Ind. Dep't of Natural Res. v. Houin
| Decision Date | 14 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 21A-CC-1178 |
| Citation | 191 N.E.3d 241 |
| Parties | INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, Appellant-Defendant, v. Marvin HOUIN, Diane Houin, Charles Houin, Houin Grain Farms, LLC, and Marvin Houin as power of attorney for Marilyn J. Ralston, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorneys for Appellant: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Benjamin M.L. Jones, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Todd J. Janzen, Brianna J. Schroeder, Janzen Schroeder Agricultural, Law LLC, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] The Indiana Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") appeals the Marshall Circuit Court's order awarding damages to Marvin, Diane, and Charles Houin, Houin Grain Farms, LLC, and Marvin Houin as power of attorney for Marilyn Ralston (collectively "the Houins") after concluding that the DNR negligently operated a dam causing the Houins’ farm property to flood.
The trial court also concluded that the Houins proved their inverse condemnation claim against the DNR.
[2] The DNR appeals and raises several issues. Regarding the negligence judgment, we address only the following, dispositive issue: whether the DNR is immune from liability on the Houins’ negligence claims. We conclude that our General Assembly has granted immunity to the DNR where damages result from its operation of a dam on a public Indiana lake.
[3] The DNR also argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that its operation of the dam, which caused the Houins’ farm property to flood, constituted a taking of the Houins’ property. We disagree and affirm the trial court's ruling on the Houins’ inverse condemnation claim.
[4] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[5] Marvin and Diane Houin, together, and with their son Charlie Houin, own and operate Houin Grain Farms. The farm is approximately 4,890 acres and spread out over a thirty-five-mile radius.1 The Houins grow corn and soybeans on eight fields totaling 407 acres located in the Lake of the Woods watershed (hereinafter "the affected fields").
[6] Lake of the Woods is a public, freshwater lake located in Marshall County, Indiana. The lake is surrounded by residential waterfront homes. A higher water level is more advantageous for the property owners and the boating public. Because the affected fields and the Lake of the Woods are located in a relatively flat plain with little elevation change between the fields and the lake, a change in the level of the water of the lake impedes the drainage of the affected fields following a rain event. A lower lake level is thus more advantageous for the Houins’ farming operation. The "tolerances for the connectivity between precipitation, infiltration, drainage, and the lake levels are very small." Appellant's App. p. 34.
[7] To address the tension between the residential property owners and the agricultural property owners, a dam was constructed in 1957 at the sole outlet of the lake. Due to continued conflict, in 1986, the Marshall Circuit Court issued an order setting the legal average lake level at 803.85 feet from May 15 to September 15. From September 15 to May 15, the legal average lake level was set at 802.85 feet. The court's order required the DNR to repair or rebuild the dam so that it could be operated by third parties at the court-ordered lake levels. When the dam is not operated to maintain a legal summer average of 803.85, the affected fields cannot be drained as designed and intended. Appellant's App. pp. 34-35. The Lake Level Order did not require DNR to operate the dam.
[8] Operation of the dam is manually controlled. The controls are locked with two padlocks, which must both be removed to raise or lower the dam. Traditionally, a representative of the agricultural community and a representative of the residential lake property owners each held a key. The representatives would meet at the same time to raise or lower the dam to achieve the legal water level. The DNR provided the locks and keys and kept a set of keys to the dam.
[9] For many years, the agricultural community and residential property owners cooperated and operated the dam and maintained the legal water level. The average water level of the lake during the summer months was maintained at 803.85 feet. As a result, the field tile system installed in the affected fields worked as designed to drain the soil allowing for crops to be planted and harvested. The affected fields were successfully row cropped through 2009.
[10] In 2005, the residential lake property owners decided they no longer wanted responsibility for opening and closing the dam. The DNR assumed their responsibilities. In 2009, the DNR posted the following notice at the dam: "Effective immediately it is the intent of the IDNR to leave the gate closed until the mandated opening date of September 15, 2009 unless the lake level elevation exceeds 804.35.’ At 804.35’ the gate will be opened to draw down the lake level to 803.85." Appellant's App. p. 28. The same notice was posted in 2015. Id. at 29. The DNR's changed operation of the dam was not compliant with the 1986 Lake Level Order.
