Independent School District No. 6 In Twin Falls County v. Common School District No. 38 In Twin Falls County

• Decision Date: 06 November 1942
• Docket Number: 6980,6981
• Citation: 64 Idaho 303,131 P.2d 786
• Parties: INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 6 IN TWIN FALLS COUNTY, IDAHO, Respondent, v. COMMON SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 38 IN TWIN FALLS COUNTY, IDAHO, Appellant. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 6 IN TWIN FALLS COUNTY, IDAHO, Respondent, v. COMMON SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 41 IN TWIN FALLS COUNTY, IDAHO, Appellant
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

131 P.2d 786

64 Idaho 303

INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 6 IN TWIN FALLS COUNTY, IDAHO, Respondent, v. COMMON SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 38 IN TWIN FALLS COUNTY, IDAHO, Appellant.

INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 6 IN TWIN FALLS COUNTY, IDAHO, Respondent, v. COMMON SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 41 IN TWIN FALLS COUNTY, IDAHO, Appellant

Nos. 6980, 6981

Supreme Court of Idaho

November 6, 1942

Rehearing denied December 21, 1942.

SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS-CONTRACT FOR TEMPORARY CONSOLIDATION-TAXATION-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. Every presumption must be indulged and every doubt resolved in favor of validity of statute.

2. A statute susceptible of two constructions, one of which would render statute invalid, must be so construed that statute may be enforced.

3. The 1933 statute, construed as authorizing a school district to contract for reception of students from another district at a lesser rate of compensation than the actual average cost per capita for education in receiving district, is not unconstitutional as denying "due process of law" or "equal protection of the law." (Sess. Laws, 1933 chap. 184, sec. 2; Const. art. 1, sec. 13; U.S. C.A. Const Amend. 14, sec. 1.)

4. The 1933 statute, construed as authorizing a school district to contract for reception of students from another district at a lesser rate of compensation than the actual average cost per capita for education in receiving district, is not unconstitutional as imposing an ununiform tax. (Sess. Laws 1933, chap. 184, sec. 2; Const. art. 7, sec. 5.)

5. The tax uniformity provision of Constitution is not violated because another taxing unit within the state has a heavier or lighter tax rate than the tax unit complaining, since all that uniformity clause requires is that the rate shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax. (Const. art. 7, sec. 5.)

6. The 1933 statute authorizing school trustees to enter into a contract to combine for educational purposes with another school district is not in violation of constitutional provision prohibiting Legislature from imposing taxes for purpose of any county, city, town or other municipal corporation. (Sess. Laws, 1933, chap. 184, sec. 2; Const art. 7, sec. 6.)

7. In determining validity of contract between school districts regarding amount of compensation to be paid receiving district for educating pupils from sending district, it would be assumed, in absence of contrary proof, that trustees of receiving district acted in the interest of their district. (Sess. Laws, 1933, chap. 184, sec. 2.)

8. The 1933 statute authorizing school trustees to enter into a contract to combine for educational purposes with another school district is not unconstitutional as authorizing the incurring of any indebtedness exceeding the income and revenue provided for district for such year, especially where, so far as record showed, receiving districts profited by the transaction. (Sess. Laws, 1933, chap. 184, sec. 2; Const. art. 8, sec. 3.)

9. The 1933 statute authorizing school trustees to enter into a contract to combine for educational purposes with another school district is not in violation of constitutional provision prohibiting a school district from "lending or pledging the credit" in aid of any individual, association or corporation or becoming responsible for any debt, contract or liability of any individual, association or corporation. (Sess. Laws, 1933, chap. 184, sec. 2; Const. art. 8, sec. 4.)

10. In determining validity of contract between school districts relating to compensation to be paid for educating pupils in receiving district, that districts sending pupils allegedly made a profit by receiving more school funds from state and county apportionment than they were obliged to pay under the contract was immaterial, since such fact did not concern receiving district. (Sess. Laws, 1933, chap. 184, sec. 2.)

Rehearing denied December 21, 1942.

Appeals from the District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, for Twin Falls County. Hon. James W. Porter, Judge.

Actions to recover difference between amount paid under contract, for tuition of school children sent by defendants to plaintiff districts, and the actual per capita cost of educational advantages incurred for pupils of receiving district for the same years. Judgments for plaintiff. Defendants appeal. Reversed and remanded.

Reversed and remanded. Costs awarded to appellants.

Rayborn & Rayborn for appellants.

Under the provisions of Sec. 2, Chap. 184, 1933 Session Laws, a contract entered into between two school districts for temporary consolidation, which provides for payment of tuition fees less than the per capita cost of education of the receiving district is valid and enforceable, and is not ultra vires or void or contrary to the provisions of said section. (Sec. 2, Chap. 184, 1933 Session Laws; Fillmore Union High School Dist. v. Cobb, (Cal.) 53 P.2d 349; See Annotations 72 A. L. R. 499, 133 A. L. R. 77.)

