Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v. Heimann, 79-1696

Decision Date11 June 1980
Docket NumberNo. 79-1696,79-1696
Citation627 F.2d 486
PartiesINDEPENDENT BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, a corporation, v. John G. HEIMANN, Comptroller of the Currency of the United States Department of Treasury, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

L. Robert Griffin, Atty., U. S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., with whom Alice Daniel, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., and Carl S. Rauh, U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., at the time the brief was filed, were on brief, for appellant. Ronald R. Glancz, Atty., U. S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance for appellant.

Leonard J. Rubin, Washington, D. C., with whom Meyer Eisenberg, Christine E. Carnavos, Washington, D. C., and Horace R. Hansen, St. Paul, Minn., were on brief, for appellee.

James F. Bell and Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Washington, D. C., were on brief for amicus curiae Conference of State Bank Supervisors, urging affirmance.

Arnold M. Lerman, Michael S. Helfer, and Edward Tynes Hand, Washington, D. C., were on brief for amici curiae Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association, et al., urging reversal.

Before TAMM and ROBB, Circuit Judges, and GESELL, * United States District Judge for the District of Columbia.

Opinion PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM:

The Independent Bankers Association of America (IBAA), a trade association of federal- and state-chartered banks, challenges an interpretive ruling issued by the Comptroller of the Currency that declares loan production offices (LPO's) engaging in certain limited activities not to be "branches" within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1976). On IBAA's motion for summary judgment, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia entered an order declaring the Comptroller's ruling to be incorrect and ordering him to rescind the ruling and to refrain from further implementation of it. The Comptroller now appeals. We conclude that IBAA's claim is barred by laches. We therefore reverse the district court's order and remand the case with instructions that the order be vacated and the case dismissed.

Under federal law, national banks may open branches only in accordance with state branching statutes. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1976). Federal law defines a branch "to include any branch bank, branch office, branch agency, additional office, or any branch place of business . . . at which deposits are received, or checks paid, or money lent." Id. § 36(f) (emphasis added). In 1966, as part of an operating manual, and again in 1971, as part of the Code of Federal Regulations, the Comptroller of the Currency issued an interpretive ruling concerning the application of this language to LPO's:

Origination of loans by employees or agents of a national bank or of a subsidiary corporation at locations other than the main office or a branch office of the bank does not violate 12 U.S.C. §§ 36 and 81: Provided, That the loans are approved and made at the main office or a branch office of the bank or at an office of the subsidiary located on the premises of, or contiguous to, the main office or branch office of the bank.

12 C.F.R. § 7.7380(b) (1979) (rescinded 1979 pursuant to district court's order in this case). By excluding LPO's falling within this language from the definition of a branch, the ruling permits national banks to open LPO's without having to comply with otherwise applicable requirements of state branching laws. IBAA argues that because LPO's are places where "money (is) lent," they are branches under 12 U.S.C. § 36(f); the Comptroller's ruling, therefore, has allowed national-bank LPO's that do not conform to state branching laws to flourish in violation of 12 U.S.C. § 36(c). The rise of these allegedly unlawful LPO's, IBAA contends, gives their parent national banks a competitive advantage over state-chartered IBAA members, which may open similar facilities only in accordance with applicable state banking laws and regulations.

As noted above, the Comptroller first promulgated this ruling in 1966. IBAA did not file this action until 1978. The venerable maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus aequitas subvenit (equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights) requires that a suit in equity, though otherwise meritorious, be dismissed if two requirements are met: (1) unreasonable delay in bringing the claim for relief and (2) prejudice caused by that delay. E.g., H. McClintock, Handbook of the Principles of Equity § 28, at 71 (2d ed. 1948); 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence § 419d (5th ed. S. Symons 1941). These two elements clearly are present in the case before us, and the district court abused its discretion in not ruling that laches barred IBAA's request for relief.

First, IBAA waited twelve years before commencing this action. It had standing to do so, if not immediately on the Comptroller's issuance of the ruling, then certainly by the early 19...

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