Indiana Dept. of State Revenue v. Caylor-Nickel Clinic, P.C.
| Citation | 587 N.E.2d 1311 |
| Decision Date | 06 March 1992 |
| Docket Number | CAYLOR-NICKEL,No. 49S00-9107-TA-594,49S00-9107-TA-594 |
| Parties | INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVENUE, Appellant (Respondent below), v.CLINIC, P.C., Appellee (Petitioner below). |
| Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Jane E. Griffin, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellant.
Barton T. Sprunger, Mark J. Richards, Ice Miller Donadio & Ryan, Indianapolis, for appellee.
Appellant Indiana Department of State Revenue (Department) appeals from a summary judgment granted by the Indiana Tax Court in favor of appellee Caylor-Nickel Clinic, P.C. Caylor-Nickel Clinic v. Dep't of State Revenue (1991), Ind. Tax, 569 N.E.2d 765. We affirm.
In its appeal to this Court, the Department reasserts two arguments: 1) that the timely filing of Form IT-20SC is a condition precedent to claiming the small business corporation gross income tax exemption under Ind.Code Sec. 6-2.1-3-24.5; and 2) that the Indiana Special Corporation Income Tax Return, Form IT-20SC, is not an information return as defined by 45 IAC 15-11-6 subject only to the penalty contemplated under Ind.Code Sec. 6-8.1-10-6.
Caylor-Nickel has determined its tax liability on a fiscal year basis, beginning May 1 and ending April 30. For its tax years ending in 1985, 1986, 1988, and 1989, Caylor-Nickel qualified for the small business corporation tax return on or before August 15 of each year. For 1987, however, Caylor-Nickel filed its federal corporation income tax return and its Indiana Special Corporation Income Tax Return, IT-20SC, on January 15, 1988. Caylor-Nickel had not previously filed state or federal returns for the fiscal year ending in 1987, and it did not obtain extensions of time to file the 1987 returns.
On July 19, 1988, the Department issued a Notice of Tax Due in the amount of $133,592.12 for unpaid 1987 Indiana gross income tax, interest, and penalties. The Department asserted that Caylor-Nickel waived the small business corporation exemption provided for by Ind.Code Sec. 6-2.1-3-24.5 for the 1987 fiscal year because it failed to file either Form IT-20SC or an extension of time to file by August 15, 1987. Following a hearing on Caylor-Nickel's protest, the Department issued a Letter of Findings denying the protest as to the tax and interest but waiving the penalties. The Department then denied rehearing and issued a Notice of Assessment of gross income tax and interest in the amount of $136,980.57.
Caylor-Nickel commenced an appeal in the Indiana Tax Court and petitioned to enjoin collection. An agreed order was entered enjoining the Department's collection of the tax and interest for the 1987 fiscal year pending resolution of the appeal. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, but neither asserted the existence of any genuine issue of material fact. Granting Caylor-Nickel's motion, the Tax Court determined that the timely filing of Form IT-20SC was not a condition precedent for claiming the small business corporation income tax exemption, and that the form was an "information return" for which there was only a $10.00 penalty for untimely filing. The Department seeks our review, reversal, and entry of summary judgment in its favor.
This summary judgment, as all trial court judgments, enters the process of appellate review clothed with a presumption of validity. The party appealing from the grant of summary judgment must persuade the appellate tribunal that the judgment erroneously determined "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). Thus, the reviewing appellate court faces the same issues that were before the trial court and follows the same process, Burke v. Capello (1988), Ind., 520 N.E.2d 439; Brandon v. State (1976), 264 Ind. 177, 340 N.E.2d 756. The trial court's determination must be "carefully scrutinized on appeal" to assure that the non-prevailing party is not improperly prevented from having his day in court. Ayres v. Indian Heights Vol. Fire Dep't (1986), Ind., 493 N.E.2d 1229, 1234.
As to summary judgments entered by the Tax Court, however, we will utilize a limited departure...
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