Indianapolis & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 28 April 1885
• Citation: Indianapolis & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 102 Ind. 352, 26 N.E. 200 (Ind. 1885)
• Parties: Indianapolis & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Johnson.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

102 Ind. 352

26 N.E. 200

Indianapolis & St. L. Ry. Co.

v.Johnson.¹

Supreme Court of Indiana.

April 28, 1885.

Appeal from superior court, Vigo county.

J. T. Dye and W. E. Hendrich, for appellant.J. H. Blake, J. W. Shelton, and W. H. Spencer, for appellee.

ELLIOTT, J.

The first paragraph of the appellee's complaint alleges that he was employed by the appellant as switchman, and that while engaged in coupling cars he was injured, without any fault on his part.The cause of the injury is thus stated: “And the plaintiff says that said cars were wholly and totally unfit for the purpose of transporting rails, and that said injury was sustained by him through and in consequence of the negligence and fault of defendant, in this: that defendant suffered, permitted, and directed said cars to be used for transportation of said rails, when it knew, and had good reasons to know, that said cars were totally unfit for that purpose, on account of said rails being so much longer than said cars, and when other cars of sufficient length and proper make could have been procured; and by loading bent or crooked iron on said cars, being packed up and allowing the same to project downward, and over the end of said cars, whereby the plaintiff's hand was caught and injured, as aforesaid; and said defendant suffered, permitted, and directed said bent and crooked iron rails to be placed on and projecting over the end of said cars last named, with the bent or crooked side or end downward, when, if proper care and precaution had been taken, and said crooked rails had been placed on said car with the crooked end up, instead of down, this plaintiff would not have run the same risk in attempting to perform his duty in coupling said cars, and he might not have been injured in any way.But the defendant had good reason to know that the said bent and crooked iron rails so projecting downward would greatly increase the risk to the person attempting to make a coupling, and would endanger the life of any person caught between the end of said rail and any object that it might push against.”

The general statement that the cars were unfit for the transportation of iron rails is not of controlling importance, for the specific statement which follows it is the one which governs.A general introductory statement, or a general conclusion, will always yield to specific statements of the facts.Ragsdale v. Mitchell, 97 Ind. 458;McMahan v. Newcomer, 82 Ind. 565;State v. Wenzel, 77 Ind. 428, ( vide authorities, page 430;)Richardson v. Snider, 72 Ind. 425;Reynolds v. Copeland, 71 Ind. 422.Acting upon this rule of pleading, we must hold that the specific statement of the facts controls the general averment.

The paragraph of the complaint under immediate mention does not show that the employer of the appellee negligently supplied unsafe machinery; on the contrary, the facts specifically stated clearly show that the injury of which the appellee complains was caused by the manner in which the cars were loaded.The cause of the injury was not unsafe machinery, but the improper use of safe machinery.It is too well settled to admit of debate that for the negligence of one fellow-servant, engaged in the same line of employment, another servant cannot make the master answerable.Car Co. v. Parker, 100 Ind. 181.The rule applies to such cases as this.Ballou v. Railway Co., 54 Wis. 257, 11 N. W. Rep. 559;Smith v. Potter, 46 Mich. 258, 9 N. W. Rep. 273.It is contended by the appellee that it is not alleged that the cars were loaded by his fellow-servants, and therefore that the question argued by the appellant is not presented.We think otherwise.The appellee must affirmatively make out his case, and to do this he must state all the facts essential to a cause of action; he cannot...