Indiana Waste Systems, Inc. v. County of Porter

• Decision Date: 12 March 1992
• Docket Number: Civ. No. H 89-338.
• Citation: 787 F. Supp. 859
• Parties: INDIANA WASTE SYSTEMS, INC., Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF PORTER, Brian Gesse, William Carmichael, Larry Sheets, in their capacity as members of Bd. of Com'rs of Porter County; Porter County Bd. of Health, and Gary A. Babcoke, in his capacity as Porter County Health Officer, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

787 F. Supp. 859

INDIANA WASTE SYSTEMS, INC., Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF PORTER, Brian Gesse, William Carmichael, Larry Sheets, in their capacity as members of Bd. of Com'rs of Porter County; Porter County Bd. of Health, and Gary A. Babcoke, in his capacity as Porter County Health Officer, Defendants.

Civ. No. H 89-338.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division.

March 12, 1992.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Robert F. Parker, Beckman, Kelly & Smith, Hammond, Ind., for plaintiff.

Robert A. Welsh, Chesterton, Ind., David L. Hollenbeck, Valparaiso, Ind., for defendants.

ORDER

LOZANO, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Indiana Waste Systems, Inc.'s ("IWS") Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint filed on March 20, 1990, and Motion for Summary Judgment filed on May 16, 1990. Before the Court is also the County of Porter, Brian Gesse, William Carmichael, Larry Sheets, Porter County Board of Health and Gary A. Babcoke's ("Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment filed on July 6, 1990. For the reasons set forth herein, IWS' Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint is DENIED, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART, and IWS' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED.

BACKGROUND

IWS operates the Wheeler Landfill, a landfill located in Porter County, Indiana (the "Landfill"). The Landfill operates under permit issued by the Indiana Department of Environmental Management ("IDEM"). Ind.Admin.Code tit. 329, art. 2, et seq. (1991). The Landfill disposes of approximately 875,000 yards of waste per year, which results in revenue ranging from $4.8 to $5.25 million. The Porter County Board of Health (the "Board") enacted an ordinance, effective September 1, 1989 (the "Ordinance"), which regulates all sanitary landfills in Porter County (the "County") that require a permit from IDEM.¹ Porter County, Ind., Ordinance 89-16 (July 17, 1989) hereinafter "Ordinance".

In sum, the Ordinance sets up a permitting system in which landfill owners must apply for a permit in order to operate a landfill within the County's borders.² Within 45 days of receipt of an application for a permit, the health officer of the County is to decide "whether or not to issue the applicant a local permit for operation of a sanitary landfill ..." (Ordinance, at Section III). If a permit is denied, the applicant can appeal to the Board. The Ordinance also provides that a permit may be revoked or suspended if the facility operates in violation of any of the technical criteria contained in Section II of the Ordinance.³

Section V of the Ordinance provides for an assessment of an annual fee against a landfill of $.20 per cubic yard of waste disposed in the landfill. Collected fees are placed in a cumulative, nonreverting fund administered and managed by the County Treasurer. Based on the amount of waste that IWS collects, it estimates that it will be paying the County approximately $175,000 to $200,000 per year. The cost⁴ of implementing the landfill oversight program is estimated at $25,000 to $30,000 per year. Under the Ordinance, any sums taken over and above the costs of administering the program will be used to promote, encourage, and implement public and private recycling programs.

IWS advances three bases for why the Ordinance is unconstitutional. First, IWS contends that Section III of the Ordinance, which sets up the permitting process, violates their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. IWS believes the section is unconstitutionally vague because it provides no guidance to government officials who are in the position of granting or denying permits and contains no standards by which an applicant could seek judicial review of permit actions. Second, IWS argues that Section V, which assesses a fee of $.20 per cubic yard of waste deposited, is an unconstitutional land use regulation which constitutes a regulatory taking of IWS' property without compensation within the Fifth Amendment as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment. Third, IWS believes that Section V violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the fee imposed is not rationally related to any legitimate exercise of the County's police power. IWS asserts that these three constitutional violations establish that the Defendants, in enacting the Ordinance, denied IWS the privileges and immunities of the Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and requests this Court to declare the Ordinance unconstitutional and to enjoin the County from enforcing its provisions. Lastly, IWS asks this Court for attorneys fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