When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect and there is no occasion for construction. (State v. Jutila, 34 Idaho 595; Village of Oakley v. Wilson, 50 Idaho 334; Drainage Dist. No. 2 v. Ada County, 38 Idaho 778.)

Chapman & Chapman and James T. Murphy for respondent.

Any legislative act which grants a power to school districts to enter into agreements fixing the tuition for nonresident pupils at less than the per capita cost of education within the school district where such non-resident pupils are attending would be an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power and in contravention to Art. I, Sec. 13 of the Constitution of Idaho; Art. XIV, Sec. 1 of the Constitution of the United States; Art. VII, Sec. 5; Art. VII, Sec. 6; Art. VIII, Sec. 3, and Art. VIII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution of Idaho. (City of Dallas v. Love, (Tex. Civ. App.) 23 S.W.2d 431, (affirmed 40 S.W.2d 20); Slocum v. Cameron Ind. Sch. Dist., 116 Tex. 288, 288 S.W. 1068; High School Dist. No. 137 v. County of Lancaster, 60 Neb. 152, 82 N.W. 382, 49 L. R. A. 345; Wilkinson v. Lord, (Neb.) 122 N.W. 699, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1104; Smith v. Barnard, 142 Ore. 557, 21 P.2d 204.)

Whenever an act of the legislature can be so construed and applied as to avoid conflict with the Constitution and give it the force of law, such construction will be adopted by the courts. ( Irvin v. Gregory, 86 Ga. 605, 13 S.E. 120; In re Gale, 14 Idaho 761, 95 P. 679; Grice v. Clearwater Lumber Co., 20 Idaho 70, 117 P. 112; Williams v. Baldridge, 48 Idaho 618, 284 P. 203.)

Contracts which are ultra vires and illegal are void, and there can be no ratification by performance or otherwise of such contracts. (State v. Johnson, 32 Idaho 251, 181 P. 523; Sch. Dist. No. 8 of Twin Falls v. Twin Falls County Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 30 Idaho 400, 164 P. 1174; Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 5 v. Collins, 15 Idaho 535, 98 P. 847, 128 Am. St. Rep. 76; Petrie v. Sch. Dist. No. 5 in Ada County, 44 Idaho 92, 255 P. 318.)

Appellants liability is upon an implied contract to pay for services rendered, and comes within the provisions of Sec. 5-217, I. C. A., providing a four year period of limitations. (Sec. 5-217, I. C. A.; Sec. 5-218, I. C. A.; Lincoln County v. Twin Falls North Side Land & Water Co., 23 Idaho 433, 130 P. 788; Feehan v. Kendrick, 32 Idaho 220, 179 P. 507.)

AILSHIE, J. Budge and Holden, JJ., concur. Givens, C.J., dissents.

OPINION

AILSHIE, J.

Independent School District No. 6 of Twin Falls County filed two actions, one against Common School District No. 41 of Twin Falls County and the other against Common School District No. 38 of Twin Falls County, seeking to recover from each of the districts sums claimed as balances due for attendance of pupils from these two districts at the school maintained by the plaintiff for the period of three school years. Both cases involve the same legal question and have been consolidated on this appeal. We shall hereinafter refer to respondent as plaintiff and to appellants as defendants.

September 7, 1936, plaintiff entered into a contract with the trustees of Common School District No. 38, as follows:

"BE IT AGREED: That the Board of Trustees of Independent School District No. 6 will accept and cause to be instructed with pupils of their own district, the elementary school pupils residing in Common School District No. 38.

"In consideration of the above arrangements, the Board of Trustees of Common School District No. 38 agrees to pay to the Treasurer of Independent School District No. 6, the sum of twenty-five dollars ($ 25.00) per pupil per year for each child attending Independent School District No. 6 from Common School District No. 38."

This contract was complied with in all respects and was renewed for the school years of 1937-38 and 1938-39. The same form of contract was entered into between the plaintiff and the trustees of Common School District No. 41 and was likewise complied with. For the years mentioned, School District Nos. 38 and 41 did not maintain any school but sent their pupils to Independent School District No. 6, under the terms of the foregoing agreement.

Independent School District No. 6 instituted these actions to recover the "difference between the per capita cost of education in the plaintiff school district for the three academic years commencing in September, 1936, and concluding in May, 1939 and the amounts previously paid to the plaintiff school district by the defendant districts", under the agreements above mentioned. The actions are based upon the theory, that the statute under which these contracts were made (sec. 2, chap. 184, 1933 Sess. Laws, p. 340) did not authorize, and was not intended to...