In The Matter Of The Dissolution Of The Marriage Of Kelly Drew Wood v. Wood, 2009-CA-00679-SCT.

• Decision Date: 27 May 2010
• Docket Number: No. 2009-CA-00679-SCT.,2009-CA-00679-SCT.
• Citation: 35 So.3d 507
• Parties: In the Matter of the DISSOLUTION OF the MARRIAGE OF Kelly Drew WOOD, Husband, and Melissa Weeks Wood, Wife:Melissa Weeks Wood.v.Kelly Drew Wood.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

35 So.3d 507

In the Matter of the DISSOLUTION OF the MARRIAGE OF Kelly Drew WOOD, Husband, and Melissa Weeks Wood, Wife:

Melissa Weeks Wood.

v.Kelly Drew Wood.

No. 2009-CA-00679-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

May 27, 2010.

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Kristen Wood Williams, Marc D. Amos, Columbus, attorneys for appellant.

Timothy C. Hudson, Columbus, attorney for appellee.

Before WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH and CHANDLER, JJ.

WALLER, Chief Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. Melissa Weeks Wood appeals the Lowndes County Chancery Court's valuation and equitable distribution of a joint retirement savings account. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. Melissa and Kelly Wood were married in 1990 and separated on April 24, 2008. Subsequently, they filed a joint bill for divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. On May 2, 2008, Melissa and Kelly executed an “Agreement Concerning the Custody, Support of and Visitation with Minor Children and Settlement of Property Rights Made in Contemplation of Obtaining a Divorce on the Ground of Irreconcilable Differences” (“the Agreement”). The Agreement included the following provision, at Section VIII(b).

Husband and Wife acknowledge, contract and agree that Wife shall receive the sum of Two Hundred Three Thousand Two Hundred and no/100 Dollars ($203,200.00) from the GGC savings account which has an estimated balance of Three Hundred Seventy[-]Six Thousand

[35 So.3d 507 511]

and no/100 Dollars ($376,000.00). Husband shall receive the sum of One Hundred Seventy[-]Two Thousand Eight Hundred and no/100 Dollars ($172,800.00).¹

The chancellor granted the parties an irreconcilable-differences divorce on August 12, 2008, and incorporated the Agreement into the final “Judgment of Divorce.”

¶ 3. On January 12, 2009, Melissa filed a Motion for Contempt in the trial court. She asserted that “as of the date of filing of this Motion, [the $203,200] had not been paid to [her,]” as required by the Agreement and the final Judgment of Divorce. Melissa averred that she had requested that Kelly transfer the money into her separate IRA account as early as September 2008, but Kelly had refused. Melissa stated that, after Kelly's first refusal, she had told him that she wanted her money by the end of the year (2008), even though she requested the transfer again in November 2008. Melissa prayed that the trial court hold Kelly in contempt and order him to pay her the $203,200.

¶ 4. Kelly responded by filing a “Motion for Clarification.” In it, he asserted that “the decline in this account due to the global economic situation has rendered it impossible to perform as stated in the [divorce decree] due to the fact that the account is substantially lower than three hundred seventy-six thousand dollars ($376,000.00).” Kelly further argued that “the applicable percentages of the account at the time of the divorce was the Wife receiving 54% and the Husband receiving 46%.” Thus, Kelly asked the chancellor to “clarify the aforementioned provision of the Divorce [Judgment] and [have] the Parties divide the current balance of the GGC savings account pursuant to the percentages set forth above.”

¶ 5. A hearing on Melissa's contempt motion was held on March 9, 2009. At the hearing, when asked why he did not transfer the money on August 12, 2008, the date of divorce, Kelly responded that it was impossible for Melissa to receive $203,200 and for Kelly to receive $172,800 as stated in the agreement, because there was not enough money to accomplish this.² Kelly also asserted that he was unaware of the existence of a qualifying account to which to transfer the money, and that he did not receive the appropriate account information to make the transfer until February or March 2009. However, Melissa averred that, when she requested the transfer in September, she had told Kelly that the account information was in the former marital home, where Kelly continued to live.

¶ 6. On March 25, 2009, the chancellor issued his final judgment, ruling in favor of Kelly. The chancellor's analysis, states, in pertinent part, that:

Kelly argues that it was always the intent of the parties that Melissa receive 54% of the account, and he 46%. He argues that these percentages should still apply no matter what amount is in the account. He further argues it was not the parties intent that the one party get all of the funds[,] which is essentially what would happen if Melissa were to

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receive the full amount of $203,200.00 at this point.³

This Court is inclined to agree with Kelly. Exhibit P4 clearly shows that Kelly was to receive 46% of the subject account.⁴ Furthermore, Melissa did not establish to this Court's satisfaction that she provided the necessary information to effect the roll over until 2009, after the current litigation began. Finally, this is a Court of equity and it would be patently unfair for Kelly to be the sole bearer of the stock market losses, a situation that was beyond either parties' control.

