Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Raike

• Decision Date: 12 May 1975
• Docket Number: No. 2--273A38,2--273A38
• Citation: 329 N.E.2d 66,164 Ind.App. 169
• Parties: INDIANA HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION and Rushville Consolidated School Corporation, Appellants (Defendants below), v. Jerry W. RAIKE, by his next friend Audrey J. Minneman, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 66

329 N.E.2d 66

164 Ind.App. 169

INDIANA HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION and Rushville

Consolidated School Corporation, Appellants (Defendants below), v. Jerry W. RAIKE, by his next friend Audrey J. Minneman,

Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 2--273A38.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, Second District.

May 12, 1975.

[164 Ind.App. 171]

Hughes & Young, Rushville, Adams & Cramer, Shelbyville, for appellants

Robert F. Lehman, Robert C. Hagemier, Indianapolis, for appellee.

BUCHANAN, Judge.

[164 Ind.App. 172] CASE SUMMARY

This is an appeal by Defendants-Appellants, Indiana High School Athletic Association (IHSAA) and Rushville Consolidated School Corporation (Rushville) from a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction prohibiting the Appellants from denying Plaintiff-Appellee Jerry W. Raike (Raike), a married high school student, from participating in Rushville's athletic and extra-curricular program, the Appellants claiming: (1) constitutionality of IHSAA's and Rushville's rules prohibiting married students from participating in athletics as violative of the equal protection clause of the U.S. and Indiana Constitutions; (2) improper joinder; (3) improper granting of a preliminary injunction; (4) failure of Raike to exhaust administrative remedies; (5) improper form of the declaratory judgment; and (6) 'unclean hands'.

We affirm.

FACTS

The essential facts most favorable to the trial court's judgment are:

On November 27, 1971, Raike was a senior in good standing enrolled in the Rushville High School in Rushville, Indiana. On that date, Raike, being seventeen years of age, married a sixteen-year-old Rush County female and approximately two weeks later, a child was born to Mrs. Raike. The trial court specifically found that this marriage 'conformed exactly to the statutory mandate of Burns Ind.Stat. § 44--101 (I.C. 1971, 31--1--1--1)' (now 31--1--1--1 et seq. (Burns Supp.1974)).

Prior to this marital union Raike actively participated in Rushville's athletic program, including football, wrestling and baseball.

Being aware of certain rules adopted by IHSAA and Rushville prohibiting married students from participating in athletics, Raike sought unsuccessfully prior to his marriage to avoid operation of these rules.

[164 Ind.App. 173] He then filed, on December 16, 1971, a complaint against Rushville and IHSAA seeking a Declaratory Judgment and a Temporary Restraining Order (with Affidavits). The Temporary Restraining Order was granted the same day (ex parte) and on September 21, 1972, the Superior Court of Marion County, Room No. 6, made findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered a Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction against IHSAA and Rushville enjoining them from enforcing their restrictive rules prohibiting married high school students from engaging in athletic competition and extra-curricular activities. In granting injunctive relief the trial court specifically found that the rules in question violated equal protection of the laws guaranteed Raike under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and that the same rules were also violative of due process of law as guaranteed Raike by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

The parties have stipulated that enforcement of the rules in question constitutes State action.

Six issues are presented by this appeal and additional and supplemental facts will be supplied as each issue is considered.

ISSUE ONE

Do the Rules of Rushville and IHSAA prohibiting married high school students from participating in athletics and extracurricular activities deny Raike equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution?

ADDITIONAL FACTS

Raike attacks these rules as being discriminatory:

The Rushville Rule:

'Married students, or those who have been married, are in school chiefly to

meet academic needs and they will be disqualified from participating in extracurricular activities and Senior activities except Commencement and Baccalaureate.'

[164 Ind.App. 174] The IHSAA Rule:

'Students who are or have been at any time married are not eligible for participating in intraschool athletic competition.' (Rule 14 of its By-laws)

(Collectively referred to as the Rules)

The trial court found that Rushville was subject to the rules and regulations of IHSAA and evidence was introduced showing IHSAA's avowed purpose to be:

'The purpose of this Association shall be to encourage and direct wholesome amateur athletics in the schools of Indiana. In keeping with this purpose the Association shall regulate, supervise, and administer interscholastic athletic activities among its member schools. All such activities shall remain an integral factor in the total secondary educational program.' (As emphasized in Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp., infra.)

