Indiana Dept. of Correction v. Stagg

• Decision Date: 18 July 1990
• Docket Number: No. 67A04-8905-CV-206,67A04-8905-CV-206
• Citation: 556 N.E.2d 1338
• Parties: INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, Keith Butts and John Nunn, Appellants, v. R. Paulette STAGG, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 1338

556 N.E.2d 1338

INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, Keith Butts and John Nunn Appellants, v. R. Paulette STAGG, Appellee.

No. 67A04-8905-CV-206.

Court of Appeals of Indiana Fourth District.

July 18, 1990.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 31, 1990.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Michael A. Schoening, Deputy Atty. Gen., Office of Attorney General, Indianapolis, for appellants.

Jessie A. Cook, Trueblood Harmon Carter & Cook, Terre Haute, for appellee.

MILLER, Presiding Judge.

Plaintiff-appellee Paulette Stagg, an attorney, represented a prisoner at the State Farm. After her representation was ended, she received from the prisoner a copy of a Department of Correction memorandum regarding her prison visitations which stated she was alleged to be romantically involved with the prisoner. The letter was opened by her law partner. Stagg sued defendants-appellants Indiana Department of Correction and its employees Keith Butts and John Nunn in a small claims action alleging the memorandum was defamatory and caused her embarrassment and humiliation. She sought damages in the amount of $3,000. At the conclusion of the trial, the court awarded Stagg $1,000 in damages and $560.12 in costs. The defendants' appeal raises two issues. One issue is dispositive--whether the court erred by failing to find the defendants immune under the Indiana Tort Claims Act because they were government employees acting within the scope of their employment and there was no evidence they were acting in bad faith.

We reverse.

FACTS

At the time of trial, Stagg was a partner with the law firm Leedy & Stagg in Terre Haute, Indiana, and on occasion Stagg served as a criminal defense attorney on a court-appointed basis. She has never been subject to disciplinary action or complaint.

In 1986, she was appointed to represent Byron Alston, a prisoner at the Indiana State Farm in Putnamville, who had been charged with battery and rioting arising from an incident which occurred at the Farm. Stagg met with Alston in January, February and March, 1986 in order to prepare his defense. On each of these occasions, the meetings occurred at the maximum security unit of the Indiana State Farm. Stagg complied with all Department of Correction regulations and submitted to searches of her person and briefcase. Alston entered a plea of guilty in April, 1986.

On June 5, 1986, Stagg received a letter from Alston who had since been transferred to the Indiana Reformatory. This letter included a memorandum which had been placed in Alston's prison file prepared by officials of the Indiana Reformatory. The memorandum read as follows:

Information has been received from the Investigator at the Indiana State Farm that the subject has employed a female attorney by the last name of Stagg, who is alleged to be romantically involved with the offender. If Ms. Staff visits the subject on a client/attorney basis, they should be observed closely and all offender/attorney procedures followed. Due to the offender being housed in G Cellhouse at the present, there will be no regular visiting passes issued for him, but in the event he is transferred to another housing location where visiting is authorized, it should be noted on the Visiting Card that Ms. Stagg can only visit as either an attorney or friend, not both.

(R. 317). (emphasis added).

The memorandum was signed by defendant John Nunn, Assistant Superintendent/Operations of the Indiana Reformatory. It included on its face a distribution list limited to Major Scrogham, the Information Desk, the Control Room, Visiting Room Officer, the offender's packet, and John Nunn's file.

The memorandum was a result of an investigation initiated by defendant, Keith Butts, Institutional Investigator at the Indiana State Farm, in response to information he received from an employee whose identity he could not recall. Before a complete investigation could be conducted, Alston was transferred from the Indiana State Farm to the Indiana Reformatory. As part of his routine duties, Butts telephoned the Indiana Reformatory and After Stagg received the copy of Nunn's memorandum and due to her knowledge of its publication, she declined further appointments to represent criminal defendants incarcerated at the Indiana State Farm. She testified that she was concerned about her ability to function as an advocate for prospective clients, and she believed she would be unable to obtain the respect and cooperation of Indiana Department of Correction employees necessary to fulfill such obligations. Stagg specifically relayed her concerns to a local judge after the judge requested that she accept an appointment to represent another State Farm inmate on an escape charge.

informed officials that an investigation had begun with regard to Alston. As a result of Butt's phone call, the memorandum described above was prepared.

