Indiana Land Company, LLC v. City of Greenwood, IP 01-0533-C-B/G (S.D. Ind. 9/4/2003)
| Decision Date | 04 September 2003 |
| Docket Number | IP 01-0533-C-B/G.,Cause No. IP01-0533-C-D/F. |
| Parties | INDIANA LAND COMPANY, LLC, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF GREENWOOD, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Plaintiff Indiana Land Company, LLC filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant City of Greenwood, alleging that the Greenwood City Council violated Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process, substantive due process and equal protection rights when it required a two-thirds vote, instead of the simple majority vote prescribed by state law, to overturn a recommendation of the City of Greenwood Planning Commission. Defendant moves for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff suffered no constitutional violation. For the reasons set forth below, we GRANT Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff Indiana Land Company, LLC ("ILC"), an Indiana limited liability company, contracted to purchase 142 acres of real estate in Johnson County, Indiana, adjacent to Defendant City of Greenwood ("City"), an Indiana municipal corporation. Def.'s Stint, of Material Facts ("Facts") ¶¶ 1, 2, 4; Pl's Stmt. of Add'1 Material Facts ("Add'l Facts") ¶ 17. ILC intended to develop the real estate into a residential subdivision. Facts ¶ 5; Add'l Facts ¶ 19. In furtherance of this intention, in 1999, ILC filed a petition, PC 99-56, with the City of Greenwood Planning Commission ("Planning Commission") to annex the real estate into the City and to rezone the real estate from agricultural (A-1) to residential (R-2A and R-3). Add'l Facts ¶ 18. Following a recommendation by the Planning Commission to redesign the proposed residential subdivision as a planned unit development ("PUD"), in January 2000, ILC filed a new petition, PC 2000-04, for the real estate to be annexed and rezoned PUD. Id. ¶¶ 19-22.
Despite ILC's redesign of its petition, on January 10, 2000, the Planning Commission sent an unfavorable recommendation of ILC's petition to the Greenwood City Council ("Council"). Facts ¶ 6; Add'l Facts ¶ 23. On March 20, 2000, the Council held a public hearing to consider ILC's petition, which came before the Council as proposed Ordinance 00-03. Facts ¶ 7; Add'l Facts ¶ 24. After a discussion involving ILC representatives, members of the community, City officials and Council members, the Council voted on the Planning Commission's unfavorable recommendation of ILC's petition. Six of the seven Council members were present for the vote, and their vote resulted in a three-three tie. Facts ¶¶ 8-9; Def.'s Designation & Tender of Evid., Ex. 3. The Mayor of Greenwood attempted to break the tie by voting in favor of ILC's petition. Facts ¶ 9; Add'l Facts ¶ 26. After the vote, a Council member challenged the legality of the majority vote, referencing Greenwood Municipal Code § 10-136, 9.09.06, which requires a two-thirds vote to overturn a recommendation of the Plan Commission (the "Two-Thirds Ordinance"). Facts ¶ 9. The Two-Thirds Ordinance contains a footnoted reference to Indiana Code § 36-7-4-609, the state statute addressing the vote required for legislative action on a zoning amendment. Section 36-7-4-609 states that "[a] legislative body may take action . . . only by a vote of at least a majority of all the elected members of the body." City Attorney Shawna Koons-Davis agreed to research the validity of the Two-Thirds Ordinance and its applicability to the Council's March 20, 2003 vote, and the Council agreed to debate these issues at its next meeting.