[11] The DNR regulates access to the dam. The DNR installed a fence in its easement around the dam. The DNR also installed a chain link fence around the dam which is locked with a padlock. Therefore, to access the dam, a person needs a key to open the padlocked fence and the two keys needed to operate the dam. DNR makes and possesses the keys but also give keys to selected local residents.
[12] The Houins’ fields flooded in multiple years due to the DNR's noncompliant operation of the dam. As a result of the higher lake level, the Houins’ drainage tile system was no longer adequate to drain the fields within one or two days. The Houins told the DNR that the higher lake level negatively impacted their ability to farm the affected fields. The DNR told the Houins that it would keep the dam closed until the water level rose to 804.35 feet regardless of weather conditions. The DNR also stated that it would instruct the keyholders on how and when to operate the dam. "There was no benefit to this trigger level other than saving DNR staff time." Appellant's App. p. 32.
[13] On April 27, 2016, the Houins filed a Tort Claim Notice with the State claiming damages because the DNR did not operate the dam under the terms set by the Marshall Circuit Court's 1986 Lake Level Order. Specifically, the Houins alleged that the DNR kept the dam closed until the water level rose to 804.65 feet, which is approximately ten inches above the legal level set in the 1986 Order. The DNR's operation of the dam also did not account for local weather conditions.
[14] The Houins filed a complaint against DNR on February 27, 2017,2 arguing that the DNR's operation of the dam was negligent, constituted a nuisance and a trespass, and claiming inverse condemnation.3 In response, the DNR asserted that it was immune from liability under Indiana Code sections 34-13-3-3 and 14-27-7.5-15. During summary judgment proceedings, the trial court concluded that the DNR was not entitled to immunity for its decisions concerning how the dam was operated.
[15] After a bench trial, the trial court entered extensive findings of fact and conclusions thereon. First, the trial court concluded that the "DNR has breached their assumed duty to operate the dam in a reasonable manner (pursuant to the 1986 Lake Level Order) and the Houins have been damaged by such negligence." Id. at 34. In addition to the loss of their crop yields, the Houins’ drainage tile silted shut because of the higher summer average lake levels between 2009 and 2016. The drainage tile was also damaged by pressure that was created when water from the lake ran backwards into the affected fields.
[16] The trial court also concluded that the DNR's operation of the dam caused the Houins’ fields to flood, which constitutes a nuisance. The court concluded that crop yield losses and damages to the drainage tile system are losses recoverable under the theory of nuisance.4 The court also determined that the "intermittent flooding of the affected fields caused by the DNR's failure to reasonably operate the dam was a ‘taking.’ "5 Id. at 49.
[17] Finally, the trial court rejected DNR's defense under the common enemy doctrine. Specifically, the court concluded that the doctrine was not a viable defense because the agency is not a landowner in this case.
[18] With regard to damages, the court determined that, under the Torts Claims Act, the Houins’ damages were limited to a time period from August 1, 2015, to the date of trial in January 2021. And because the statute of limitations for damage to personal property is two years, the court concluded that the Houins’ claims for damage "to personal property that fall outside of the tort claims notice requirements are limited to time period of February 17, 2015 to the date of trial." Id. at 51. And citing the six-year statute of limitations for damage to real property, the court limited damages to damage that occurred from February 17, 2015, to the date of trial. Id. at 52. Ultimately, the trial court awarded the Houins a judgment in the aggregate amount of $485,644.00 "excluding any distinct damages that might later be assessed for inverse condemnation" plus the costs of the action. Id. at 53.
[19] The DNR now appeals.
[20] The DNR argues that the trial court's judgment in favor of the Houins on their tort claims is contrary to law because the DNR had immunity. Whether governmental immunity applies is a matter of law for the courts to decide. Gary Cmty. Sch. Corp. v. Roach–Walker , 917 N.E.2d 1224, 1226 (Ind. 2009). The party seeking immunity bears the burden of establishing the immunity. Id. If the facts allow multiple reasonable conclusions as to an element triggering the...
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...2009), trans. denied. "Ordinarily, the question of whether a particular interference is substantial is a question of fact." Houin, 191 N.E.3d at 249; see also Indiana &Michigan Elec. Co. v. City Anderson, 176 Ind.App. 410, 420, 376 N.E.2d 114, 121 (1978) ("The question as to whether there h......