. Mother reported that she had used marijuana a couple of times during the end of the pregnancy due to the stress of being homeless and having no support but denied using cocaine. She also reported that she had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder but was not taking medication for it. Mother agreed to complete drug treatment. She also named Father as the baby's father but reported that he did not support her or the baby, was homeless and unemployed, and wanted “to smoke pot all day.”

Mother attended treatment for a few weeks. The baby was in her custody, and they lived with various relatives and friends. In December 2009, Mother told her probation officer that she was using PCP and was no longer in treatment. ³ The Children's Division worker informed Mother that if she did not report to and participate in treatment, the Children's Division would seek protective custody of the baby. On January 12, 2010, Mother reported to ReDiscover, a substance abuse treatment center, and completed a drug test. The next day, she tested positive for cocaine, marijuana, and PCP. She was told that she needed inpatient treatment, but she refused. She was again told that if she did not do inpatient treatment, the Children's Division would seek custody of the baby. While holding the child, Mother became belligerent and erratic and cursed and threatened the staff. The Children's Division worker called the police, and the child was taken into temporary protective custody.

The Juvenile Officer filed a petition on January 14, 2010, alleging that A.R. was without proper care, custody, and support and subject to the juvenile court's jurisdiction under section 211.031.1(1) because Mother's mental health and use of illegal substances impaired her ability to parent. The petition alleged that Father was the putative father and that he was homeless. Father attended the protective custody hearing held January 15, 2010. At the hearing, the juvenile court placed A.R. in the temporary legal custody of the Children's Division for placement with his maternal grandmother, ordered supervised visitation with Father, ordered paternity testing, and appointed counsel for Father.

On January 21, 2010, the Juvenile Officer filed a first amended petition. It added a second count alleging that A.R. was without proper care, custody, and support and subject to the family court's jurisdiction under section 211.031.1(1) because Father used illegal substances and his ability to parent, his residence, and his ability to care for the child were unknown. Father's appointed attorney appeared for Father at the case management hearing on February 3, 2010. At the hearing, the juvenile court set an adjudication hearing for March 9, 2010. It also ordered that A.R. remain in the custody of the Children's Division for placement with his grandmother. Finally, the juvenile court ordered Father to participate in drug testing.

On March 9, 2010, the adjudication hearing was held. Father was present with his attorney. Mother was not present because she was incarcerated. The juvenile officer dismissed count 2 of the first amended petition concerning the allegations regarding Father. Evidence was presented regarding the allegations about Mother in count 1. The juvenile court found that clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supported the allegations of count 1 and assumed jurisdiction over the child. The disposition hearing was then immediately held. The juvenile officer offered exhibit 1, the social file containing the Children's Division's reports. Father objected based on hearsay, but the court admitted the exhibit into evidence. No other evidence was presented by any party. The court then heard recommendations from the Children's Division and the guardian ad litem. Father asked that he be given “some custody [of the child] at this time.” In the alternative, he asked that the court order that once the home study was completed, he be awarded custody of the child. At the end of the hearing, the juvenile court ordered that A.R. remain in the custody of the Children's Division for placement with his grandmother. Regarding Father, the court stated, “So before I change custody I want to see clean UAs, a clean hair test, and some—and some stability as far as with where dad is; where he's staying, and that he can take care of this child, be stable enough to do that. So that's what I want to see.”

The next day, the juvenile court entered its findings, recommendations, and judgment in which it found at disposition that “continued placement of the child in the home or with the parents is contrary to the welfare of the child due to the mother and father not completing services at this time.” It ordered that A.R. remain in the custody of the Children's Division for placement with his grandmother and that Father complete a psychological evaluation, participate in parenting classes, and submit to a hair test and be subject to random urinalysis with DRAGNET. The court further ordered that contact between the child and Father shall be as recommended by the Children's Division.

Thereafter, Father filed a motion for rehearing arguing that the judgment disregarded his constitutionally protected fundamental liberty interest to raise his own child and violated section 211.037. The juvenile court overruled Father's motion. This appeal by Father followed.

Standard of Review

The decision of the juvenile court will be affirmed on appeal unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976); Waint v. M.B. ( In Interest of T.B.), 963 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Mo.App. W.D.1997). The evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's judgment. T.B., 963 S.W.2d at 254.

Authority of the Juvenile Court & Section 211.037

In his first point on appeal, Father asserts that the juvenile court's disposition judgment denying him custody of A.R. was without statutory basis and exceeded the limited power of the court. He contends that the juvenile court had no statutory authority to deny him custody of his child when there was no allegation or proof of any wrongdoing against him. In his third point on appeal, Father claims that the juvenile court erred in not applying section 211.037 pertaining to nonoffending parents in the disposition phase of the proceeding. He contends that he was entitled to custody of A.R. under the statute. These points are discussed together.

The purpose of Chapter 211, which governs the juvenile court, is “to facilitate the care, protection and discipline of children who come within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” § 211.011, RSMo 2000. Section 211.031 is the abuse and neglect statute. The hearing in a proceeding under section 211.031.1 is bifurcated. Rules 124.06 and 124.07; In the Interest of D.K.S., 106 S.W.3d 616, 619 (Mo.App. W.D.2003). The first phase is adjudication where the juvenile court determines whether the juvenile officer established, by clear and convincing evidence, that the court should assume jurisdiction over the child. D.K.S., 106 S.W.3d at 619. In the second phase, disposition, the juvenile court determines the disposition or treatment that should be ordered for the child. Id.

“To assert jurisdiction under section 211.031.1(1), the juvenile court must find clear and convincing evidence that the child is in need of care because the parent has neglected to provide the care necessary for the child's well-being.” In the Interest of G.C., 50 S.W.3d 408, 410 (Mo.App. E.D.2001). See also In the Interest of S.H. v. O.M.H., 796 S.W.2d 71, 72 (Mo.App. E.D.1990). Specifically, section 211.031 provides, in pertinent part:

1. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the juvenile court ... shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings:

(1) Involving any child ... who is alleged to be in need of care and treatment because:

(a) The parents, or other persons legally responsible for the care and support of the child ... neglect or refuse to provide proper support, education which is required by law, medical, surgical or other care necessary for his or her well-being; ...

(b) The child ... is otherwise without proper care, custody or support;....

Once a court has acquired jurisdiction over a child in a proper proceeding, the child becomes a ward of the court, and the court then has the inherent jurisdiction to award custody as it deems will preserve and protect the child's welfare. State ex rel. Catholic Charities of St. Louis v. Hoester, 494 S.W.2d 70, 73 (Mo. banc 1973); S.H., 796 S.W.2d at 72.

In this case, the juvenile court assumed...