In the Matter of Morris Strauss
| Citation | 49 L.Ed. 774,197 U.S. 324,25 S.Ct. 535 |
| Decision Date | 03 April 1905 |
| Docket Number | No. 186,186 |
| Parties | IN THE MATTER OF MORRIS STRAUSS |
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
The petitioner was charged by affidavit before a justice of the peace of Youngstown township, Ohio, with the crime of obtaining $400 worth of jewelry at Youngstown, Ohio, by false pretenses, contrary to the law of that state. He was arrested as a fugitive from justice and brought before a magistrate of the city of New York, August 11, 1902. The governor of New York, after a hearing, at which the accused was represented by counsel, issued his warrant, dated August 22, 1902, directed to the police commissioner of New York city, directing him to arrest the accused and deliver him to the duly accredited agent of Ohio, to be taken to that state.
The warrant recites that it has been represented by the governor of Ohio that the accused stands charged in that state of the crime of securing property by false pretenses, which is a crime under its law, and that he has fled from that state. It also recites that the requisition was accompanied by affidavits and other papers, duly certified by the governor of Ohio to be authentic, charging the accused with having committed the said crime, and with having fled from Ohio and taken refuge in the state of New York.
On the 29th of August, after the arrest of the petitioner, a writ of habeas corpus was allowed by the district court. The police commissioner made return that he held the accused by virtue of the governor's warrant. On September 16, 1902, the district court discharged the writ and remanded the accused to the custody of the police commissioner. This order was taken on appeal to the circuit court of appeals of the second circuit, which certified the following questions:
Article 4, § 2, subd. 2, of the Constitution reads:
'A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime.'
Revised Statutes, § 5278, so far as is material, is:
'Whenever the executive authority of any state or territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any state or territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any state or territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the state or territory from whence the person so charged has fled, it shall be the duty of the executive authority of the state or territory to which such person has fled to cause him to be arrested and secured, and to cause notice of the arrest to be given to the executive authority making such demand, or to the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and to cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear.'
Messrs. Max J. Kohler and Moses H. Grossman for Strauss.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 326-328 intentionally omitted] Messrs.Howard S. Gans and William Travers Jerome for respondent.
The Constitution provides for the surrender of a person charged with treason, felony, or other crime. The statute prescribes the evidence of the charge to be produced, to wit: 'A copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate . . . charging . . . treason, felony, or other crime.' The offense for which extradition was sought is, under the Ohio statute, a felony (Bates' Anno. Stat. Ohio 4th ed. § 7076), and subject to trial only upon an indictment (Ohio Const. art. 1, § 10, Bill of Rights), the proceedings in such a case before a justice of the peace being only preliminary and for the purpose of securing arrest and detention. It is contended that the constitutional provision for the extradition of persons 'charged with treason, felony, or other crime' requires that the charge must be pending in a court that can try the defendant, and does not include one before a committing magistrate, who can only discharge or hold for trial before another tribunal.
But why should the word 'charged' be given a restricted interpretation? It is found in the Constitution, and ordinarily words in such an instrument do not receive a narrow, contracted meaning, but are presumed to have been used in a broad sense, with a view of covering all contingencies. In M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579, one question discussed was as to the meaning of the word 'necessary,' as found in the clause of the Constitution giving to Congress power 'to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.' Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the court, said (p. 415, L. ed. p. 603):
'This word, then, like others, is used in various senses; and, in its construction, the subject, the context, the intention of the person using them, are all to be taken into view.
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