In the Matter of Minority of Geiger, No. 2006 CA 2079 (La. App. 9/14/2007)
| Decision Date | 14 September 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 2006 CA 2079,2006 CA 2079 |
| Parties | IN THE MATTER OF THE MINORITY OF EMIL JOHN GEIGER AND AMY NICOLE GEIGER |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
KEITH B. NORDYKE, Baton Rouge, LA, Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellee Emil John Geiger.
JOSEPH McKEARN, Baton Rouge, LA, Counsel for Defendants-Appellants Sandra Geiger Howard and Dennis Howard.
THOMAS J. EPPLING, LANCE E. HARWELL, Metairie, LA, Counsel for Defendants-Appellees Travelers Insurance Company And Travelers Indemnity Company of Illinois.
Before: WHIPPLE, GUIDRY, and HUGHES, JJ.
The parents and former tutors of the plaintiff appeal a summary judgment ordering them to restore workers' compensation death benefits to the plaintiff that they allegedly wrongfully continued to receive on his behalf after the plaintiff turned eighteen. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
In 1986, while working in Indiana in the course and scope of his employment as an engineer with the Wells Services Division of Schlumberger Technology Corporation (Schlumberger), Steven Ray Geiger suffered fatal injuries in a car accident. He was survived by his wife, Sandra Milam Geiger, and their two children, Emil John Geiger (Emil) and Amy Nicole Geiger. Shortly after the accident, The Travelers Insurance Company (Travelers),1 as Schlumberger's workers' compensation carrier, began paying workers' compensation death benefits to Steven Geiger's survivors.
On March 19, 1988, Sandra Geiger married Dennis Raymond Howard, and later that same year, she filed suit against Schlumberger, Travelers, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company2 for uninsured motorist benefits. The suit was filed by Mrs. Howard in her individual capacity and as the natural tutrix of her then minor children. Later, Mrs. Howard filed a petition to be confirmed as the natural tutrix of her children and their property and to have her husband appointed as undertutor. The trial court signed an order confirming her as natural tutrix and appointing Mr. Howard undertutor on October 10, 1990. Concurrent with the filing of the tutorship petition, Ms. Howard also filed a "Petition for Authority to Settle Minors' Claim" against Schlumberger and Travelers, wherein the recommended undertutor concurred. The trial court authorized the settlement in a judgment rendered the same date.
Pursuant to this judicial authorization, the parties executed a settlement agreement, entitled a "Covenant Not To Sue," on October 11, 1990. The covenant expressly provided that Mrs. Howard would dismiss the claims then pending against Schlumberger and Travelers and that she would not commence, prosecute, or maintain any future claims, of any nature, against Schlumberger and Travelers, either individually, as tutrix of her minor children's estate, or as the personal representative of the estate of Steven Geiger. In exchange, Schlumberger and Travelers agreed, "to continue to pay weekly workers' compensation death benefits in favor of Sandra Milam's two minor children in accordance with the provisions of Illinois law." The parties additionally stipulated that the covenant would be governed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of Indiana.3
On April 4, 2000, Emil turned eighteen; however, it was not until over two years later that he filed an ex parte motion to formally terminate the judgment of tutorship rendered on October 10, 1990. In the motion, Emil stated that he had executed a "receipt and release," which was attached to the motion, averring "that the tutrix has provided a full and complete accounting of all property, securities, effects and cash" that she had held on behalf of Emil. The trial court signed an order granting the motion on September 4, 2002. Nevertheless, on June 23, 2003, Emil filed a petition against the Howards seeking an accounting of all workers' compensation benefits paid to Mrs. Howard on his behalf and demanding recovery of all benefits paid to Mrs. Howard on his behalf after he attained the age of eighteen and any other sums legally due him.
The Howards initially filed an answer generally denying the demands contained in Emil's petition; however, after conducting some discovery and unsuccessfully moving for the dismissal of Emil's petition, the Howards filed a second answer with a recoventional demand against Emil seeking compensation for fulfilling their duties as tutors, the costs of providing a final accounting, and all court costs incurred in the proceedings. The Howards later filed a third-party demand against Travelers seeking indemnification for any sums the Howards might be found to owe Emil in his claim for the post majority workers' compensation payments disbursed to Mrs. Howard on Emil's behalf. The Howards additionally alleged that Travelers' act of discontinuing payment of the workers' compensation benefits to Mrs. Howard was in breach of "a certain contract of workers' compensation insurance with Schlumberger" and reconvened for the balance of the payments allegedly owed under that contract.
Thereafter, Emil amended his petition to limit his request for an accounting to those workers' compensation death benefits paid to Mrs. Howard on his behalf after he had attained the age of majority and to claim damages against Travelers4 for improperly disbursing the disputed workers' compensation payments to Mrs. Howard. Travelers raised several defenses and exceptions in answer to the Howards' third party demand and Emil's amended petition, in addition to generally denying the claims of both pleadings. Travelers later re-urged the objection of no right of action raised in its answer to the third-party demand filed by the Howards by separately filing a pleading entitled "Exception of No Right of Action and/or Motion for Summary Judgment." Travelers also re-urged the objection of prescription raised in its answer to Emil's amended petition by separately excepting to claims asserted by Emil in the amended petition.5
On May 15, 2006, Emil filed a motion for summary judgment seeking judgment in his favor on the demands asserted against the Howards and Travelers in his original and amended petitions. The Howards filed a cross motion for summary judgment seeking: dismissal of Emil's claims against them; judgment against Travelers for an award of workers' compensation payments owed after March 13, 2003, or indemnification for any sums they might be found to owe Emil; and a declaration that the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act governed a determination of payment and ownership of the disputed workers' compensation death benefits.
On July 10, 2006, the trial court considered the motion for summary judgment filed by Emil, the cross motion for summary judgment filed by the Howards, and the "Exception of No Right of Action and/or Motion for Summary Judgment" filed by Travelers. In a judgment signed July 14, 2006, the trial court rendered rulings:
• Granting Emil's motion for summary judgment against the Howards and awarding him the sum of $37,842.40, plus legal interest from the date of demand until paid;
• Denying the Howards' motion for summary judgment and denying their claims for annual compensation, costs for rendering an accounting, and for special and general court costs;
• Overruling the exception and denying the motions for summary judgment and for costs6 filed by Travelers;
• Assessing the Howards with all costs of the proceedings.
The Howards have suspensively appealed that judgment.7
The Howards contend that the trial court committed the following errors in rendering the judgment appealed:
1. The Trial Court committed legal error by basing its decision on [a prior judge's] earlier opinion that Louisiana tutorship laws governed the determination of Emil's claims.
2. The Trial Court's Judgment is contrary to the applicable law, namely the Illinois Workers['] Compensation Act which prohibited any change in payment of death benefits without the prior approval of the Illinois Workers['] Compensation Commission.
A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used to avoid a full-scale trial when there is no genuine issue of material fact. Fagan v. LeBlanc, 04-2743, p. 5 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/10/06), 928 So. 2d 571, 574. Summary judgment is properly granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(B).
The initial burden of proof is on the movant. However, if the movant will not bear the burden of proof at trial, the movant's burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, but rather to point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim. La. C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2). Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the motion should be granted. La. C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2).
On appeal, summary judgments are reviewed de novo under the same criteria that govern the district court's consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Sunrise Construction and Development Corporation v. Coast Waterworks, Inc., 00-0303, p. 4 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/22/01), 806 So. 2d 1, 3, writ denied, 01-2577 (La. 1/11/02), 807 So. 2d 235.
Since in their second assignment of error, the Howards question the authority of the trial court to decide the issues presented, as well as assert that the trial court's...
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