Article Two of the Constitution of IHSAA.

Also, there was evidence that IHSAA was originally organized in 1903 in an attempt to establish and maintain uninformity of rules and regulations in athletic events.

High school principals, teachers, coaches and consultants testified to the reasons ¹ justifying the existence of the Rules. Their testimony may be summarized as follows:

1. Married students need time to discharge economic and family responsibilities, and participating in athletics and extracurricular activities would interfere with these responsibilities;

2. Teenage marriages should be discouraged so as to reduce the high percentage of divorce and school dropout rates among married students;

3. Athletes serve as models or heroes to other students and teenage marriages are usually the result of pregnancy [164 Ind.App. 175] so that immorality is encouraged if married students participate without sanction in athletics.

4. If married students participate in athletics, a double standard must be applied, thereby causing discipline, training and administrative problems.

5. Unwholesome interaction between married and non-married students is prevented by avoidance of undesirable 'locker room talk'.

After Raike was permitted to participate in athletics as a married person, his athletic and academic career showed marked improvement. He won the sectional wrestling championship and was elected captain of the wrestling team. Similarly, in baseball Raike's batting average improved by almost 100 points from the prior year and the baseball team's record improved from the prior year.

Raike was able to maintain a B average, hold down a part-time job, engage in athletics and at the same time discharge his family responsibilities.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

Rushville and IHSAA assert that, under the two-tier standard of review for equal protection issues, there is neither a fundamental right nor suspect criteria presented

which require 'strict judicial scrutiny'. The constitutionality of the Rules is supported by a rational basis and justified by the evidence under the low scrutiny standard of review

Raike claims the Rules impair and infringe upon the fundamental right to marry and that no compelling state interest is satisfied under the strict scrutiny test. Secondly, these Rules fail to satisfy even the rational basis standard and this contention is fully supported by the evidence.

DECISION

CONCLUSION--It is our opinion that the Rules prohibiting a married high school student from participating in athletics [164 Ind.App. 176] and extra-curricular activities do not bear a fair and substantial relation to the objective sought, and therefore deny Raike equal protection of the laws contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. ²

PREFACE

IHSAA's rules limiting the right of high school students to participate in athletics have not fared well in Indiana. In 1972 the Indiana Supreme Court decided Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp. (1972), Ind., 289 N.E.2d 495, nullifying a rule prohibiting female students from competing in male non-contact sports (golf). Two years later in Sturrup v. Mahan (1974), Ind., 305 N.E.2d 877, the same court considered and found 'ineligible' for constitutional purposes an IHSAA rule which declared a high school student ineligible to participate in athletics if he or she transferred from one school district to another unless the student's parents actually changed their residence to the new school district. Violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibiting a state from denying 'to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws' was the basis for these decisions. Now we consider ³ an IHSAA rule which denies participation[164 Ind.App. 177] in athletics to a student who is or has been married--a classification based on marriage.

In reviewing a classification for equal protection impurity, classic constitutional methodology requires us to determine the appropriate standard of review to be used. That choice determines how closely the justification for the classification will be scrutinized.

I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A two-tier approach has been developed by the United States Supreme

Court in evaluating and reviewing equal protection cases. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972); Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 92 S.Ct. 479, 30 L.Ed.2d 502 (1971); Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629, 632 (2d Cir. 1973); Gilpin v. Kansas St. High School Activities Ass'n, Inc., 377 F.Supp. 1233, 1238 (D.Kan.1974); Norton v. Weinberger, 364 F.Supp. 1117, 1121 (D.Md.1973); Sumpter v. State (1974), Ind., 306 N.E.2d 95, 100; Stroud, Sex Discrimination in High School Athletics, 6 Ind.L.Rev. 661, 673 (1973). The 'low' tier or low scrutiny test presumes Supreme Court (Plurality opinion.) Sumpter will not disturb the state action unless the classification bears no 'rational relationship' to a legitimate governmental interest...