Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n, Inc. v. Carlberg by Carlberg

• Decision Date: 19 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. 29S02-9610-CV-681,29S02-9610-CV-681
• Citation: 694 N.E.2d 222
• Parties: 125 Ed. Law Rep. 821 INDIANA HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant (Defendant below), v. Jason CARLBERG by Next Friend James E. CARLBERG and Donna S. Carlberg, Appellee (Plaintiffs below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 222

694 N.E.2d 222

125 Ed. Law Rep. 821

INDIANA HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant (Defendant below), v. Jason CARLBERG by Next Friend James E. CARLBERG and Donna S Carlberg, Appellee (Plaintiffs below).

No. 29S02-9610-CV-681.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Dec. 19, 1997.

Rehearing Denied May 4, 1998.

Robert M. Baker, III, Johnson Smith Pence Densborn Wright & Heath, Indianapolis, for Appellant.

James E. Carlberg, Ronald E. Elberger, George T. Patton, Jr., Bose McKinney & Evans, Indianapolis, for Appellee.

ON PETITION TO TRANSFER

SULLIVAN, Justice.

Disputes involving the rules and enforcement actions of the Indiana High School Athletic Association ("IHSAA") frequently find their way into state and federal court in Indiana. In this case, and a companion case, Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Reyes, 694 N.E.2d 249 (Ind.1997), we re-examine the approach Indiana courts take to resolving such cases. We do so here in a case involving a student's challenges to enforcement of the IHSAA's "Transfer Rule" and "Restitution Rule." We do so in Reyes in a case involving a high school's challenge to enforcement of the Restitution Rule.

Background

Jason Carlberg lives with his parents near Indianapolis. After spending his freshman year at Brebeuf Preparatory School where he swam on the varsity swim team, Carlberg transferred to Carmel High School for academic reasons. Carlberg's transfer prompted enforcement of Rule 19 of the IHSAA, ¹ the Transfer Rule, which provides in relevant part that a student who transfers for nonathletic reasons without a change of permanent residence by the student's parents or guardians has only limited athletic eligibility ² for 365 days following enrollment. ³ Carlberg exhausted the administrative remedies available to him, including a hearing before the IHSAA Executive Committee. After the IHSAA denied his appeals, Carlberg took his case to court, alleging that application of the Transfer Rule was arbitrary and capricious and violated his constitutional rights. The trial court enjoined the IHSAA and Carmel High School from enforcing the Transfer Rule, finding that (i) the IHSAA's decision limiting his eligibility was arbitrary and capricious and (ii) "[t]he Transfer Rule operates, as applied in this case, as a violation of Carlberg's rights under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 12 and Section 23, of the Indiana Constitution." (R. at 18.) The trial court ordered that Carlberg be allowed to participate on the Carmel High School varsity swimming team. In addition, the trial court enjoined the IHSAA from enforcing its Restitution Rule ⁴ against Carlberg or Carmel High School.

While Carmel High School chose not to appeal the trial court's judgment, the IHSAA presented to the Court of Appeals five different issues for its review: (1) whether the trial court erred in ignoring the Indiana law of judicial noninterference in the affairs of voluntary associations, and in concluding that the IHSAA's actions are reviewable; (2) whether the trial court erred in concluding that the IHSAA decision was subject to scrutiny under the Indiana or U.S. Constitution; (3) whether the trial court erred in concluding that the IHSAA decision violated Carlberg's equal privileges and equal protection rights under the Indiana and U.S. Constitutions; (4) whether the trial court erred in concluding that the IHSAA decision violated Carlberg's due process rights under the Indiana and U.S. Constitutions; and (5) whether the trial court erred in enjoining the IHSAA from implementing the IHSAA Restitution Rule.

The Court of Appeals found one of the issues dispositive. It upheld the trial court's decision, holding that under Sturrup v. Mahan, 261 Ind. 463, 305 N.E.2d 877 (1974), the IHSAA Transfer Rule was overbroad in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution when used to deny varsity eligibility to a student who transferred for nonathletic reasons. Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Carlberg, 661 N.E.2d 833 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). The IHSAA sought and this Court granted transfer on October 24, 1996. ⁵

Discussion

I

The IHSAA's rules and its enforcement thereof are the source of much litigation. And the number of cases cited in this and the Reyes opinion illustrate that a not insubstantial number of these cases result in published opinions in the federal and state reporters. When first presented with such a case in 1959, we held that the courts would not interfere with the enforcement or administration of the constitution or by-laws of the IHSAA. State ex rel. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Lawrence Cir. Ct., 240 Ind. 114, 162 N.E.2d 250 (1959). But twenty-five years ago we began to review IHSAA decisions, Haas v. South Bend Community Sch. Corp., 259 Ind. 515, 289 N.E.2d 495 (1972), and the courts of Indiana--including our federal cousins--continue to do so to this day.