In Defendants' Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Pending Motion for Sumary sic Judgment and in Support of Defendant's Pending Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants contend that the Ordinance is constitutional because it is explicit as to the requirements that a landfill owner must meet in order to qualify for a permit, namely complying with Ind.Admin.Code tit. 329, art. 2, et seq. (1991). Defendants also argue that the procedure is not vague because to apply for a local permit all a landfill owner has to do is file a duplicate of the IDEM application. In addition, Defendants argue that the fee provided for in Section V is a legitimate exercise of their police power and that the fee will become a cost of doing business which is passed on through its customers.⁵ Further, Defendants contend that the fee would not result in a significant reduction in value of IWS' property and thus no taking within the Fifth Amendment. Lastly, Defendants believe that the Ordinance is rationally related to the County's legitimate interests, among others, of promoting and implementing recycling programs and defraying the costs of enforcing the Ordinance.

DISCUSSION

A. IWS' Second Motion To Amend Complaint

The grant or denial of a motion to amend a complaint is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. E.g., Jones v. Hamelman, 869 F.2d 1023, 1026 (7th Cir.1989). Moreover, Rule 15(a) mandates that leave to amend a complaint "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). The Court notes that Defendants are not objecting to the IWS' Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint and, in fact, Defendants have answered Plaintiff's second amended complaint. However, this Court finds that IWS' amendments are specious, as neither the first nor the second amended complaint would cure blatant jurisdictional defects. Therefore, IWS' motion to amend is DENIED.

B. Cross-Motions For Summary Judgment

Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper only if it is demonstrated "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Walter v. Fiorenzo, 840 F.2d 427, 434 (7th Cir.1988); Beard v. Whitley County R.E.M.C., 840 F.2d 405, 409 (7th Cir.1988); Roman v. United States Postal Serv., 821 F.2d 382, 385 (7th Cir.1987); McGraw-Edison Co. v. Walt Disney Prods., 787 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir.1986); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 1267 (7th Cir.1986). "Whether a fact is material depends on the substantive law underlying a particular claim and `only disputes over facts which might effect the outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.'" Walter, 840 F.2d at 434 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 211 (1986)).

The burden is upon the moving party to establish that no material facts are in genuine dispute, and any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue must be resolved against the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-162, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1609-1610, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Backes v. Valspar Corp., 783 F.2d 77, 79 (7th Cir.1986). To preclude summary judgment, a non-moving party must show a material issue of fact. "A party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue may not rest on its pleadings, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of material fact which requires trial." Beard, 840 F.2d at 410. Therefore, if a party fails to establish the existence of an essential element of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment will be appropriate. In this situation, "there can be no `genuine issue as to any material fact', since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of a non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). See also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511.

Defendants claim that there are two material facts in dispute which would preclude summary judgment. The first is IWS' statement that "one of the clear purposes of this scheme was to reduce the amount of waste being deposited at the Wheeler Landfill and thereby prolong its life". (Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts and "Genuine Issues" Pursuant to General Rule 11, at 2.) Defendants claim this is an inaccurate statement. The second is IWS' assertion that the committee formed by the Board to study the solid waste disposal situation in the County ("the Committee") "neither solicited nor received disposal statistics from any other landfill or solid waste disposal facility in Porter County." Id. Defendants reply to this assertion by stating that the chairman of the Committee, Mr. Les Chapman, was head of disposal for Bethlehem Steel Corporation and brought to the Committee his knowledge and insight concerning private industrial waste disposal facilities in Porter County which knowledge was shared with the Committee on a regular basis. Id. As to Defendants' first contention, this Court finds that this to not be a...