In The Matter Of The Estate Of Cedric E. Chatham
| Decision Date | 26 July 2010 |
| Docket Number | 253-A/07 |
| Citation | 2010 NY Slip Op 51303 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Estate of Cedric E. Chatham, also known Cedric Ernest Chatham, Deceased. |
| Court | New York Surrogate Court |
Robert Blossner, Esq., for Jannae Chatham, petitioner/mother
Bruce S. Reznick, P.C., for Olivia Richard Adams, the administratrix of the estate of the decedent's post-deceased father
Eileen M. Mentone, Guardian Ad Litem for unknown distributees.
The decedent's mother, the administratrix of his estate, petitioned to compromise causes of action arising from the decedent's death, disqualify the estate of the decedent's post-deceased father from sharing in the recovery based on abandonment and failure to support the decedent (see EPTL 4-1.4 [a] [1]; EPTL 5-4.4 [a] [2]), and to judicially settle her account. The court appointed a guardian ad litem for unknown heirs who filed objections on their behalf and on behalf of an alleged child of the decedent's post-deceased father. Subsequently, the father's surviving spouse obtained counsel and filed objections.
Although the petitioner's statement of issues framed the issue for trial differently, at a pretrial conference, the parties narrowed the issue solely to abandonment and, thereafter, the issue of abandonment was tried before the court, without a jury. In their post-trial memoranda of law, the parties address the abandonment issue and resurrect the issue of a failure to support the decedent.
The petitioner testified on her own behalf and called three witnesses: Sarah Johnson, a close family friend who the petitioner referred to as "Aunt Sarah," and Sarah Johnson's two children, Stephanie Miller Johnson and Cynthia Hinds. The witnesses for the objectants were the spouse and sister of the post-deceased father, Olivia Richards and Patricia Pryor, respectively.
During the petitioner's case-in-chief, her testimony and that of her three witnesses was similar. The decedent was born on July 3, 1977 and died on October 5, 1992 at the age of 15. The father post-deceased on June 30, 1994. Although the father's name does not appear on the decedent's birth certificate, it is undisputed that the decedent was his child and, at birth, received his given name. The petitioner and Sarah Johnson both testified that on the day of the decedent's birth, thethen 17-year-old petitioner and Johnson passed the father on the street while on their way to the hospital and, when they told him that the petitioner was about to give birth, he responded "good luck."
The parties disputed the period of time after the decedent's birth that the petitioner and the father lived together, with the petitioner claiming it was for a month or two and the father's sister claiming it was for a year or two. The petitioner testified that shortly after the decedent's birth, she tried to establish a household with the father but he was largely absent from their home and, therefore, she and the decedent returned to live with her mother. Thereafter, the petitioner moved to various locations in the Bronx and she conceded that she never specifically told the father where she lived. Nonetheless, the entirety of the testimony at the hearing demonstrated that the father could have located the residence of the petitioner and the decedent easily, as the petitioner's mother, the father's mother and Sarah Johnson all knew one another from the neighborhood and church. In fact, Sarah Johnson and the father's mother lived one building away from one another.
The petitioner requested nominal monetary support from the father on only one occasion, when she sought assistance with the cost of the decedent's daycare during a time when the petitioner worked during the day and attended college at night. On that occasion, the father refused to contribute, so the petitioner never asked him for money again. Cynthia Hinds and Stephanie Johnson added that during the decedent's early years, they often saw the father in the neighborhood and on more than one occasion asked him why he did not help the petitioner and the decedent. From time to time during the decedent's infancy and pre-teen years, the decedent, while walking with the petitioner or others, most frequently the petitioner's mother, would pass by a Seventh Avenue street location in Harlem where the father tended to "hang out" and, on those occasions, there was interaction between the decedent and his father. When the decedent reached the age of 12 or 13 years, he went independently to the Seventh Avenue street location to visit his father. A day or two after the decedent was fatally injured, the petitioner saw the father on the street and advised him of the decedent's condition; thereafter, it appears that the father visited the decedent in the hospital until the decedent's death.
Pryor testified on behalf of the objectant that during the first year or two of the decedent's life she saw the decedent and her brother together "weekly" and they were always affectionate toward one another. She also stated that during those years the petitioner's mother brought the decedent to the Seventh Avenue street location where the father could be found. On those occasions, Pryor saw the father give the decedent's maternal grandmother undisclosed sums in cash and purchase sneakers and shirts for the decedent. She also testified that when the decedent reached the age of 12 or 13, he visited his father independently at the Seventh Avenue street location.
Pryor did not know whether the father knew or had the ability to know where the petitioner and the decedent lived. Pryor stated that the father's salary was garnished to provide support for the decedent's half sister, and conceded that the father never provided financial support voluntarily for that child or the decedent. Upon learning that the decedent was injured, Pryor also visited him in the hospital before his death.
In post-trial memoranda of law, the petitioner argues that the evidence demonstrates overwhelmingly that the father is disqualified from sharing in the decedent's estate as he failed to support and abandoned the decedent. In support, the petitioner notes that the occasional gifts of undisclosed amounts of money and clothing items do not constitute support, and abandonment wasdemonstrated by the lack of any meaningful contact between the decedent and the father other than occasional street visits. The objectant counters that the petitioner failed to meet her burden of proving abandonment and failure to support in light of the evidence of the regular street encounters between the decedent and his father, and the money and clothing provided by the father to the maternal grandmother for the decedent. The objectant contends that there was a loving father/son relationship and it was the petitioner who tried to thwart that relationship by failing to keep the father informed about the decedent's whereabouts and involved in the decedent's life.
Pursuant to EPTL 4-1.4 (a) (1), a parent may be disqualified from sharing in the estate of a deceased child where the parent, while the child was under the age of 21, either failed or refused to support the child or abandoned the child (see EPTL 4-1.4 [a] [1]; Matter of Wigfall, 20 Misc 3d 648, 651 [2008]; Matter of Emiro, 5 Misc 3d 1002 [A], 2004 NY Slip Op 51149 [U] [2004]; Matter of Gonzalez, 196 Misc 2d 984, 987 [2003]). As the statutory criteria of EPTL 4-1.4 is set forth in the disjunctive, proof of either will result in disqualification of the parent (see Matter of Wigfall, 20 Misc 3d at 651; Matter of Emiro, 5 Misc 3d at 1002 [A] supra). The disqualification extends to sharing in the settlement proceeds allocated to the cause of...
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