Indiana Bell Telephone Co., Inc. v. Ernst

• Decision Date: 15 February 1983
• Docket Number: No. 2-882A263,2-882A263
• Citation: 444 N.E.2d 1258
• Parties: INDIANA BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellant, v. Clifford ERNST, Plaintiff-Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 1258

444 N.E.2d 1258

INDIANA BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellant, v. Clifford ERNST, Plaintiff-Appellee.

No. 2-882A263.

Court of Appeals of Indiana Third District.

Feb. 15, 1983.

Richard O. Creedon, Indianapolis, for defendant-appellant.

Alton D. Priddy, Hardy, Logan & Priddy, New Albany, for plaintiff-appellee.

GARRARD, Judge.

Indiana Bell appeals from the Industrial Board's decision that Ernst was entitled to workmen's compensation.

We affirm.

Ernst was employed on April 20, 1979 as an installation and repair technician for Indiana Bell. On that day his assigned tasks for the afternoon were to upgrade the telephone system in a church and to disconnect a wire at a mobile home park. He was then to return his truck to the company garage.

A Bell supervisor assisted Ernst at the church for several hours. The supervisor then left the church about 3:30 p.m. but Ernst did not leave until after 11:00 p.m. From the church Ernst proceeded to the mobile home park and disconnected a line, his last assigned task for that day. While returning to the company garage Ernst's truck was struck by another vehicle which had crossed the center line.

Ernst suffered severe injuries as a result of the collision. Following the accident Bell placed Ernst on disability for one year and one week. Bell classified the accident as a "non-job" incident and terminated Ernst's employment when "one year and one week" had passed. During that period Bell paid Ernst $343.50 per week for 14 weeks and $171.75 per week for 39 weeks under a sickness benefit authorization program.

On January 14, 1981 Ernst filed a Form 9 complaint with the Industrial Board seeking an adjustment of his claim for compensation from Bell. He designated the general nature of the question in dispute as "The defendant denies liability for compensation."

Upon hearing, the hearing member found that on April 20th Ernst was assigned to perform the two jobs previously referred to and that he took longer on the church job than he should have. However, the hearing member found the delay was immaterial since at the time of the collision Ernst had clearly resumed his duties by disconnecting the line at the mobile home park and returning from there directly to the garage. He awarded compensation and the full board affirmed.

Bell argues that the board erred in finding the injury occurred in the course of and arose out of the employment. It also argues the board erred in refusing to credit against the award payments it made to Ernst.

ISSUE 1:

IC 22-3-2-2 provides:

"[E]very employer and every employee, except as herein stated, shall be required to comply with the provisions of this law, respectively to pay and accept compensation for personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, and shall be bound thereby."

As we discussed in Olinger Construction Co. v. Mosbey (1981), Ind.App., 427 N.E.2d 910:

"The phrases 'out of' the employment and 'in the course of' the employment have separate meanings and both requirements must be fulfilled before compensation is awarded.

'Out of' portends some probe into causation and the relationship of a particular accident and a particular harm to the employment sought to be charged. The primary inquiry is directed toward the question of whether the accidental injury or death was the outgrowth of the employment, whether it was due to the employment, whether it was work-induced. Generally stated, the rule seems to be that an accident arises out of the employment when there is a causal connection between it and the performance of some service of the employment. A causal connection is established when the accident is shown to have arisen out of a risk which a reasonable person might comprehend as incidental to the employment, or where the evidence shows an incidental connection between conditions under which the employee worked and his resulting injury or death. The phrase, inthe course of, requires, on the other hand, some investigation into the work itself and the breadth of its grasp. The principal emphasis is upon the time and place elements, so that 'in the course of' the employment might be taken to mean 'during' the employment." (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).

B. SMALL, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW IN INDIANA, Section 6.1 (1950).

Ernst was returning a company truck to the company garage after completing the last assigned task of the day when the accident occurred. It is undisputed that his duties called for him to return the truck after he finished work. The facts are clear that he was injured in an accident arising out of his employment since such collisions are a reasonably foreseeable consequence of driving a company truck over the public highways. See Suburban Ready Mix Concrete v. Zion (1983), Ind.App., 443 N.E.2d 1241; Olinger Construction Co. v. Mosbey, supra.

The dispute is whether Ernst was injured in the course of his employment.

Ernst was injured after 11:00 p.m., hours beyond his scheduled quitting time. The fact that he was working outside his scheduled hours does not necessarily mean he was not in the course of his employment.

"If an injury occurs either before or after working hours, it is generally considered as not arising in the course of his employment for the obvious reason that the employment has not started, or that it is all over. However, it is...