Stagg claimed damages of $3,000 due to her inability to accept future court appointments from Putnam County on behalf of prisoners housed at the Indiana State Farm. She also claimed she suffered embarrassment and humiliation and fear of potential disciplinary action. In bringing her claim to trial, Stagg incurred costs totaling $560.12 including her filing fee and payment for three depositions. Other facts pertinent to the decision will be added as necessary.

DECISION

The trial court made specific findings of fact and conclusions of law which can only be set aside if they are clearly erroneous. A judgment is clearly erroneous if a review of the record leaves one with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Porter County Board of Zoning Appeals v. Bolde (1988), Ind.App., 530 N.E.2d 1212. The trial court's decision can only be reversed where the evidence is without conflict and points unerringly to a different conclusion. Public Service Company of Indiana, Inc. v. Gibbs (1984), Ind.App., 460 N.E.2d 992.

Defendants Department of Correction, Butts and Nunn contend the trial court erred in awarding judgment to Stagg because the defendants were protected by the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA), IND. CODE Sec. 34-4-16-.5-1 et. seq. Specifically, defendants contend they are immune by operation of I.C. Sec. 34-4-16.5-3(7) which provides:

A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of his employment is not liable if a loss results from:

(7) the adoption and enforcement of or failure to adopt or enforce a law (including rules and regulations), unless the act of enforcement constitutes false arrest or false imprisonment; ...

The Court erred in addressing this issue in that it adopted Stagg's proposed conclusion of law no. 8 which states:

That the Defendants are entitled to no immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act due to their lack of good faith in making the statement at issue herein and their reckless disregard for the veracity of same. The Court declines to address the issue of whether Defendants Butts and Nunn are law enforcement officers entitled to the protections of I.C. 34-4-16.5-3 but notes that no investigation of any kind was conducted by them and the Court finds that their conduct was carried out without either good faith or a reasonable belief or grounds for belief in the truth of the statement as it appeared in Defendant Nunn's April 1, 1986 memorandum.

(R. 156). (Emphasis added).

We disagree with the trial court's conclusion that the defendants were not entitled to the immunity of the Tort Claims Act because the immunity is provided to any governmental entity or employee acting within the scope of his employment--not just law enforcement officers. Additionally, there is no requirement of a showing of good faith in order to qualify for the immunity.

First, I.C. Sec. 34-4-16.5-3(7) does not restrict the provision to "law enforcement officers". On its face the immunity is provided to any "governmental entity" or "employee acting within the scope of his employment." This section is not limited to instances involving enforcement of the criminal code by police officers. City of Seymour v. Onyx Paving Co., Inc. (1989), Ind.App., 541 N.E.2d 951 (applied to municipality that issued a stop work order for purposes of enforcing the zoning ordinance); Board of Commissioners of Hendricks County v. King (1985), Ind.App., 481 N.E.2d 1327 (applied to sanitation officer's attempt to enforce a local sewage disposal ordinance). Butts and Nunn are governmental employees. Butts was an Institutional Investigator at the Indiana State Farm and Nunn was Assistant Superintendent/Operations of the Indiana Reformatory. The Indiana State Farm and the Indiana Reformatory are governmental entities as defined by I.C. Sec. 34-4-16.5-2(c) as they are institutions maintained and operated by the Indiana Department of Correction. ¹

Both Butts and Nunn were acting within the scope of their employment. Butts testified it was his job to investigate allegations made in reference to offenders, staff or visitors. He initiated an investigation of Stagg and Alston based on allegations he received from a staff member whose identity he could not recall. Based on that information, Butts observed portions of one of Stagg's visits with Alston. He testified that it was his "gut" feeling that Alston, who was a known troublemaker, was up to something because he appeared to be happy and high-spirited. Butts was unable to complete his investigation because Alston was transferred to the Indiana Reformatory within a few days of his receiving the tip--providing Butts only one opportunity to observe Alston and Stagg. Butts further testified it was a routine and normal part of his duties to telephone the institution where an offender is transferred to inform officials at the new institution that an investigation had been initiated.

Edward Cohn, Superintendent of the Indiana Reformatory testified he received a telephone call from Butts to the effect that Alston's attorney had a relationship with, or feelings toward him other than those of an attorney....