Indiana Bicycle Co. v. Tuttle

• Decision Date: 05 March 1902
• Citation: 51 A. 538,74 Conn. 489
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: INDIANA BICYCLE CO. v. TUTTLE.

51 A. 538

74 Conn. 489

INDIANA BICYCLE CO.

v. TUTTLE.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 5, 1902.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Hartford county; Epaphroditus Peck, Judge.

Action by the Indiana Bicycle Company against Constant S. Tuttle. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

The following are the material facts found: The plaintiff, a corporation located in Indiana, engaged in the bicycle business, made a written contract with Geo. N. Olmsted in March, 1898, by which Olmsted took the agency for the sale of the plaintiff's goods at Hartford, in this state. This contract contained no time limit, but it was therein expressly provided that it might be terminated "at any time on written notice by either party to the other." Before the plaintiff would enter into this contract it required Olmsted to send to it a written contract of guaranty; and thereupon Olmsted requested the defendant to execute and deliver to the plaintiff the contract sued upon, dated March 9, 1898, and, this being done, the plaintiff executed the contract with Olmsted. The material parts of the contract sued upon are as follows: "To Indiana Bicycle Company, Indianapolis, Ind.—Dear Sirs: In consideration that you will sell and deliver on credit to George N. Olmsted, of Hartford, county of Hartford, state of Connecticut, bicycles, bicycle parts, sundries, and other articles connected with or pertaining to bicycles, I hereby guaranty the payment to you of the price of, and value of, said bicycles, sundries, and other articles, at the time or times of payment agreed upon by said George N. Olmsted, to an amount not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500). This shall be held as a continuing guaranty by him in your favor for all such bicycles, sundries, and other articles that you have sold or that you may from time to time sell and deliver to said George N. Olmsted, until further notice from me. * * * And whenever George N. Olmsted owes you any sum whatever for any of the bicycles, sundries, or other articles above mentioned, and the same becomes due and payable, I am to pay the same on demand, if the said George N. Olmsted does not pay the same when due. My liability to be limited to the said sum of five hundred dollars." The negotiations between the plaintiff and Olmsted which resulted in said contracts were conducted on behalf of the plaintiff by one Hoblett, its agent to establish agencies for the sale of its goods; but, in performing this duty, Hoblett had no authority to make contracts on behalf of the plaintiff, nor to bind it thereby. Pursuant to its agreement with Olmsted, the plaintiff, during the year 1898, sold and delivered its goods to him on credit at Hartford from time to time as required. In December, 1898, the plaintiff and Olmsted entered into another contract which, in terms, rescinded the prior one, and was in its provisions similar to that. This second contract was negotiated by Hoblett, as agent for the plaintiff, substantially in the same way as the first had been. When this second contract was made, Olmsted was not indebted to the plaintiff, except for a small balance, evidenced by a note which was paid at maturity. In February, 1899, Hoblett had a conversation with the defendant, in which Hoblett said, in substance, that Olmsted was a good man; had sold a large number of wheels for the plaintiff in 1898, and had settled in full with the plaintiff, and did not owe it a cent. The defendant then said to Hoblett, "Cancel the bond, then." "Hoblett replied, 'I will,' 'All right,' or some similar expression of...