In the Matter of The Civil Commitment of Jeremiah Jerome Johnson

• Decision Date: 20 July 2011
• Docket Number: Nos. A09–2225,A09–2226.,s. A09–2225
• Citation: 800 N.W.2d 134
• Parties: In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of Jeremiah Jerome JOHNSON,andIn the Matter of the Civil Commitment of Lloyd Robert Desjarlais.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

800 N.W.2d 134

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of Jeremiah Jerome JOHNSON,andIn the Matter of the Civil Commitment of Lloyd Robert Desjarlais.

Nos. A09–2225

A09–2226.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 20, 2011.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Minnesota's civil commitment statute, Minnesota Statutes chapter 253B (2010), falls within the express grant of jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (2006).

2. Because the civil commitment of appellants as sexually dangerous persons for conduct committed on and off reservation does not unduly interfere with tribal sovereignty and is not otherwise preempted by federal law, the exceptionally strong state interests in protecting public safety and rehabilitating the mentally ill support the state's enforcement of its civil commitment law against tribal members.

Victor H. Smith, Smith Law Office, Walker, MN, for appellants Jeremiah Jerome Johnson and Lloyd Robert Desjarlais.Christopher J. Strandlie, Cass County Attorney, Walker, MN; and Noah A. Cashman, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, for respondent Cass County.

OPINION

GILDEA, Chief Justice.

The question in this case is whether Minnesota's civil commitment statute, Minn.Stat. ch. 253B (2010), can be enforced to commit appellants, who are enrolled tribal members, as sexually dangerous persons. Because we conclude that Minnesota has jurisdiction to commit appellants, we affirm.

Appellant Johnson

Appellant Jeremiah Jerome Johnson is an enrolled member of the Bois Forte Band of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe. In 2008, respondent Cass County sought to commit Johnson under the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act, Minn.Stat. ch. 253B. Johnson was incarcerated at the time the County sought his commitment. Prior to his incarceration, the record reflects that Johnson did not live on the Bois Forte reservation, but resided on the Leech Lake reservation.

At his commitment hearing, Johnson stipulated to classification as a “sexually dangerous person” under Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c. The district court also made extensive findings to support Johnson's commitment as a sexually dangerous person. The court's findings concerning Johnson's history of harmful sexual conduct are the most relevant to our decision. See Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c (defining a “sexually dangerous person” as a person who, among other things, “has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct” as defined by Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c(a)); see also Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 7a (defining “harmful sexual conduct” and establishing a rebuttable presumption that certain criminal conduct constitutes “harmful sexual conduct”). The court found that in 2003, when Johnson was 17 years old, Johnson sexually assaulted a 15–year–old female in Kego Lake Township in Cass County. Johnson pleaded guilty to a false imprisonment charge for that incident. See Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 7a(b) (establishing a rebuttable presumption that false imprisonment under Minn.Stat. § 609.255 (2010) creates a substantial likelihood that the victim suffered serious physical or emotional harm). The court also found that in 2005, Johnson forced another 15–year–old victim to have sexual intercourse in Bena, Minnesota. Johnson pleaded guilty to fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct for that incident. See id. (establishing a rebuttable presumption that fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn.Stat. § 609.345 (2010) creates a substantial likelihood that the victim suffered serious physical or emotional harm). The sentencing court stayed execution of Johnson's sentence for this offense, but Johnson violated the terms of his probation. Johnson's probation was revoked, and in 2006, his 33–month prison sentence was executed. Johnson was serving his sentence at the Minnesota Correctional Facility at Rush City when the County sought his commitment.

The district court concluded that Johnson satisfied the requirements for commitment as a sexually dangerous person and committed Johnson to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program in St. Peter and Moose Lake, Minnesota, in 2009. In August 2009, the court made Johnson's commitment indeterminate. See Minn.Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 3.

The district court did not make any factual findings as to whether the conduct underlying the court's conclusion that Johnson was a sexually dangerous person occurred on or off an Indian reservation. But the parties agreed at oral argument before our court that some of the conduct occurred on reservation and some of it occurred off reservation. To the extent the conduct occurred on a reservation, such conduct occurred on the Leech Lake reservation.

