Indiana Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co.

• Decision Date: 16 July 2004
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:03 CV 7511.
• Citation: 326 F.Supp.2d 844
• Parties: INDIANA INSURANCE CO., et al., Plaintiff, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., et al., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

326 F.Supp.2d 844

INDIANA INSURANCE CO., et al., Plaintiff, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., et al., Defendant.

Case No. 3:03 CV 7511.

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Western Division.

July 16, 2004.

Andrew R. Malone, Smith, Rolfes & Skavdahl, Columbus, OH, for Plaintiff.

Laura M. Faust, Ronald B. Lee, Moira M. Pietrowski, Roetzel & Andress, Akron, OH, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KATZ, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Defendant's motion to strike (Doc. No. 58) as to which Plaintiff has filed an opposition (Doc. No. 61); Defendant's motion in limine to exclude the expert testimony of Bernard Doran and Steve Claytor (Doc. No. 48) as to which Plaintiff has filed an opposition (Doc. No. 54) and Defendant has filed a reply (Doc. No. 55); and Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 47) as to which Plaintiff has filed an opposition (Doc. No. 56) and Defendant has filed a reply (Doc. No. 57).¹

The Court has jurisdiction to decide this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion in limine will be granted. Defendant's motion for summary judgment will also be granted. Defendant's motion to strike will be denied as moot.

BACKGROUND

This subrogation action arises out of a fire that occurred at the residence of Plaintiffs Robert and Paula Fleming (the "Flemings"), Willshire, Ohio, on March 26, 2000. Subsequent to the fire the Flemings filed a claim with Plaintiff Indiana Insurance Company ("Indiana"), which paid the Flemings $88,815.00 on their claim. Indiana retained experts Steven Claytor ("Claytor") and Bernard Doran ("Doran") to investigate the incident. Plaintiffs contend that the fire originated in the General Electric refrigerator located in the Fleming's basement.

Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant General Electric Company ("GE") in the Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton County, Ohio, seeking to recover the amount paid to the Flemings. They allege inter alia negligent manufacture, negligence as a supplier, manufacturing defects, design defects, failure to warn, failure to conform with representations, breach of warranty of merchantability, willful and wanton misconduct, breach of warranty, breach of implied warranty and strict liability. GE removed the case to the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division. Defendant then filed a motion to transfer venue to the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, which was granted. GE now moves to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs' experts, and to dispose of the case on summary judgment.

DISCUSSION

A. MOTION IN LIMINE

1. Motion in Limine Standard

Motions in limine are generally used to ensure evenhanded and expeditious management of trials by eliminating evidence that is clearly inadmissible for any purpose. See Jonasson v. Lutheran Child and Family Serv., 115 F.3d 436, 440 (7th Cir.1997). The court has the power to exclude evidence in limine only when evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds. Cf. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n. 4, 105 S.Ct. 460, 463 n. 4, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984) (federal district courts have authority to make in limine rulings pursuant to their authority to manage trials). Unless evidence meets this high standard, evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context. (citations omitted). Denial of a motion in limine does not necessarily mean that all evidence contemplated by the motion will be admitted at trial. Denial merely means that without the context of trial, the court is unable to determine whether the evidence in question should be excluded. The court will entertain objections on individual proffers as they arise at trial, even though the proffer falls within the scope of a denied motion in limine. See United States v. Connelly, 874 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir.1989) (citing Luce, 469 U.S. at 41, 105 S.Ct. at 463) ("Indeed, even if nothing unexpected happens at trial, the district judge is free, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling."). Hawthorne Partners v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 831 F.Supp. 1398, 1400-01 (N.D.Ill.1993).

2. Daubert Standard — Admissibility of Expert Testimony

The legal standard to be used in Daubert challenges was accurately articulated by Judge Bechtle in his memorandum opinion issued on February 1, 2001:

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 obligates judges to ensure that any scientific testimony or evidence admitted is relevant and reliable. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147[, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238] (1999) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589). The party offering the expert has the burden of proving admissibility. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n. 10. The subject of an expert's testimony must be grounded in the methods and procedures of science and based on more than subjective belief or speculation. Id. at 589-590. Further, Rule 702 requires that expert testimony assist the trier of fact, i.e., it must "fit" the issues in the case by having a "valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry." Id. at 591-92.

