Indiana State Employees Association, Inc. v. Boehning

• Decision Date: 13 April 1973
• Docket Number: No. IP 73-C-99.,IP 73-C-99.
• Citation: 357 F. Supp. 1374
• Parties: INDIANA STATE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., et al. v. Richard A. BOEHNING et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

357 F. Supp. 1374

INDIANA STATE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., et al. v. Richard A. BOEHNING et al.

No. IP 73-C-99.

United States District Court, S. D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

April 13, 1973.

Donald R. Anderson and Ronald Elberger, Bose, McKinney & Evans, Indianapolis, Ind., for plaintiffs.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen. of Ind. by Sheldon Breskow and Edward Squier Neal, Indianapolis, Ind., for defendants.

ENTRY

NOLAND, District Judge.

The above entitled cause came before the Court for hearing on April 2, 1973, on plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction and other pending motions. At the beginning of said hearing, plaintiffs withdrew their discovery motions and the Court granted plaintiffs' motion for consolidation of trial on the merits with the hearing on the application for preliminary injunction pursuant to Rule 65(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, taking defendants' motion to dismiss under advisement. For the reasons which follow, the scope of this entry is limited to a discussion of the propriety of applying the abstention doctrine in this cause.

Plaintiffs allege jurisdiction based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), (4) and seek injunctive relief and monetary damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. The central issue presented to the Court is whether plaintiff Phyllis A. Musgrave and others similarly situated have been denied due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment by the policy and practice of the Indiana Highway Commission of discharging employees summarily and denying them a prior hearing to determine whether such employees are being discharged in accordance with the provisions of the Indiana State Highway Commission — Bi-Partisan Personnel System, IC 1971, 8-13-1.5-1. The underlying factual dispute between the parties concerns whether there was sufficient cause for the termination of plaintiff Musgrave's employment pursuant to IC 1971, 8-13-1.5-6.

IC 1971, 8-13-1.5-6 provides as follows:

"Dismissal of employees for cause. — Any employee may be dismissed, demoted, suspended or laid off for cause. For the purpose of this chapter §§ 36-163c-36-163j cause shall be any action or inaction of any employee that produces, incurs or results in the substantial diminution of the employee's ability or willingness to perform his duties, impairs the ability or willingness of any other employee of the institution or agency of state government to perform his duties or brings discredit upon the State of Indiana. Cause may include but shall not be limited to the following:

Intoxication on the job; physical or mental inability to perform the job requirements; personality characteristics which substantially limit the employee's or his fellow employee's ability to perform his duties, or which severely handicap the administration of the commission; and, action or inaction which severely limits or prohibits the implementation of administrative policies. IC 1971, 8-13-1.5-6, as added by Acts 1971, P.L. 92, § 1, p. 436."

Plaintiffs contend that the foregoing section of the Bi-Partisan Personnel System Act gave Mrs. Musgrave the due process right to a pre-discharge hearing to determine whether cause for her dismissal existed. The defendants, on the other hand, deny that any such right exists.

The Bi-Partisan Personnel System Act is silent on the question of whether a hearing is required before dismissal for cause, and no Indiana court has had the opportunity to construe the Act and resolve this uncertainty. Furthermore, no Indiana court has had occasion to consider whether the Administrative Adjudication and Court Review Act, IC 1971, 4-22-1-1 et seq., Ind.Stat.Anno. § 63-3001 et seq. (Burns' 1961 Repl.) is applicable to the Bi-Partisan Personnel System, thus establishing not only the right to a pre-discharge hearing but also setting forth the procedures for such administrative hearings and determinations and providing for judicial review in the Indiana courts.¹

It is the opinion of the Court that should the Administrative Adjudication and Court Review Act be construed to apply to the Bi-Partisan Personnel System, then plaintiff would have a right to a pre-discharge hearing as a matter of Indiana law. Such construction of Indiana law would, therefore, obviate the need for this Court to pass upon the federal constitutional issue of whether plaintiffs' due process rights were violated by defendants' refusal to grant such a hearing.²

Given this situation, the propriety of abstention is well illustrated by Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639, 640, 79 S.Ct. 455, 456, 457, 3 L.Ed.2d 562, and Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 90 S.Ct. 788, 789-790, 25 L.Ed. 2d 68 (1970) wherein the Supreme Court stated that:

"Proper exercise of federal jurisdiction requires that controversies involving unsettled questions of state law be decided in the state tribunals preliminary to a federal court's consideration of the underlying federal constitutional questions. * * * That is especially desirable where the questions of state law are enmeshed with federal questions. * * * Here, the state law problems are delicate ones, the resolution of which is not without substantial difficulty — certainly for a federal court. * * * In such a case, when the state court's interpretation of the statute or evaluation of its validity under the state constitution may obviate any need to consider its validity under the Federal Constitution, the federal court should hold its hand, lest it render a constitutional decision unnecessarily."

The facts in the instant case are highly analogous to those before the Supreme Court in Reetz. Plaintiff Musgrave claims to have a property interest under the Bi-Partisan Personnel System Act which establishes personnel policies regulating employment with Indiana State Highway Commission. In addition to the enunciation of specific policies, the Act makes provision for rulemaking authority as follows:

"Rule for bipartisan personnel system. — The Indiana state highway commission shall enforce, through the executive director, the provisions of this chapter §§ 36-163c—36-163j and shall have the power to promulgate all rules necessary for the most effective administration of a bipartisan personnel system established by this chapter." IC 1971, 8-13-1.5-2.

Although the Indiana State Highway Commission has not exercised this rulemaking authority and has denied the existence of a right to a pre-discharge hearing under the Bi-Partisan Personnel System, an Indiana court of competent jurisdiction could well conclude that the aforementioned rule making powers of the Commission extend to dismissal for cause (see IC 1971, 8-13-1.5-6 set forth supra) and require the Commission to exercise those powers to establish procedures for pre-termination hearings in conformity with the policies embodied with the Act and the Indiana Constitution.³ Similarly, an Indiana Court of competent jurisdiction could well conclude that despite the rule-making authority vested in the Highway Commission, the Administrative Adjudication and Court Review Act is applicable to the Bi-Partisan Personnel System Act, and that the Commission must therefore conduct pre-discharge hearings in accordance with the detailed provisions of the Administrative Adjudication and Court Review Act. Finally, it is possible that an Indiana court ruling on these issues would conclude that employees of the Indiana State Highway Commission do not have a right to a...