Indep. Volunteer Fire Co. v. Town of Hammonton
| Decision Date | 19 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | DOCKET NO. A-2876-18 |
| Parties | INDEPENDENT VOLUNTEER FIRE COMPANY and JOSEPH J. CARUSO, III, Plaintiffs, and JOSEPH CARUSO, JR., WILLIAM TOMASELLO, JOHN H. WARREN, JR., and JOHN MICHAEL WARREN, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. TOWN OF HAMMONTON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
Before Judges Messano, Hoffman and Suter.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County, Docket No. L-0132-16.
Fox Rothschild, LLP, attorneys for appellant (Michael J. Malinsky, on the briefs).
Jacobs & Barbone, PA, attorneys for respondents (Louis M. Barbone, on the brief).
Plaintiffs Joseph Caruso, Jr., Joseph Caruso III, William Tomasello, John H. (J.H.) Warren, Jr., and John Michael (J.M.) Warren were members of the Independent Volunteer Fire Company No. 2 (the Company), one of two fire companies that provided volunteer firefighting services to the Town of Hammonton (the Town).1 On September 28, 2015, another member of the Company and its only female member, Nicole Ruberton, filed a formal complaint directly with the Town administrator alleging Tomasello and Caruso III sexually harassed her, and she feared retaliation from the other plaintiffs "because they are all family." Never before had a member of either fire company filed a complaint alleging harassment directly with the Town administration.
At its regular meeting the same day, the Town council suspended all plaintiffs and appointed the town solicitor to investigate Ruberton's complaint.2 A second member of the Company, Enrico Sepe, also filed a complaint with the Town, alleging Tomasello harassed him because he was a dwarf. After the solicitor interviewed J.H. Warren, Jr., and J.M. Warren and absolved them of any misconduct, the Town reinstated both to full membership in the Company ten days later, on October 8, 2015.
In January 2016, plaintiffs filed a verified complaint in lieu of prerogative writs. They alleged the Town violated N.J.S.A. 40A:14-19, which provides that a "member or officer of [a] paid or part-paid fire department or force shall be . . . suspended, removed, fined or reduced in rank . . . only upon a written complaint setting forth the . . . charges" and a hearing thereafter. (emphasis added). Citing these specific statutory procedural guarantees, each plaintiff claimed the Town violated his civil rights, specifically, "depriv[ation] of procedural and substantive due process, equal protection of the law, as well as privileges and/or immunities secured by the Constitution, and laws of the State of New Jersey[.]" Within days of plaintiffs' filing, the Town lodged formalwritten disciplinary charges with specifications against Caruso, Jr. and Tomasello.
The Town then moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint. Apparently without any cross-motion by plaintiffs and relying not upon N.J.S.A. 40A:14-19, but rather certain Town ordinances, the judge denied the motion to dismiss and granted relief on plaintiffs' prerogative writ claim. He ordered the Town to appoint "an independent hearing officer[] and provide . . . [p]laintiffs with a statement of charges, a period of discovery, and a hearing" within one-hundred-twenty days.
Before the hearing took place, the Town reinstated Caruso, Jr., who by then had been suspended for thirteen months. Following several days of testimony, the hearing officer found Tomasello guilty of three disciplinary charges, none of which dealt with Ruberton's complaints, but one of which dealt with Sepe's complaints, and dismissed the other charges. He recommended Tomasello's now nineteen-month suspension as an appropriate penalty. The Town adopted the hearing officer's findings and recommendations and reinstated Tomasello.
The Town moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs' remaining civil rights claims. A different judge partially granted the Town's motion, dismissingplaintiffs' procedural and substantive due process causes of action; she denied summary judgment as to plaintiffs' equal protection claims, and the matter proceeded to trial.3
The jury found in favor of all four plaintiffs on their "class-of-one" equal protection claims and awarded $15,000 each to Caruso Jr., and Tomasello, and $25,000 each to J.H. Warren Jr., and J.M. Warren. The jury declined to award punitive damages. Plaintiffs subsequently sought counsel fees as prevailing parties under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2 (the CRA), and the judge awarded them $85,963.06 in attorney's fees and costs. The judge stayed execution of the judgment pending this appeal.
