In the Matter of The Marriage of J.B. And H.B. In Re State

Citation326 S.W.3d 654
Decision Date08 December 2010
Docket NumberNo. 05-09-01170-CV.,05-09-01170-CV.
PartiesIn the Matter of the MARRIAGE OF J.B. AND H.B. In re State of Texas, Relator.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
326 S.W.3d 654

In the Matter of the MARRIAGE OF J.B. AND H.B.
In re State of Texas, Relator.


No. 05-09-01170-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas,
Dallas.


Aug. 31, 2010.
Supplemental Opinion on Denial of En Ban Reconsideration Dec. 8, 2010.

326 S.W.3d 658

James C. Ho, Solicitor General, Reed N. Smith, James D. Blacklock, Office of Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Appellant.

Peter A. Schulte, Schulte & Apgar, PLLC, J. Carl Cecere, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., Dallas, TX, James Scheske, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., Austin, TX, for Appellee.

Jeffrey C. Mateer, Hiram S. Sasser, III, Erin E. Leu, Plano, for Other.

Before Justices BRIDGES, FITZGERALD, and FILLMORE.

OPINION

Opinion By Justice FITZGERALD.

Does a Texas district court have subject-matter jurisdiction over a divorce case arising from a same-sex marriage that occurred

326 S.W.3d 659
in Massachusetts? The trial court held that it had jurisdiction and that article I, section 32(a) of the Texas Constitution and section 6.204 of the Texas Family Code, which limit marriage to opposite-sex couples, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We hold that Texas district courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a same-sex divorce case. Texas's laws compelling this result do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order and remand with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We also conditionally grant the State's petition for writ of mandamus to correct the trial court's erroneous striking of the State's petition in intervention.

I. Background

Appellee filed a petition for divorce in Dallas County in which he sought a divorce from H.B., whom appellee alleged to be his husband. Appellee alleged that he and H.B. were lawfully married in Massachusetts in September 2006 and moved to Texas in 2008. Appellee further alleged that he and H.B. "ceased to live together as husband and husband" in November 2008.

Appellee alleged in his divorce petition that there are no children of the marriage, born or adopted, and he requested a division of community property if a property-division agreement could not be reached. He prayed for a divorce, that his last name be changed back to his original last name, and "for general relief." The record contains no answer by H.B.

A few days after appellee filed suit, the State intervened in the action "as a party respondent to oppose the Petition for Divorce and defend the constitutionality of Texas and federal law." The Texas laws in question are article I, section 32(a) of the Texas Constitution and section 6.204 of the Texas Family Code. The federal law in question is the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.1 The State alleged that appellee is not a party to a "marriage" under Texas law, that he is therefore not eligible for the remedy of divorce, and that the trial court cannot grant a divorce without violating Texas law. At the end of its petition in intervention, the State prayed for dismissal of the petition for divorce.

Several weeks later, the State filed a plea to the jurisdiction in which it asserted, inter alia, that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because appellee's petition demonstrated on its face that he and H.B. were not "married" as a matter of Texas law. The State asserted that section 6.204(c) of the family code "strips courts of jurisdiction" to confer the legal status of marriage upon any relationship besides the union of one man and one woman—even if only for the purpose of granting a divorce.

The trial court denied the State's plea to the jurisdiction without a hearing. In its order, the court concluded that article I, section 32(a) of the Texas Constitution and section 6.204 of the family code violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It further concluded that it

326 S.W.3d 660
had jurisdiction "to hear a suit for divorce filed by persons legally married in another jurisdiction and who meet the residency and other prerequisites required to file for divorce in Dallas County, Texas." It ordered "that Intervenor's Plea to the Jurisdiction is denied and that the Intervention filed by the Office of the Attorney General is hereby stricken." The State filed its notice of interlocutory appeal the day after the trial court signed the order. A few days later, the State filed its Conditional Petition for Writ of Mandamus in this Court seeking relief from the part of the trial court's order striking its petition in intervention.

