Indiana Limestone Company v. Ridge
| Decision Date | 24 September 1929 |
| Docket Number | 13,737 |
| Parties | INDIANA LIMESTONE COMPANY v. RIDGE |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
From Industrial Board of Indiana.
Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Jack Ridge against the Indiana Limestone Company, employer. From an award for claimant, the defendant appealed.
Affirmed.
George W. Henley, Alfred Evens and Leroy Baker, for appellant.
John F Regester and James R. Regester, for appellee.
On March 22, 1928, appellee, while in the employment of appellant, received an injury to his right foot, and was awarded compensation on the basis of total temporary disability. On March 5, 1929, a review on account of alleged change in conditions resulted in a finding that appellee had sustained a seventy-five per cent permanent impairment of the right foot below the knee, and an award was made accordingly that is, for 112 1/2 weeks.
At the hearing, the only question in controversy was as to the degree of permanent partial impairment of appellee's injured member; and, on appeal, the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the award is the one question presented.
The physician who treated the injury and examined appellee with a view of determining the degree of impairment, testified that all of the toes and a part of the foot were amputated, the amputation being back of the ball of the great toe, and that in his opinion, the degree of permanent partial impairment "with respect to the foot below the knee" is from thirty-three and one-third per cent to thirty-five per cent. Appellee, as a witness in his own behalf, appeared before the Industrial Board without an attorney, described his injuries and explained the use he had of his foot, following which, in response to a question asked by a member of the board, he stated that the degree of impairment of "the foot" was seventy-five per cent.
It is argued by appellant that there is no evidence to sustain the award. Two reasons are advanced, the first being that the testimony of appellee as to the degree of impairment was but the opinion of a layman, and, therefore, cannot be considered. We do not so understand the law. Appellee was not testifying as an expert; he was not expressing, as an opinion, the degree of impairment; he stated as a fact, based upon his own experience, that the impairment of the foot was seventy-five per cent. The evidence was competent and material; its weight was...
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