Indiana State Bd. of Health v. Werner

• Decision Date: 20 April 2006
• Docket Number: No. 49A02-0505-CV-375.,49A02-0505-CV-375.
• Citation: 846 N.E.2d 669
• Parties: INDIANA STATE BOARD OF HEALTH FACILITY ADMINISTRATORS, Appellant-Respondent, v. Angela WERNER, H.F.A., Appellee-Petitioner.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

846 N.E.2d 669

INDIANA STATE BOARD OF HEALTH FACILITY ADMINISTRATORS, Appellant-Respondent, v. Angela WERNER, H.F.A., Appellee-Petitioner.

No. 49A02-0505-CV-375.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

April 20, 2006.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Frances H. Barrow, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for Appellant.

J. Richard Keifer, Karl L. Mulvaney, Nana Quay-Smith, Bingham McHale, LLP, Indianapolis, for Appellee.

OPINION ON REHEARING

BARNES, Judge.

The Indiana State Board of Health Administrator's ("the Board") petitions for rehearing following our opinion in Indiana State Board of Health Facility Administrators v. Werner, 841 N.E.2d 1196 (Ind. Ct.App.2006). We grant the Board's petition for rehearing; however, we reaffirm our opinion in all regards. We issue this opinion on rehearing to clarify our earlier opinion and to address an argument raised by the Board for the first time in its petition for rehearing.

The Board first contends that "a closer look" at certain cases is warranted. Rehearing Pet. p. 3. We disagree. As they were cited in our opinion, we are well aware of Clendening v. Indiana Family and Soc. Servs. Admin., 715 N.E.2d 903, 904 (Ind.Ct.App.1999); Park v. Med. Licensing Bd. of Indiana, 656 N.E.2d 1176, 1178 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied (1996); Indianapolis Yellow Cab, Inc. v. Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n, 570 N.E.2d 940, 942 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), trans. denied; Seattle Painting Co. v. Comm'r of Labor, 661 N.E.2d 596, 597 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied.¹ In those cases, timely motions to dismiss were filed and, therefore, their outcomes did not turn on whether the trial courts had acquired subject matter jurisdiction or jurisdiction over the case.

The issue before us in this case is whether the jurisdiction issue was waived by the Board's failure to timely raise it. As we explained in our opinion, the answer to this question turns on whether the failure to timely file an agency record deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction or jurisdiction over the case.²

It is well settled that the time provisions of Indiana Code Section 4-21.5-5-13 are mandatory and a condition precedent to a trial court acquiring jurisdiction to consider a petition for judicial review. Indiana State Bd. of Educ. v. Brownsburg Cmty. School Corp., 813 N.E.2d 330, 333 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). What type of jurisdiction the trial court is deprived of, however, is unclear. On appeal and again on rehearing the Board urges that the failure to comply with the statutory requirements deprives trial courts of subject matter jurisdiction. In support of its position, the Board cites for the first time on rehearing Indiana Department of Highways v. Dixon, 541 N.E.2d 877, 879 (Ind.1989), in which our supreme court addressed in part whether Dixon's petition for judicial review was timely filed. As dicta, our supreme court summarily observed:

In an action for judicial review of an administrative determination, statutory compliance is a condition precedent to subject matter jurisdiction in the trial court. City of South Bend v. Brooksfield Farm (1981), Ind.App., 418 N.E.2d 305. The provisions concerning time are mandatory and a condition precedent to a court acquiring jurisdiction where review is sought from an administrative determination. State v. Van Ulzen (1983), Ind.App., 456 N.E.2d 459.

Id. More recently, however, our supreme court noted that an important principle of administrative law is that the failure to comply strictly with the jurisdictional requirements embodied in the statute providing for judicial review prevents a trial court for acquiring jurisdiction of the parties or the particular cause. Shipshewana Convenience Corp. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of LaGrange County, 656 N.E.2d 812, 813 n. 9 (Ind.1995); see also Chandler v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Evansville and Vanderburgh County, 658 N.E.2d 80, 81 (Ind.1995) (reaffirming the "important principle of administrative law that where there is a failure to comply strictly with the jurisdictional requirements embodied in the statute ... a trial court does not acquire jurisdiction of the parties or the particular case" and concluding that "strict compliance with jurisdictional requirements embodied in the statute are required for a trial court to acquire jurisdiction").