Within twenty days after the court signed the order, appellee filed a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. The State opposed the request. A few weeks later, the trial court signed both a set of findings of fact and conclusions of law and an amended order denying the State's plea to the jurisdiction. In the amended order, the court made no reference to article I, section 32 of the Texas Constitution, concluded that section 6.204 of the family code violated several provisions of the federal Constitution in addition to the Equal Protection Clause, and concluded that the State lacked both constitutional and statutory authority to intervene. The amended order concluded, "Therefore, the State's Plea to the Jurisdiction is denied and the Intervention filed by the Office of the Attorney General is hereby stricken."

We have consolidated the State's mandamus proceeding with its interlocutory appeal.

II. Mandamus Relief From Order Striking Intervention

To obtain mandamus relief from the order striking its intervention, the State must meet two requirements. It must show that the trial court clearly abused its discretion and that the State has no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex.2004) (orig.proceeding); see also Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex.1992) (orig.proceeding). In its mandamus petition, the State contends that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by striking the State's intervention sua sponte and without sufficient cause. The State further contends that its remedy by appeal is inadequate.

We agree with the State that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by striking the State's intervention sua sponte. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 60 provides, "Any party may intervene by filing a pleading, subject to being stricken out by the court for sufficient cause on the motion of any party." Tex.R. Civ. P. 60 (emphasis added). The court abuses its discretion by striking an intervention in the absence of a motion to strike. Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 793 S.W.2d 652, 657 (Tex.1990); Prototype Mach. Co. v. Boulware, 292 S.W.3d 169, 172 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2009, no pet.); Ghidoni v. Stone Oak, Inc., 966 S.W.2d 573, 586 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied) (en banc); Flores v. Melo-Palacios, 921 S.W.2d 399, 404 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied). Because appellee did not file a motion to strike the State's intervention, the trial court clearly abused its discretion.

The foregoing analysis also disposes of appellee's argument that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by striking the State's intervention because the office of the attorney general has no justiciable interest in the case. Lack of a justiciable interest to intervene must be raised by a motion to strike or the defense is waived.

326 S.W.3d 661
Bryant v. United Shortline Inc. Assur. Servs., N.A., 972 S.W.2d 26, 31 (Tex.1998); see also Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank, 793 S.W.2d at 657. Thus, appellee cannot defend the trial court's action by arguing that the State (which is the actual intervenor, not the office of the attorney general) lacks a justiciable interest in the case.

We also agree with the State that it has no adequate remedy by appeal. This second prong of the test for mandamus relief has no comprehensive definition but calls for "the careful balance of jurisprudential considerations." In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d at 136. "When the benefits outweigh the detriments, appellate courts must consider whether the appellate remedy is adequate." Id. The detriments of mandamus review can include undue interference with trial-court proceedings, diversion of appellate-court attention to issues that are not important to the litigation or the development of the law, and increase in expense to the parties. Id. But mandamus review may yield benefits as well:

Mandamus review of significant rulings in exceptional cases may be essential to preserve important substantive and procedural rights from impairment or loss, allow the appellate courts to give needed and helpful direction to the law that would otherwise prove elusive in appeals from final judgments, and spare private parties and the public the time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal of improperly conducted proceedings.
Id. The balancing of detriments and benefits is practical and prudential. Id.

In this case, the benefits of mandamus review outweigh the detriments. This is an exceptional case that involves not only basic principles of subject-matter jurisdiction but also the constitutionality of Texas's laws concerning marriage. The trial court's order striking the State's petition in intervention potentially interferes with the State's important right to be heard on the constitutionality of its statutes and its statutory right to pursue an interlocutory appeal of the denial of its plea to the jurisdiction. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 37.006(b) (Vernon 2008) (requiring attorney general to be given notice of any proceeding in which a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional); id. § 51.014(a)(8) (authorizing interlocutory appeal from denial of plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit); see also Wilson v. Andrews, 10 S.W.3d 663, 666 (Tex.1999) (attorney general intervened to defend statute, moved for summary judgment, and pursued...

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