In the Matter of T.J.B., 2010 MT 116 (Mont. 5/25/2010)

• Decision Date: 25 May 2010
• Docket Number: No. DA 09-0490.,DA 09-0490.
• Citation: 2010 MT 116
• Parties: IN THE MATTER OF T.J.B., A Youth Under the Age of Eighteen.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

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2010 MT 116

IN THE MATTER OF T.J.B., A Youth Under the Age of Eighteen.

No. DA 09-0490.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs: March 17, 2010.

Decided: May 25, 2010.

Appeal from: Youth Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DJ 09-29, Honorable Robert L. Deschamps, III, Presiding Judge.

For Appellant: Joslyn Hunt, Chief Appellate Defender; Eric Bunn, Assistant Appellate Defender; Helena, Montana.

For Appellee: Hon. Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General; Jonathan M. Krauss, Assistant Attorney General; Helena, Montana.

Fred R. Van Valkenburg, Missoula County Attorney; Dori Brownlow, Deputy County Attorney; Missoula, Montana.

Justice BRIAN MORRIS delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 T.J.B. appeals from an order of the Youth Court for the Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County, adjudicating him as a serious delinquent youth, and committing himto the custody of the Department of Corrections until he reaches the age of 18. We affirm.

¶2 We review the following issues on appeal:

¶3 Did the Youth Court violate the Confrontation Clause when it denied T.J.B.'s motion in limine?

¶4 Did the Youth Court properly deny T.J.B.'s motion for a directed verdict?

¶5 Did the Youth Court properly refuse T.J.B.'s proposed jury instruction?

¶6 Did sufficient evidence support the Youth Court's jury instruction on serious bodily injury?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶7 T.J.B. and several of his friends engaged in numerous acts of vandalism in Missoula over the course of two weeks in February 2009. T.J.B. and his friends "hung out" and drank together. They drove around Missoula smashing car windows. They accomplished much of the damage by shooting car windows with BB guns. T.J.B. and his friends took turns shooting from the front passenger seat. Sometimes they would shoot at parked cars as they drove past. Other times they would get out, walk up to the parked car, and shoot the windows. They would decide at random whether to shoot at a parked car.

¶8 T.J.B. and his friends also shot the windows of businesses and schools, and sometimes used rocks or metal pipe to break the windows. T.J.B. and his friend J.F. also stole a car stereo from one of the cars that they had vandalized. T.J.B. estimated that he and his friends broke between seventy-five and one hundred windows during their vandalism spree. T.J.B. occasionally shot at moving vehicles, and on at least one occasion, he shot at a pedestrian. T.J.B. and J.F. stole spray paint, food, beer, and later a BB gun from Wal-Mart. They used the stolen paint to "tag" graffiti at the skate park and at other locations around Missoula.

¶9 Detectives conducted a videotaped interview with T.J.B. on February 20, 2009. Detectives arrested T.J.B. after the interview. The State filed a petition in which it alleged that T.J.B. was a delinquent youth. The State alleged that T.J.B. had committed the offenses of felony conspiracy to commit criminal mischief by common scheme, felony criminal endangerment, misdemeanor criminal mischief, and misdemeanor theft.

¶10 The investigating officers testified at trial subject to cross-examination by T.J.B. The State played the videotape of T.J.B.'s interview at trial. T.J.B. did not object. T.J.B. did object to ten "statements" contained in the interview questions. T.J.B. asserted that these statements constituted hearsay because they were attributable to witnesses who were not testifying at trial and therefore who would not be subject to cross-examination. T.J.B. claimed that the introduction of the statements would violate his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him.

¶11 The Youth Court admitted eight of the ten statements that did not constitute hearsay or that T.J.B. had adopted, affirmed, or admitted. The Youth Court initially sustained T.J.B's objection to the remaining two statements because T.J.B. had denied them and the declarant was not scheduled to testify at trial. The Youth Court reversed its initial ruling after the declarant, J.F., testified.

¶12 T.J.B. moved to dismiss the conspiracy charges at the close of the State's case based upon insufficient evidence. The Youth Court found the record to be "replete with evidence of conspiracy." The Youth Court refused T.J.B.'s proffered jury instruction on negligent endangerment as a lesser included offense of criminal endangerment. The Youth Court instead instructed the jury on criminal endangerment and the definition of "serious bodily injury" over T.J.B.'s objection.