On April 17, 2000, the Council considered the validity of its March 20, 2000 majority vote. Facts ¶ 10; Add'l Facts ¶ 27. Before the April 17, 2000 meeting, the City Attorney distributed a memorandum advising each Council member of her opinion that the Two-Thirds Ordinance was invalid because it conflicted with state statutes, including Indiana Code § 36-4-6-12, which states that "[a] majority vote of the legislative body is required to pass an ordinance, unless a greater vote is required by statute." Add'l Facts ¶¶ 28-35. Despite the City Attorney's opinion that the Two-Thirds Ordinance was unenforceable, Council members stated the following reasons for upholding the Two-Thirds Ordinance: (1) the public would perceive overturning the local Two-Thirds Ordinance in favor of a state statute benefitting ILC as "a railroad job," (2) the state statute providing for the passage of local ordinances by majority vote may be interpreted as permissive rather than mandatory, (3) the Council must treat its local constituency consistently and according to the laws as they stand on the books, and therefore, must uphold a local ordinance in conflict with a state statute, and (4) other attorneys consulted by Council members offered legal opinions supporting application of the Two-Thirds Ordinance. PL's Designation & Tender of Evid., Ex. 13, at pp. 6, 11-12, 15, 19.
After discussion, the Council voted unanimously to apply the Two-Thirds Ordinance to the March 20, 2000 vote, rendering it insufficient to overturn the Plan Commission's unfavorable recommendation of ILC's petition. Facts ¶ 10; Add'l Facts ¶ 37-38. Therefore, ILC's petition was defeated. After the Council voted to apply the Two-Thirds Ordinance to ILC's petition, it voted to amend the Greenwood Municipal Code to require only a simple majority vote in order for the Council to act upon (approve or overturn) any recommendation from the Plan Commission. Add'l Facts ¶¶ 39-41.
ILC did not challenge the validity of the Two-Thirds Ordinance in state court following the Council's application of the Two-Thirds Ordinance to its petition. Rather, upon the recommendation of the Mayor of Greenwood, ILC redesigned its proposed PUD development and filed a second request for rezoning and annexation, PC 2000-43, with the Plan Commission. Add'l Facts ¶¶ 43-44. On August 28, 2000, the Plan Commission voted 8-2 to forward a favorable recommendation to the Council of ILC's second petition. Facts ¶ 12. On November 8, 2000, the Council overturned the Plan Commission and denied ILC's second petition by a vote of 4-3; ILC's second petition was before the Council as proposed Ordinances 00-35 and 00-36. Id.; Add'l Facts ¶¶ 47-48; Def.'s Designation & Tender of Evid. Ex. 3, p. 3.
On April 4, 2001, ILC filed a Complaint with the Johnson County Superior Court. The City removed the case to this court on April 21, 2001.
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party on the particular issue. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Eiland v. Trinity Hosp., 150 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 1998).
On a motion for summary judgment, the burden rests on the moving party to demonstrate "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). After the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue for trial, the responsibility shifts to the non-movant to "go beyond the pleadings" and point to evidence of a genuine factual dispute precluding summary judgment. Id. at 322-23. "If the non-movant does not come forward with evidence that would reasonably permit the finder of fact to find in his favor on a material question, then the court must enter summary judgment against him." Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87 (1986)); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24; Anderson 477 U.S. at 249-52.
Summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial on the merits, nor is it a vehicle for resolving factual disputes. Waldridge, 24 F.3d at 290. Therefore, in considering a motion for summary judgment, we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 962 (7th Cir. 1997). If genuine doubts remain, and a reasonable fact-finder could find for the party opposing the motion, summary judgment is inappropriate. See Shields Enterprises., Inc. v. First Chicago Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992); Wolf v. City of Fitchburg, 870 F.2d 1327, 1330 (7th Cir. 1989). But if it is clear that a plaintiff will be unable to satisfy the legal requirements necessary to establish his case, summary judgment is not only appropriate, but mandated. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Waldridge, 24 F.3d at 920.
ILC claims that the City of Greenwood violated § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, which provides a cause of action for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" by any person acting "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, to state a claim under § 1983, plaintiff must show that (1) the offending conduct was committed by a person acting under color of state law, and (2) that such conduct deprived the plaintiffs of rights secured by the Constitution. See Smith v. City of Chicago, 820 F.2d 916, 917 (7th Cir. 1987). A municipality violates the Constitution when it has an unconstitutional custom or policy. A "custom" or "policy" can take one of three forms: (1) an express policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a "custom or usage" with the force of law; or (3) an...
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