Indiana Ed. Employment Relations Bd. v. Benton Community School Corp.

• Decision Date: 12 July 1977
• Docket Number: A,AFL-CI,No. 776S203,776S203
• Citation: 365 N.E.2d 752,266 Ind. 491
• Parties: , 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3084, 82 Lab.Cas. P 55,068 INDIANA EDUCATION EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, Franklin K. DeWald, Individually and in his capacity as Chairman of the Indiana Education Employment Relations Board, Cleon Foust and George D. Gardner, Individually and in their capacity as Members of the Indiana Education Employment Relations Board, Appellants, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,ppellant-Intervenor, v. BENTON COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORPORATION, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 752

365 N.E.2d 752

266 Ind. 491, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3084,

82 Lab.Cas. P 55,068

INDIANA EDUCATION EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, Franklin K DeWald, Individually and in his capacity as Chairman of the Indiana Education Employment Relations Board, Cleon Foust and George D. Gardner, Individually and in their capacity as Members of the Indiana Education Employment Relations Board, Appellants American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, Appellant-Intervenor, v. BENTON COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORPORATION, Appellee.

No. 776S203.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

July 12, 1977.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Arthur Thaddeus Perry, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellants

Zwerdling & Maurer by Wendy L. Kahn, Washington, D. C., Bingham, Summers, Welsh & Spilman, Richard J. Darko, Indianapolis, for appellant-intervenor.

Alan H. Lobley, Alan T. Nolan, Martha S. West, Ice, Miller, Donadio & Ryan, Indianapolis, for appellee.

PRENTICE, Justice.

This is an appeal from the determination of the trial court that Public Law 254, Acts of 1975 (Ind. Code 22-6-4-1) et seq. is unconstitutional as violative of Article I, Section 12 of our state constitution, in that it prohibits judicial review of an administrative agency's determination.

Three issues are presented, for our determination, by briefs of Appellant and Appellant-Intervenor.

(1) Did the trial court err, as a matter of law, in ruling upon the constitutionality of the statute, in the absence of a justiciable controversy?

(2) Did the trial court err, as a matter of law in holding that the challenged sections precluded judicial review of administrative agency determination made with respect to representation proceedings held under Section 7 of the Act?

(3) Did the trial court err, as a matter of law, in ruling that the challenged sections are not severable from the remainder of the Act, thus rendering the entire Act unconstitutional?

Public Law 254, Acts of 1975 (Ind. Code 22-6-4-1 through 22-6-4-13) provides for collective bargaining between public employees and their governmental employer. The defendant (appellant), Indiana Education Employment Relations Board, (Board) is the state agency charged under the Act with its administration.

Plaintiff (Appellee), Benton Community School Corporation filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, a temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent injunctions, all relative to the enforcement of Public Law 254, which it charged is unconstitutional under Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Indiana. Said action by the plaintiff was instituted following its receipt from the defendant (Board) of a notice of hearing upon a representation petition theretofore filed with the Board by the Retail Clerk's Union, Local No. 25. Local No. 25 had previously filed the petition with the Board, seeking to be certified as the exclusive representative of said employees; and the purpose of the hearing was to determine an "appropriate unit" of the plaintiff's employees, for purposes of collective bargaining under the Act, and to determine if a question existed as to the exclusive representative of such unit.

A temporary restraining order was issued, restraining the Board from proceeding with said hearing, and notice issued for hearing upon plaintiff's application for a temporary injunction. Thereafter, the The trial court overruled said motions to dismiss, declared the entire Act unconstitutional in that subsections 8(d), (g) and (i) thereof were not severable from the remainder of the Act and prohibited judicial review of state administrative agency determinations made in regard to representation proceedings held under Section 7 of the Act. Accordingly, the Board was permanently enjoined from further proceedings under the Act.

hearing upon the application for a temporary injunction was continued and consolidated with the hearing upon the merits; The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (Intervenor) was allowed to intervene, stipulations of fact were filed and the cause put at issue by motions for judgment filed by the Board and by the intervenor.

ISSUE I

Intervenor challenges the jurisdiction of the trial court and asserts that the Board's actions neither injured Plaintiff nor threatened it with injury sufficient to pose a justiciable controversy regarding the constitutionality of the Act.