In determining "whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact," the court must assess whether the methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and whether it can properly be applied to the facts in issue. Id. at 592-93 . Furthermore, the court must examine the expert's conclusions in order to determine whether they can reliably follow from the facts known to the expert and the methodology used. Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir.1999).

In Daubert, the Court identified several factors to assist courts in evaluating whether a scientific theory or methodology constitutes reliable scientific knowledge. These include: whether the theory or technique can be or has been tested; whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; whether a technique has a known or potential rate of error and whether there are standards controlling the technique's operation; and whether the theory or method has general acceptance in the scientific community. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94. These factors "are simply useful signposts, not dispositive hurdles that a party must overcome in order to have expert testimony admitted." Heller, 167 F.3d at 152.

In addition, a court should "exclude proffered expert testimony if the subject of the testimony lies outside the witness's area of expertise." 4 Weinstein's Fed. Evid. § 702.06[1], at 702-52 (2000). In other words, a party cannot qualify as an expert generally by showing that the expert has specialized knowledge or training which would qualify him or her to opine on some other issue. Redman v. John D. Brush & Co., 111 F.3d 1174, 1179 (4th Cir.1997); Barrett v. Atl. Richfield Co., 95 F.3d 375, 382b (5th Cir.1996).

Moreover, testimony of an expert that constitutes mere personal belief as to the weight of the evidence invades the province of the jury. McGowan v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 863 F.2d 1266, 1273 (6th Cir.1987); STX, Inc. v. Brine, Inc., 37 F.Supp.2d 740, 768 (D.Md.1999) (quotation omitted), aff'd, No. 99-1540, 2000 WL 564010 (Fed.Cir. May 8, 2000); Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Lipson, 46 F.Supp.2d 758, 763 (N.D.Ill.1998).

Lastly, the court "should also be mindful of other applicable rules." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. Federal Rule of Evidence 703 "provides that expert opinions based on otherwise inadmissible hearsay are to be admitted only if the facts and data are `of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject.'" Id. (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 703). Under Rule 703, "[i]f the underlying data are so lacking in probative force and reliability that no reasonable expert could base an opinion on them, an opinion which rests entirely upon them must be excluded." In re Paoli RR. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d [717,] 748 (quoting In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F.Supp. 1223, 1245 (E.D.N.Y.1985)).

In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prod. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1203, 2001 WL 454586, at *5-6 (E.D.Pa. Feb.1, 2001) (footnotes omitted). The district court is not required to hold a hearing to address a Daubert issue. See Greenwell v. Boatwright, 184 F.3d 492, 498 (6th Cir.1999). Defendant claims that the testimony of Claytor and Doran is unreliable, and should be excluded based on Fed.R.Evid. 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) due to unreliable investigations that fail to conform to standard practice embodied in National Fire Protection Association ("NFPA") 921 entitled "Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations." (Doc. No. 48, Ex. C). GE also contends that neither Claytor nor Doran are qualified.

3. Qualifications

a. Claytor

Defendant unpersuasively argues that Claytor is not qualified to testify as an expert because he never designed or manufactured a refrigerator, and would not know whether a product defect caused the fire, directing the Court to Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 104 F.3d 472 (1st Cir.1997). In Bogosian, the court affirmed the exclusion of an expert witness because of "a lack of any significant expertise — by way of knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education — in relevant areas such as the design or manufacture of automobiles or their components." Id. at 477. The Bogosian court noted the "lack of a mechanical engineering degree or other engineering expertise." Id.

Claytor is the cause and origin expert, and left to Doran the determination of the defect that gave rise to the fire. (Doc. No. 52, Claytor Dep., pp. 30-31, 118). In this capacity, he has significant training and experience. Claytor has been a firefighter since 1972. Id. at 13. He has been employed full time with the Green Township, Ohio, fire...