In the course of that quarter century's worth of cases, there has been great variation in the claims made and law invoked by the parties and in the method of analysis employed by the reviewing courts. Some of the cases have treated IHSAA decisions as requiring federal and state constitutional review under the Equal Protection, Due Process, Privileges and Immunities, and Due Course of Law Clauses of the federal and state constitutions. See Sturrup, 261 Ind. 463, 305 N.E.2d 877; Haas, 259 Ind. 515, 289 N.E.2d 495; Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Avant, 650 N.E.2d 1164 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied; Thomas v. Greencastle Community Sch. Corp., 603 N.E.2d 190 (Ind.Ct.App.1992); Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Schafer, 598 N.E.2d 540 (Ind.Ct.App.1992); Ruman v. Eskew, 165 Ind.App. 534, 333 N.E.2d 138 (1975); Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Raike, 164 Ind.App. 169, 329 N.E.2d 66 (1975).

Other cases have treated IHSAA decisions as requiring review under the common law of Indiana. At least one of the common law cases analyzes the challenged IHSAA decision by applying the extremely deferential standard of review due the internal decisions of private membership organizations, Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Reyes, 659 N.E.2d 158 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), aff'd 694 N.E.2d 249 (Ind.1997); others apply "an arbitrary and capricious" standard. See Avant, 650 N.E.2d 1164; Kriss v. Brown, 180 Ind.App. 594, 390 N.E.2d 193 (1979); Crane v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 975 F.2d 1315 (7th Cir.1992).

Not only is the method of analysis in the common law cases inconsistent, but, at times, even the methods of common law and constitutional analysis merge. For example, the "arbitrary and capricious" language also appears in the context of review of the constitutionality of an IHSAA decision. See Sturrup, 261 Ind. at 470, 305 N.E.2d at 882; Schafer, 598 N.E.2d at 554 (both holding IHSAA decisions to be arbitrary and capricious under Equal Protection Clause analysis).

This case and the Reyes case raise many of the analytical issues typical of IHSAA cases and we use them today to re-examine the way in which Indiana courts analyze challenges to IHSAA decisions. Our re-examination yields the following principles, each of which will be discussed in some detail in either this opinion or in Reyes:

First, the integral role that athletics play in our state's constitutionally-mandated system of education and the history of judicial scrutiny of IHSAA decisions together dictate that the common law provide for judicial oversight of those decisions. See part III-A, infra.

Second, the common law will treat the IHSAA as a private membership organization with respect to challenges to its rules and enforcement actions brought by member schools. See part III-A-1, infra.

Third, the common law will treat the IHSAA as analogous to a government agency with respect to challenges to its rules and enforcement actions brought by students and other non-IHSAA members with standing to do so. See part III-A-2, infra.

Fourth, rules and decisions of the IHSAA constitute "state action" for the purposes of constitutional review. See part II, infra. However, there is no right or interest to participate in interscholastic sports that is entitled to protection under the federal Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses or

                the state Due Course of Law Clause.  See part IV-C-2, infra.   Thus, scrutiny of IHSAA decisions under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses will generally be limited to whether they impinge upon a suspect classification and whether they have a rational basis.  See parts IV-A and IV-C, infra.   Scrutiny under the Privileges and Immunities Clause will generally be limited to whether they have a reasonable basis.  See part IV-B, infra
                

II

We turn first to the IHSAA's claim that the trial court erred in concluding that the IHSAA decision constituted "state action" and was, therefore, subject to scrutiny under the U.S. or Indiana Constitutions. ⁶

It is clearly established that decisions of the IHSAA with respect to student-athletes constitute "state action" for purposes of federal and state constitutional review under the Equal Protection and the Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the federal and state constitutions. This argument has been decided repeatedly against the IHSAA by the appellate courts of this state for almost a quarter century. See Sturrup, 261 Ind. at 465, 305 N.E.2d at 879; Haas, 259 Ind. at 520, 289 N.E.2d at 498; Reyes, 659 N.E.2d at 167; Avant, 650 N.E.2d at 1170; Thomas, 603 N.E.2d at 192; Schafer, 598 N.E.2d at 548; Kriss, 180 Ind.App. at 604, 390 N.E.2d at 199; Raike, 164 Ind.App. at 173, 329 N.E.2d at 69; Crane, 975 F.2d at 1326 (Posner, J., dissenting) (agreeing that IHSAA decisions are state action and citing Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 193 n. 13, 109 S.Ct. 454, 463 n. 13, 102 L.Ed.2d 469 (1988)); Griffin High Sch. v. Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, 822 F.2d 671, 674 (7th...