It is true, as argued by Intervenor that courts do not pass on the constitutionality of a statute until a constitutional determination is necessarily and directly involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned. Bush v. Texas (1963), 372 U.S. 586, 83 S.Ct. 922, 9 L.Ed.2d 958; Roth v. Local Union No. 1460 of Retail Clerks Union (1939), 216 Ind. 363, 24 N.E.2d 280. A constitutional question will not be anticipated in advance of the necessity of deciding the constitutional issue. Poer, Trustee v. State ex rel. (1918), 188 Ind. 55, 121 N.E. 83; N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Pub. Ser. Comm. of Ind. (1958), 237 Ind. 544, 147 N.E.2d 547.

Contrary to Intervenor's argument, we believe that a determination of the constitutionality of the Act was necessarily and directly involved in this controversy and was essential to the protection of the rights of the plaintiff. As the facts show, a hearing on the determination of an appropriate bargaining unit among Plaintiff's employees was scheduled by the Board. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff would have been forced to proceed with such hearing from which, according to the Act, there would have been no judicial review available. Plaintiff was clearly threatened with a legal injury and should not have been forced to proceed under an unconstitutional statute at its peril. This case presents not merely the "ripening seeds" of a controversy, but presents an already existing and actual controversy.

This action was brought in part under the Indiana Declaratory Judgment Act, Ind. Code 34-4-10-2, which provides:

Any person * * * whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute * * * may have determined any question or construction or validity arising under the * * * statute, * * * and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. Ind.Code § 34-4-10-2 (1971).

The Act further provides in Ind. Code 34-4-10-12:

This act is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations; and is to be liberally construed and administered.

The judicial doctrines of justiciability and standing exist to insure that litigation will be actively and vigorously contested, thus eliminating the possibility of collusion or attempts to obtain advisory opinions. As exemplified by the record below and the briefs on appeal, this case has been vigorously contested by both sides and by the intervenor. The plaintiff was not merely seeking an advisory opinion and the decision has an immediate impact upon the rights and obligations of all parties.

The criteria for standing under the Declaratory Judgment Act was stated in Zoercher v. Agler (1930) 202 Ind. 214, 221 " '(T)he person bringing the action must have a substantial present interest in the relief sought, such as there must exist not merely a theoretical question or controversy but a real or actual controversy, or at least the ripening seeds of such a controversy, and that a question has arisen affecting such right which ought to be decided in order to safeguard such right.' " 156 Ind.App. 668 at 672, 297 N.E.2d 858 at 860.

172 N.E. 186, 189, as quoted in City of Mishawaka v. Mohney, (1973), 156 Ind.App. 668, 297 N.E.2d 858:

In City of Mishawaka v. Mohney, supra, the city was seeking a declaratory judgment that one of its own ordinances was constitutional. The court properly held that the city lacked standing for such an action in that no actual controversy involving the implementation of the ordinance had arisen. The city was seeking a purely advisory opinion.

In contrast, in Jacob Weinberg News Agency v. City of Marion (1975), Ind.App., 322 N.E.2d 730, the court held that the plaintiff had standing to bring a declaratory judgment action seeking to declare a city ordinance unconstitutional. There, the plaintiff was a news distributor challenging a city ordinance on pornography. Although he was not liable under the ordinance, his federal first amendment rights of distribution of literature were threatened. The court held that the plaintiff had standing to argue his own claim that his constitutional rights were being infringed.

Intervenor also cites Committee for Prevailing Wage Scale v. Zeller (1965), 140 Ind.App. 478, 208 N.E.2d 697, where the court held that the controversy was moot by the time the trial in the case was held. Plaintiffs were challenging the method of setting a wage scale on a school construction project. By the time of trial the construction project had been completed and all wages in question paid. The court concluded that if previously there had been any justiciable question, there remained no question at trial to litigate and any previous question was moot. However, in discussing the necessity of having an actual controversy to litigate, the court quoted:

" ' * * * It is hardly possible to measure completely the social advantage accruing from the opportunity to secure a conclusive adjudication upon contested official action before rather than after it is undertaken. The conditions of justiciability are naturally demanded, to avoid any question of rendering merely advisory opinions. * * *' " 140 Ind.App. at 489, 208 N.E.2d at 704.

The case before us involved an immediate existing controversy between the parties and illustrates the need and desirability of adjudicating the parties' constitutional rights before rather than after official action has been taken.

Intervenor further...