These cases did not address whether a challenge to the trial court's jurisdiction was waived because that issue was not timely raised. In fact, in these cases, motions to dismiss were filed.³ For that reason, these cases are not directly on point. Nevertheless, we emphasize that our supreme court more recently specifically stated that the failure to comply with statutory requirements affects a trial court's jurisdiction over the parties and the cause and did not mention subject matter jurisdiction. See Shipshewana, 656 N.E.2d at 813 n. 9; Chandler, 658 N.E.2d at 81.

What we take from all of these cases is that the issue of whether statutory compliance goes to subject matter jurisdiction or jurisdiction over the case is not as straightforward as the Board contends. For example, in the case relied on by the Dixon court for the proposition that a trial court does not acquire subject matter jurisdiction, we stated, "In an action for judicial review of an administrative determination, compliance with statutory requirements is a condition precedent to the exercise of `review jurisdiction' by the trial court." City of South Bend v. Brooksfield Farm, 418 N.E.2d 305, 307 (Ind.Ct.App. 1981) (quoting Gleason v. Real Estate Commission ex rel. Lewis, 157 Ind.App. 344, 346, 300 N.E.2d 116, 117 (1973)). "Failure to comply with the statutory mandate is jurisdictional." Id.

In Gleason, on which many cases have relied, a panel of the court cited to White v. Board of Medical Registration and Examination of Ind., 235 Ind. 572, 577, 134 N.E.2d 556, 560 (1956), in which our supreme court observed without citation, "A failure to perfect an appeal from a court within time deprives the court of review of jurisdiction of the subject matter of the particular appeal." The Gleason court also cited Indiana State Personnel Board v. Parkman, 252 Ind. 44, 49, 245 N.E.2d 153, 156 (1969), in which our supreme concluded that certain provisions of the Administrative Adjudication Act, including the timely filing of the record, are required to give the court "jurisdiction of the cause."

To further confuse matters, in Ballman v. Duffecy, 230 Ind. 220, 229, 102 N.E.2d 646, 650 (1952), our supreme court observed, "[A] court in acquiring jurisdiction must not only have jurisdiction of the parties and the general subject of the controversy respecting real property, but must have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the particular case." In this case, however, the court went on to state, "A failure to comply with the statute is jurisdictional, and therefore the trial court did not have jurisdiction of the parties or the particular case." Id., 102 N.E.2d at 650.

More recently, in Indiana Department of Environmental Management v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 703 N.E.2d 680, 682 (Ind. Ct.App.1998), the party seeking judicial review filed a timely petition, but the petition did not include the statutorily required information. Observing that the failure to satisfy the statutory requirements is a jurisdictional defect, we concluded that the trial court failed to obtain jurisdiction of the particular case and that Bethlehem's motion to dismiss was properly granted. Id. at 682-83.

Finally, in Indiana Civil Rights Commission. v. City of Muncie, 459 N.E.2d 411, 416 (Ind.Ct.App.1984), we addressed the Commission's claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to review this case because the City failed to timely file the record of proceedings. We concluded, "Furthermore, while filing the transcript is jurisdictional, it is a matter of jurisdiction over the particular case, and may be waived." Id. Because it did not appear from the record that any timely objection was made to the City's first two requests for time extensions, the Commission's failure to timely object constituted a waiver of any objection to the grant of those extensions. Id. We held that the trial court properly assumed jurisdiction over the case. Id.

Based on the muddied distinctions between subject matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the case, as illustrated by these cases, we reject the Board's attempt to oversimplify the issue. Accordingly, we rest on our discussion of the two types of jurisdiction in our original opinion. We reaffirm our conclusion that Werner's untimely motion for extension of...