The Town argues that the first judge erred in granting plaintiffs relief on their prerogative writ claim because, as members of a volunteer firefighting department, plaintiffs were not entitled to the protections of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-19, and the judge misinterpreted the relevant ordinances. It notes that in granting summary judgment on plaintiffs' due process claims, the second judgeessentially adopted the Town's position that it did not violate plaintiffs' procedural rights by immediately suspending them.
The Town further contends that the trial judge should have dismissed plaintiffs' class-of-one equal protection claims as a matter of law, either on summary judgment, or when the Town sought involuntary dismissal after plaintiffs' case pursuant to Rule 4:37-2(b), or judgment at the conclusion of all the evidence pursuant to Rule 4:40-2(a), or judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to Rule 4:40-2(b). As a corollary argument, the Town contends the judge should have dismissed the complaints of J.H. Warren, Jr. and J.M. Warren because they were reinstated within ten days of their suspensions. Finally, the Town contends it was error to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury, and the judge mistakenly exercised her discretion in calculating the fee award.
We have considered these arguments in light of the record and applicable legal standards. We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate the judgment, including the award of fees and costs, and dismiss plaintiffs' complaint.
As we made clear in Newfield Fire Co. No. 1 v. Borough of Newfield, "[t]he plain language of this statute reflects the Legislature's intent to assure governmental supervision and control of volunteer fire companies to the extent they are charged with performing public functions funded by public taxpayer resources." 439 N.J. Super. 202, 210-11 (App. Div. 2015) (citing McGovern v. Rutgers, 211 N.J. 94, 108 (2012)). However, "[t]he municipal management of volunteer fire companies . . . is limited to 'the authority to control the general affairs of a volunteer fire department,' and a municipality 'cannot dictate the day-to-day operations of the department.'" Id. at 213-14 (quoting Sprint Spectrum, LP v. Borough of Upper Saddle River Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 352 N.J. Super. 575, 598 (2002)).
In moving to dismiss the complaint, and, more pointedly when it sought reconsideration of the order denying its motion, the Town argued that by its terms, N.J.S.A. 40A:14-19 only applies to a "permanent member or officer of [a] paid or part-paid fire department." Plaintiffs, however, cited Hammonton Ordinance 25-2 (O25-2), which provided, "[t]he several fire companies composing said Fire Department shall be subject to all the laws of this state pertaining to fire departments in towns and may receive any benefits resulting therefrom." According to plaintiffs, the Town had extended the statutory procedural rights contained in N.J.S.A. 40A:14-19 to its volunteer firefighters. The motion judge correctly rejected the argument.
However, in denying the Town's motions to dismiss and for reconsideration, the judge focused his attention on two other ordinances. Hammonton Ordinance 25-6 (O25-6) provided that "[f]or any cause deemed sufficient, [the] council may reprimand, suspend or remove from office the chief or any officer or officers of any of the companies composing the fire department." The Town argued that under this ordinance, the council coulddiscipline plaintiffs without providing any written statement of charges or a hearing.
However, Hammonton Ordinance 25-5 (O25-5) provided:
The various fire companies composing the Fire Department . . . may impose suitable fines or other penalties on the members in order to promote discipline and maintain efficiency of the Fire Department. The Fire Chief shall have the power to compel each or all of the companies to observe the provisions of this section as well as any rules that may be adopted by the several companies . . . .
In initially denying the Town's motion to dismiss, the judge wrote: "Section 25-5 creates a mechanism by which the Fire Department can discipline its own officers." He reasoned, because plaintiffs "were entitled to some minimum level of due process," the Town must provide plaintiffs with written charges, discovery, and a...
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