In the Matter of Nicholas Lucien Metzger

• Decision Date: 01 January 1847
• Citation: 5 How. 176,46 U.S. 176,12 L.Ed. 104
• Parties: IN THE MATTER OF NICHOLAS LUCIEN METZGER
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

46 U.S. 176

5 How. 176

12 L.Ed. 104

IN THE MATTER OF NICHOLAS LUCIEN METZGER.

January Term, 1847

Mr. Coxe moved for a habeas corpus, according to the following petition, which he read, and also the decision of the judge below.

'To the Honorable, the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:——

'The petition of Nicholas Lucien Metzger respectfully sheweth.—That he is restrained from his liberty, and is now a prisoner in jail, and under the custody of the marshal of the Southern District for the State of New York, and that he has been committed to such jail and custody, and is now confined and detained therein, under and by virtue of a warrant and order of the Hon. Samuel R. Betts, district judge for the Southern District of New York, as an alleged fugitive from justice, pursuant to the provisions of the convention signed between the United States and the French government, on the 9th of November, 1843.

'That annexed hereto is a copy of the order, under and by virtue of which your petitioner has been apprehended and committed, and is now detained in custody.

'Wherefore, your petitioner prays, that a writ of habeas corpus may issue from this honorable court, to be directed to the marshal of the Southern District of the State of New York, or to such other persons as may hold or detain your petitioner under and by virtue of said order, commanding him or them to have the body of your petitioner before this honorable court, at such time as in said writ may be specified, for the purpose of inquiring into the cause of commitment of your petitioner, and to do and abide such order as this honorable court may make in the premises.

'And your petitioner will ever pray, &c.

METZGER.

'Sworn to before me, this 20th day of January, 1847.

GEORGE W. MORTON,

United States Commissioner for the Southern District of New York.'

'In the Matter of Nicholas Lucien Metzger:——

'This case having been heard before me, on requisition through the diplomatic agents of the French government that the said Metzger be apprehended and committed for the purpose of being delivered up as a fugitive from justice, pursuant to the provisions of the convention signed between the United States and the French government on the 9th of November, 1843:

'And exceptions having been taken by the counsel of the said Metzger, in his behalf, to the competency of a judge of the United States to take cognizance of the subject-matter, and to the sufficiency of the evidence to justify any judicial action under the treaty:

'And these exceptional objections being fully argued before me by Messrs. Blunt and Hoffman, of counsel for Metzger, and by Messrs. Tillon and Cutting in support of the requisition, and by Mr. Butler, United States Attorney, on the part of the United States (in respect to the jurisdiction of the judge, and the period the treaty went into operation):

'I find and adjudge, that a judge of the United States has competent authority, under the laws of the United States now in force, to take cognizance of this case, and to order the apprehension and commitment of the accused, pursuant to the provisions of the said treaty.

'I further adjudge, that the said treaty took effect and went into operation on and from the day of the signature thereof.

'I further adjudge, that the laws of France are to determine the constituents of the crime of forgery, or 'du faur', of which Metzger is accused, and that the facts in evidence adequately prove the commission of that crime by him in France, since the date of the treaty.

'I further find and adjudge, that Metzger is, within the meaning and description of the treaty, a person accused, 'individual accused,' of the crime of forgery, or 'du faux,' named in the treaty, and therefore subject to apprehension and commitment under our laws, pursuant to the provisions of the treaty.

'And I find and adjudge, that the evidence produced against the said Metzger is sufficient in law to justify his apprehension and commitment on the charge of forgery, had the crime been committed within the United States.

'Wherefore I order, that the said Nicholas Lucien Metzger be apprehended and committed, pursuant to the provisions of the said treaty, to abide the order of the President of the United States in the premises.

'Given under my hand and seal at the city of New York, this nineteenth day of January, one thousand eight hundred and forty-seven.

(Signed,) SAMUEL R. BETTS,

Judge of the United States for the Southern District of New York.'

[L. S.]