Thus, the chancellor ordered that “Kelly shall transfer to Melissa's account 54% of any monies therein as of April 1, 2009[, and] Kelly shall retain the remaining 46%.” Melissa filed an unsuccessful Motion for a New Trial or, Alternatively, to Amend Judgment.

¶ 7. Melissa timely appealed the chancellor's “clarification” of the divorce judgment on April 23, 2009. On appeal, Melissa argues that: (1) the property settlement agreement was a valid, unambiguous contract which was not subject to modification or clarification by the chancery court; (2) alternatively, even if the agreement was subject to contract interpretation, the documentary evidence showed that the parties intended to divide the GGC account according to specific dollar amounts, not percentages of the balance therein; and (3) alternatively, even if the parties intended to divide the account according to percentages, those percentages should have been calculated as of the date of divorce, on August 12, 2008, as opposed to April 1, 2009.⁵

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8. We employ a limited standard of review in domestic relations cases. “This Court will not disturb the findings of a chancellor when supported by substantial evidence unless the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied.” Duncan v. Duncan, 774 So.2d 418, 419 (Miss.2000) (citing Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 732 So.2d 876, 880 (Miss.1999)). “Under the standard of review utilized to review a chancery court's findings of fact, particularly in the areas of divorce, alimony and child support, this Court will not overturn the court on appeal unless its findings were manifestly wrong.” Id. For questions of law, our standard of review is de novo. Id. (citing Consol. Pipe & Supply Co. v. Colter, 735 So.2d 958, 961 (Miss.1999)).

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF LAW

I. Whether the chancellor erred in modifying or reforming the contract by applying the percentages, as opposed to the specific dollar amounts.

¶ 9. Because they are intertwined, Melissa's first two asserted errors

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will be discussed together. This Court historically has recognized that a property settlement agreement “is no different from any other contract, and the mere fact that it is between a divorcing husband and wife, and incorporated in a divorce decree, does not change its character.” Townsend v. Townsend, 859 So.2d 370, 376 (Miss.2003) (quoting East v. East, 493 So.2d 927, 931-32 (Miss.1986)). This Court uses a three-tiered approach to contract interpretation. Put simply, step one is to look to the four corners of the agreement to attempt to translate a clear understanding of the parties' intent; only if that intent remains illusive may a court apply the canons of contract construction or turn to parol evidence. Harris v. Harris, 988 So.2d 376, 378-79 (Miss.2008) (citing Tupelo Redev. Agency v. Abernathy, 913 So.2d 278, 283 (Miss.2005)). “[I]t is a question of law for the court to determine whether a contract is ambiguous. In the event of an ambiguity, the subsequent interpretation presents a question of fact for the trier of fact which we review under a substantial evidence/manifest error standard.” Harris, 988 So.2d at 378. “Where terms of a contract are ambiguous, the contract will be interpreted in a reasonable manner.” Id.

¶ 10. By agreeing with Kelly, the chancellor found that the contract was ambiguous with respect to the parties' intent regarding how the account should be divided. Thus, the chancellor found that, at the time they entered into the Agreement, Melissa and Kelly intended that, regardless of the account's value, Melissa would receive 54% of the account's balance, and Kelly would retain 46%, instead of the specific dollar amounts stated in the Agreement.

¶ 11. We cannot say that the chancellor erred in reaching this conclusion. The specific dollar amounts given in Section VIII(b) of the Agreement were expressly based on an estimate of the GGC account's balance. But that estimate turned out to be incorrect at the time of the divorce, when the Agreement became effective. The Agreement thus indicates that, by incorporating an estimate into the Agreement and basing their respective shares of the account on that estimate, Kelly and Melissa essentially intended to divide the GGC account according to an indefinite and fluctuating account balance. As such, Section VIII(b) did not clearly specify the parties' intentions with respect to the distribution of the account, so it was ambiguous. Hence, the chancellor was free to apply the canons of contract construction and consider parol evidence to determine the meaning of Section VIII(b). One canon of contract construction is that “uncertainties should be resolved against the party who prepared the instrument.” Pursue Energy Corp. v. Perkins, 558 So.2d 349, 352-53 (Miss.1990) (citing Clark v. Carter, 351 So.2d 1333, 1334 & 1336 (Miss.1977)). Here, Melissa's attorney drafted the Agreement, so...