¶13 The jury returned a unanimous verdict. The jury found that T.J.B. had committed all of the offenses with which the State had charged him. The Youth Court adjudicated T.J.B. as a delinquent youth and serious juvenile offender. The court committed T.J.B. to the Pine Hills Youth Correctional Facility until his eighteenth birthday. T.J.B. appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶14 We review a court's evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion. State v. Mizenko, 2006 MT 11, ¶ 8, 330 Mont. 299, 127 P.3d 458. A court possesses no discretion, however, in the correct interpretation of the Sixth Amendment. Id. (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1359). We review de novo a court's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment. Id.

¶15 We review de novo a court's denial of a motion for a new trial on sufficiency of evidence grounds. State v. Jackson, 2009 MT 427, ¶ 23, 354 Mont. 63, 221 P.3d 1213. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury, and we will assume every fact that the jury could have deduced from the evidence. Id.

¶16 We review jury instructions in their entirety to determine whether the instructions, taken as a whole, fully and fairly presented the applicable law to the jury. State v. Schmidt, 2009 MT 450, ¶ 26, 354 Mont. 280, 224 P.3d 618. The trial court has broad discretion in formulating jury instructions. Id. The instructions must affect prejudicially the appellant's substantial rights to constitute reversible error. Id.

DISCUSSION

¶17 Did the Youth Court violate the Confrontation Clause when it denied T.J.B.'s motion in limine?

¶18 T.J.B. filed a motion in limine to prevent any mention of portions of the interviewthat referred to the statements of suspects who were not scheduled to testify at trial. T.J.B. argues on appeal that the Youth Court's admission of ten "statements" taken from his interviewwith police officers violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. The ability to cross-examine a witness represents the cornerstone of a defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him. See State v. Sanchez, 2008 MT 27, ¶ 32, 341 Mont. 240, 177 P.3d 444. This rule does not apply to non-hearsay statements, however, or to hearsay statements made by a declarant who is available for cross-examination at trial. UnitedStates v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 966 (9^th Cir. 2007).

¶19 The Youth Court initially admitted eight of the statements after determining that they did not constitute inadmissible hearsay. The court determined that a number of the statements constituted adoptive admissions. A party's own statement, or one in which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, does not qualify as hearsay. M. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A), (B). This Court addressed the issue of whether a defendant has adopted the statement of another for purposes of Rule 801(d)(2)(B) in State v. McCollom, 2009 MT 257, 323 Mont. 10, 214 P.3d 1230, and State v. Widenhofer, 286 Mont. 341, 950 P.2d 1383 (1997).

¶20 This Court in Widenhofer determined that a suspect had not adopted a statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(B) where the suspect had entered a patrol car at the officer's request, had not heard the initial statement, and had not responded to the officer's question about the statement. In McCollom, we applied a Sixth Circuit test articulated in U.S. v. Jinadu, 98 F.3d 239, 244 (6th Cir. 1996). The Sixth Circuit determined that a criminal defendant's"yes" answer to an officer's question about the contents of a package containing drugs constituted sufficient evidence to determine that the defendant had "heard, understood, and acquiesced in the statement." Jinadu at 244.

¶21 The purported adoption at issue in McCollum involved an equivocal statement by the defendant — who was intoxicated at the time — that another suspect's statement that McCollum had started a fire "possibly" could be true. McCollum, ¶ 25. McCollum equivocated and asserted repeatedly that he had been extremely intoxicated and could not remember the incident. Like the defendant in Widenhofer, McCollum had not heard the suspect's statement to the officer and the officer had recounted only portions of his conversation with the suspect. McCollum never affirmatively agreed with the officer's statements. McCollum stated only that the other suspect was generally a trustworthy and honest person and that it was "possible" that McCollum had lit the fire about which he was being questioned. Id. at ¶ 14. We determined that insufficient facts existed to support the requirement under Jinadu that McCollum had "heard, understood, and acquiesced in the statement." Id. at ¶ 26.

¶22 The statements that T.J.B. challenges do not present the same ambiguity. The interviewing officer asked T.J.B. if he had been at a party. T.J.B. indicated that he did not remember, but agreed that the statements of other suspects placing him at the party were likely to be correct. The officer asked "so you were with them if they said you were?" T.J.B. answered, "yes, sir." The officer further inquired whether T.J.B. had been breaking windows with the other suspects, and T.J.B. answered, "yes, sir." The officer asked T.J.B. how he could remember having broken...