The case was argued by Mr. Coxe, on behalf of the petitioner, and by the Attorney-General (Mr. Clifford) and Mr. Jones, in opposition to the motion.

Mr. Coxe, for the motion.

In conveying the intimation that the court would hear an argument on behalf of the petitioner, no suggestion was thrown out as to the points to which counsel were desired to address themselves under these circumstances. What fell from the bench conveyed merely the idea that doubts were entertained by the court, but it conveyed no intelligence as to the character of these doubts, to what part of the case they extended, or whether they embraced the substantial merits of the petitioner's case, or were limited to the form and language in which the application was presented.

Had the posture of the case permitted the court to adopt a practice which has on many occasions heretofore prevailed when similar applications have been made, and grant a rule upon the United States, or those who represent the French government, to show cause why the prayer of the petitioner should not be granted, it would have relieved his counsel from much embarrassment. The grounds upon which the application was to be resisted would have been distinctly announced, and full opportunity would have been afforded to meet, and, if practicable, to answer them. In the situation, however, in which the case then stood, ignorant whether either government felt any such interest in the proceeding as would induce it to intervene by a direct opposition to the motion which was submitted, it would scarcely have been proper for me to have suggested, or for the court to have sanctioned, the adoption of such a course.

At the same time, the appearance of counsel to resist the application only augments the difficulties of the position I occupy. Whatever may have been the origin of the doubts entertained on the bench, it by no means follows that the learning and abilities of counsel may not multiply and increase the number, as well as weight, of these objections. Placed, therefore, in this predicament by the very nature of the case, it imposes upon me the necessity of pursuing a course between two opposing difficulties, of neither undertaking to anticipate, and attempting to answer by anticipation, the views and arguments of my learned friends, or of failing to exhibit a prim a facie case at least calling for the interposition of this court.

Reserving, therefore, the privilege of answering the objections which may be urged against my application, I proceed briefly to state the grounds upon which reliance is placed to sustain it.

The petition, then, alleges, that the party on whose behalf and in whose name it is presented is now in actual confinement in jail, in the custody of the marshal of the Southern District of New York, by whom he is thus held and restrained by virtue of an order or warrant of commitment, issued and signed by the Hon. Samuel R. Betts, district judge of the Southern District of New York. It appears that this warrant of commitment is a process utterly unknown to the common law or statute law of the United States. It is not for the purpose of bringing the accused to trial before any court of the Union, for any offence committed against the laws of the United States, or triable before any of its courts; it is not for the purpose of enforcing any responsibility in the shape of a debt due to any creditor, for the violation or breach of any contract, or to answer to any allegation of a tort of which those courts have cognizance; nor is it in the nature of an execution to compel the prisoner to respond to any process in the nature of an execution upon any judgment rendered against him by any court of the United States, or in the nature of an attachment for any contempt committed against such tribunal.

All this is fully set forth in the petition, and in the order of commitment annexed to it. The object, therefore, of the writ now sued for is, to enable this court to pronounce its judgment upon the lawfulness of such an imprisonment, and upon the authority under which it has been made.

The simple fact that such imprisonment exists under color and pretence of right presents a prim a facie case warranting the application now made, and the language of the constitution and statutes of the United States, taken in connection with the reiterated judgments of this court asserting its power, and actually exercising the judisdication and authority now invoked, would seem clearly to establish prim a facie a right in the petitioner to have the benefit of this high prerogative writ. If there is any ground of objection, growing out of the circumstances of the case, which destroys this prim a facie presumption as to the facts, they are to be found in the peculiar characteristics of those circumstances which attend the arrest of the petitioner; if any to meet the legal authorities upon which we rely, they must in consequence of these circumstances be held inapplicable to the case under consideration.

The points which are thus presented for the adjudication of this court are,——

1. Whether the facts as presented exhibit a proper case for the awarding of a writ of habeas corpus.

2. Whether, if such be the case, this court has authority and jurisdiction over it.

1. As to the facts. It is understood that an application was made to the executive, by the minister representing the French government, for the...