Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Commission v. Lamb

• Decision Date: 03 March 1971
• Docket Number: No. 470S91,470S91
• Citation: 256 Ind. 65,267 N.E.2d 161
• Parties: INDIANA ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE COMMISSION, Appellant, v. Joseph J. LAMB and Geneva Yarbrough, Appellees.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 161

267 N.E.2d 161

256 Ind. 65

INDIANA ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE COMMISSION, Appellant, v. Joseph J. LAMB and Geneva Yarbrough, Appellees.

No. 470S91.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

March 3, 1971.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., William F. Thompson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward Squier Neal, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellant.

John F. Neff, Lieber & Neff, William B. Miller, Robert V. Bridwell, Indianapolis, for appellees.

GIVAN, Judge.

This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under the provisions of Chapter 390, § 3, of the Acts of 1969 as found in Burns' Ind.Stat., 1970 Supp., § 12--549, which section reads as follows:

'Whenever any application for the issuance or renewal of any permit to sell any alcoholic beverage at retail (except a temporary alcoholic beverage permit issued under the provisions of section 12 (§ 12--511) of chapter 226 of the Acts of 1935, as amended) is denied by the Indiana alcoholic beverage commission, the applicant may seek judicial review thereof by following the applicable provisions of the Administrative Adjudication Act, Acts 1947, chapter 365 (§§ 63--3001--63--3030) as amended.'

This act carried a specific proviso that it should be applicable to proceedings instituted subsequent to July 1, 1969.

The appellees applied for a renewal of a three-way Alcoholic Beverage permit in July, 1969. In August, 1969, the Monroe County Alcoholic Beverage Commission conducted a hearing at which the appellees were advised that the Commission was considering police complaints and phone calls regarding the petitioners' operation which would necessitate refusal of the petitioners' application. At the hearing the Monroe County Prosecutor, Thomas Berry, testified as to prostitution activities on appellees' premises, including one conviction for such activity. The appellees appealed the denail of their application to the Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Commission, which Commission affirmed the decision at a regular meeting without a hearing. Appellees then appealed to the Marion County Superior Court, Room 1, which reversed the Commission and made findings of fact that in the hearing before the Monroe County Alcoholic Beverage Commission the appellees were denied the right to sworn testimony; that they were denied the right to cross-examine certain witnesses and to refute hearsay evidence, and that before the Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Commission the appellees were denied a right to a hearing, were denied the right to have an attorney present at a hearing and were denied the right to submit evidence or cross-examine witnesses. Upon these findings the court rendered judgment ordering the Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Commission and its agent, the Monroe County Alcoholic Beverage Commission, to issue to appellees their renewal Alcoholic Beverage permit.

We find from the record in this case that the findings of the trial judge as above set out were correct. Under the Administrative Adjudication Act, Burns' Ind.Stat., 1951 Repl., §§ 63--3001 to 63--3030, inclusive, the appellees were entitled to an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence before the Alcoholic Beverage Commission. They were also entitled to the right of cross-examination under the statute. However, the appellant contends the trial court erroneously usurped the authority of the Commission when it ordered the Commission to renew the appellees' license.

Burns' Ind.Stat., 1961 Repl., § 63--3018 reads as follows:

'On such judicial review such court shall not try or determine said cause de novo, but the facts shall be considered and determined exclusively upon the record filed with said court pursuant to this act (§§ 63--3001--63--3030).

'On such judicial review if the agency has complied with the procedural requirements of this act, and its finding, decision or determination is supported by substantial, reliable and probative evidence, such agency's finding, decision or determination shall not be set aside or disturbed.

'If such court finds such finding, decision or determination of such agency is:

'(1) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law; or

'(2) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity; or

'(3) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations, or short of statutory right; or

'(4) Without observance of procedure required by law; or

'(5) Unsupported by substantial evidence,

the court may order the decision or determination of the agency set aside. The court may remand the case to the agency for further proceedings and may compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.

'Said court in affirming or setting aside the decision or determination of the agency shall enter its written finding of facts, which may be informal but which shall encompass the relevant facts shown by the record, and enter of record its written decision and order or judgment.'

The purpose of the Administrative Adjudication Act (and this section in particular) is to provide for a scope of review of administrative actions; thus, at the same time limiting judicial review of such action. See Dept. of Financial Inst. v. State Bank of Lizton (1969), Ind., 252 N.E.2d 248, 19 Ind.Dec. 296.

In the aforementioned case this Court stated:

'It is to be noted that the trial court, in reviewing the administrative decision, cannot retry the facts 'de novo' and cannot come to its own conclusions as to the merits of the case by weighing the facts and evidence. We have held that even though the statute (as in the case of proceedings before the Public Service Commission) provides that the appeal shall be 'de novo', constitutionally this is not correct. The court cannot hear the matter as a new action and weigh the evidence and determine the facts on the merits * * *. The court's only right or scope of review is limited to a consideration of whether or not there is any substantial evidence to support the finding and order of the administrative body. A court may also determine whether or not the action constitutes an abuse of discretion and is arbitrary or capricious, as revealed by the uncontradicted facts. Public Service Commission et al. v. City of Indianapolis (1956), 235 Ind. 70, 131 N.E.2d 308; Indiana Board of Pharmacy v. Horner (1961), 241 Ind. 326, 172 N.E.2d 62.

'In Public Service Commission of Indiana v. Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. (1956), 235 Ind. 394, 132 N.E.2d 698, reh. den. 134 N.E.2d 53, this Court said:

'The purpose of a judicial review of an administrative order by the court is not to decide the matter on the merits for the administrative body but rather solely to determine whether or not the order made by the administrative body was outside the limits and jurisdiction of such body. Once the matter of jurisdiction is determined the court has no further right to interfere with an administrative procedure which belongs to another department of the government--not the judiciary. As a court, we have no right to substitute our judgment on the merits of an issue before an administrative body acting within its jurisdiction."

Thus, even though the Act contains ambiguities judicial review of administrative decisions must be properly limited and the trial court may not substitute its discretion for that of the board.

The trial court in the instant case by taking the initiative and ordering the board to grant the three-way permit which was applied for by the...