In The Matter Of Jack L. Seelig
| Decision Date | 03 June 2003 |
| Docket Number | D-229 September Term 2001 |
| Citation | 180 N.J. 234,850 A.2d 477 |
| Parties | IN THE MATTER OF JACK L. SEELIG, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Brian D. Gillet, Deputy Ethics Counsel, argued the cause on behalf of the Office of Attorney Ethics.
Michael E. Riley argued the cause for respondent (Riley & Lifrak, attorneys).
Mark Paul Cronin, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae State of New Jersey (Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Mr. Cronin and Russell J. Curley, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Robert S. Bonney, Jr., argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Bonney, Epstein & Gilberti, attorneys; Mr. Bonney and John C. Whipple, on the letter brief).
Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices LONG, VERNIERO, ZAZZALI, ALBIN and WALLACE. Justice LaVECCHIA.
Respondent Jack L. Seelig was admitted to the practice of law in the State of New Jersey in 1972. He has been a certified Criminal Trial Attorney for more than two decades and had not been the subject of disciplinary proceedings before this matter arose. On September 22, 2000, however, the District III-B Ethics Committee (Burlington County) filed a complaint alleging that respondent had violated Rule of Professional Conduct (1984) (RPC) 1.6(b)(2) (); RPC 3.3(a)(1) ();RPC 3.3(a)(5) ();RPC 8.4(c) (); and, RPC 8.4(d) (). 1 The violations asserted in the complaint arose out of certain acts and omissions attributed to respondent during his representation of Jeffrey Poje in an underlying matter involving both motor vehicle offenses and indictable charges. The facts of the Poje case and the conduct of respondent as Poje's attorney are provided insofar as they are necessary for a disposition of the ethics complaint.
On January 1, 1998, at around 2:00 a.m., Jeffrey Poje was driving an automobile that collided with a disabled vehicle being pushed along the right lane of traffic on Route 31 (Pennington Avenue) in Ewing Township. As a result of the accident, the person pushing the vehicle died at the scene and a woman whowas behind the wheel suffered severe injuries. She died two days later on January 3, 1998.
Poje initially fled on foot but then turned himself in that same day. He was arrested and charged by the Mercer County Prosecutor with aggravated manslaughter and death by auto in respect of the deceased victim, and aggravated assault in respect of the injured victim. (When the second victim died, the prosecutor amended the charges to reflect an additional count of aggravated manslaughter and death by auto.) Poje's arraignment hearing also took place on January 1 before Municipal Court Judge William M. Lake of the Ewing Township Municipal Court, after which Poje was transferred to the Mercer County Detention Center. On January 5, 1998, the Superior Court set bail at 0,000. 2
At some point during the week following his arrest, Poje retained respondent as defense counsel. Respondent engaged in discussions about bail and other matters with William Zarling, the Assistant Prosecutor handling the investigation, until January 9 when respondent was informed that Deputy First Assistant Prosecutor Katherine Flicker had assumed responsibility for the prosecution. During the week of January 12, respondent contacted Flicker. Later, they saw one another and discussed bail issues and Poje's prior driving record. At that time, Flicker told respondent that she would "alert him when [her] investigation was completed so that [they] could talk before the case was presented to [a] grand jury." That week, also, on January 15, 1998, the Ewing Township Police Department issued three motor vehicle summonses against Poje for violations ofN.J.S.A. 39:4-96 (reckless driving), N.J.S.A. 39:4-129 (), and N.J.S.A. 39:4-130 (). Each of the three summonses indicated an accident involving personal injury and property damage and listed a court date of February 18, 1998.
Respondent filed a Notice of Representation with the Ewing Township Municipal Court on behalf of Poje, entering pleas of "not guilty" to the motor vehicle charges. The filing further requested transportation for Poje from the Detention Center to the municipal court; however, due to administrative oversight, Poje was not brought to the court on February 18 and the matter was carried over one week. On February 25, 1998, Poje appeared before Judge Lake in prison clothing and represented by respondent. It was customary for the municipal prosecutor handling such cases to meet privately with defense counsel beforehand. As to this matter, each attorney gives a slightly different account of their conversation. The municipal prosecutor remembers asking, "What do you got, Jack?" and hearing in response, "I got someone coming over from the jail." The prosecutor recalls walking away at that point. According to respondent, he also said "[M]y matter, State v. Poje, and my client's pleading guilty to the charges." Respondent claims that the prosecutor then said, "Do you need me?" and that he answered, "No." Respondent never mentioned the indictable offenses filed against Poje and the prosecutor was not aware of them.
Judge Lake called Poje's case when the prosecutor was out of the courtroom and respondent entered a guilty plea on behalf of his client. The court then asked:
After only a short further colloquy related to the imposition of fines, the court accepted the guilty pleas and imposed 0 in fines and in court fees. The court never inquired into the extent of the injuries, never directly addressed Poje to determine whether the plea was knowing and voluntary, and never set forth on therecord the factual basis for the plea as required by Rule 7:6-2(a)(1). And, despite Poje's prison clothing, the court did not even ask why Poje had been incarcerated. For his part, respondent never explained that two people died from the "injuries" caused by the accident.
Judge Lake advised the Mercer County Prosecutor's Office the following day that he had accepted a plea from Poje on the motor vehicle offenses because he had not recognized Poje as the person who had appeared before him earlier on the charges of aggravated manslaughter and death by auto. Directive No. 10-82, issued by the Administrative Director of the Courts on May 3, 1983, instructs the municipal courts in respect of "violation[s] involving a motor vehicle accident resulting in death or serious personal injury." The directive specifically places the responsibility on the municipal court judge or municipal court clerk to notify the County Prosecutor about such violations in order to give the prosecutor an opportunity to consider whether indictable offenses are involved. When the Prosecutor decides to proceed before the grand jury, the municipal court proceedings are stayed unless and until the Prosecutor notifies the municipal court that the grand jury has failed to return an indictment or that the matter has been dismissed.
The acceptance of Poje's guilty plea in contravention of Directive No. 10-82 raises double jeopardy issues in connection with prosecution on the charged indictable offenses. In State v. Dively, this Court held that "Motor Vehicle violations tried in municipal courts are within the category of offenses subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause, "92 N.J. 573, 586, 458 A.2d 502 (1983), and required the entry of a judgment of acquittal on remand to the trial court because the defendant had pleaded guilty to a merged reckless driving/drunk driving charge. Id. at 570, 587, 458 A.2d 502. Directive No. 10-82 was issued to establish a procedure for Id. at 589, 458 A.2d 502. In this instance, the criminal complaint and the motor vehicle complaint against Poje were not cross-referenced to one another. Moreover, an affidavit submitted by the Ewing Township Municipal Court Administrator to the District Ethics Committee indicates that at the time Poje faced motor vehicle charges there were no procedures in place to satisfy the mandates of Directive No. 10-82.
The Mercer County Prosecutor filed a motion on March 5, 1998 to vacate Poje's guilty pleas based on substantial defects in the proceeding that resulted in a...
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In re Seelig
... 850 A.2d 477 180 N.J. 234 In the Matter of Jack L. SEELIG, An Attorney at Law ... Supreme Court of New Jersey ... Argued June 3, 2003 ... Decided June 24, 2004 ... ...
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Censure serves as reminder that zealous advocacy is no excuse for lack of candor toward tribunal
...the court’s misundertsanding to avoid deceiving the court into imposing an improper sentence. The DRB instead pointed to In re Seelig, 180 N.J. 234 (2004), where the Court found an attorney violated Rule 3.3(a)(5) by failing to reveal to the court that the person involved in his client’s au......