Appellant Desjarlais

Appellant Lloyd Robert Desjarlais is an enrolled member of the Leech Lake Band of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe. In 2008, Cass County sought to commit Desjarlais as a sexual psychopathic personality and a sexually dangerous person. Desjarlais was in custody at the time the County sought his commitment.¹ When he was not in custody, the record reflects that Desjarlais lived on the Leech Lake reservation.

At his commitment hearing, Desjarlais stipulated to commitment as a sexually dangerous person under Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c. The district court also made extensive findings to support Desjarlais' commitment as a sexually dangerous person. As with Johnson, most relevant to our decision are the court's findings detailing Desjarlais' history of harmful sexual conduct. The court found that in 2002, when he was 14 years old, Desjarlais engaged in both consensual and forced sexual conduct while at the Northwest Minnesota Juvenile Center Satellite Home in Bemidji. Desjarlais was charged by juvenile delinquency petition with third-degree criminal sexual conduct for those acts, but the State dismissed the charge and Desjarlais was adjudicated delinquent for indecent exposure instead. The court nevertheless found for the purposes of civil commitment that the conduct constituted third-degree criminal sexual conduct, see Minn.Stat. § 609.344 (2010), which carries a presumption of harm under Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 7a(b). The court alternatively found that even without the presumption of harm under subdivision 7a(b), Desjarlais' 2002 conduct nevertheless constituted harmful sexual conduct.

The district court also found that in 2004, when he was 16 years old, Desjarlais violently forced intercourse on a 15–year–old victim on three separate occasions. The record reflects that these incidents took place in Brainerd, Minnesota. The Crow Wing County Attorney's Office declined to prosecute Desjarlais for these acts. But the court nevertheless found that the acts occurred and constituted third-degree criminal sexual conduct, which carries a presumption of harm under Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 7a(b). The court alternatively found that even without the presumption of harm, Desjarlais' 2004 conduct constituted harmful sexual conduct.

Additionally, the district court found that in 2007, Desjarlais sexually abused a 4–year–old victim. The record indicates that the 2007 conduct occurred “in the Cass Lake area of Cass County.” The State charged Desjarlais with one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, see Minn.Stat. § 609.343 (2010), which carries a presumption of harm under Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 7a(b). Desjarlais pleaded guilty to a lesser-included count of felony solicitation of a child to engage in sexual conduct under Minn.Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2 (2010). The sentencing court stayed imposition of sentence, subject to conditions, but Desjarlais violated the conditions, and the sentencing court sentenced him to 20 months in prison. The district court concluded that Desjarlais' 2007 conduct carried a statutory presumption of harm, and alternatively found that there was clear and convincing evidence that the conduct was harmful even without the statutory presumption.

The district court concluded that Desjarlais satisfied the requirements for commitment as a sexually dangerous person under Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c, and committed Desjarlais to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program at St. Peter and Moose Lake. In July 2009, the court made Desjarlais' commitment indeterminate. See Minn.Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 3.

The district court did not make any factual findings as to whether the conduct underlying the court's conclusion that Desjarlais was a sexually dangerous person occurred on or off an Indian reservation. But the parties agreed at oral argument before our court that some of the conduct occurred on the Leech Lake reservation and some occurred off reservation.

Appeal

Johnson and Desjarlais moved individually to dismiss their commitments for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, based on their status as enrolled tribal members. The district court denied both motions to dismiss. To support its decisions, the court concluded that “[s]exually deviant behavior is generally prohibited, and thus the civil commitment procedures in question are criminal/prohibitory” and subject to Congress' express grant of criminal jurisdiction to certain states under 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006). See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub.L. 83–280, 67 Stat. 588, 588–89 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–26 (2006), and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006)) (Public Law 280).

Johnson and Desjarlais individually appealed the district court's orders to the court of appeals, and the court of appeals consolidated the cases. See In re Civil Commitment of Johnson, 782 N.W.2d 274, 277 (Minn.App.2010). Appellants asserted to the court of appeals that: (1) Congress has not granted the State jurisdiction to civilly commit appellants as sexually dangerous persons; (2) appellants' civil commitments infringe on tribal sovereignty; and (3) appellants' civil commitments violate constitutional double jeopardy protections. Id. at 276. The court determined that appellants' commitments did not fall under Congress' affirmative grant of jurisdiction to the State over crimes...