Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Co. v. Kinney

• Court: Indiana Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Hadley, J.
• Citation: Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Co. v. Kinney, 171 Ind. 612, 85 N. E. 954 (Ind. 1908)
• Decision Date: 27 October 1908
• Docket Number: 21,149
• Parties: Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Company v. Kinney, by Next Friend

85 N.E. 954

171 Ind. 612

Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Company v. Kinney, by Next Friend

No. 21,149

Supreme Court of Indiana

October 27, 1908

Rehearing Denied January 28, 1909.

From Marion Circuit Court (14,329); Henry Clay Allen, Judge.

Action by Thomas J. Kinney, by his next friend, William Kinney against the Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Company. From a judgment on a verdict for plaintiff for $ 3,500 defendant appeals.

Reversed.

F. Winter and W. H. Latta, for appellant.

Elliott & Elliott and George W. Galvin, for appellee.

OPINION

Hadley, J.

Appellee was an employe of appellant. He and five others were employed to do service as common laborers in constructing and repairing tracks for the defendant, a street-railroad corporation. He claims that his injury was caused by the negligent act of John Wilson, another employe of appellant, who was at the time foreman of said gang of laborers. The gang was taken by Wilson to a flatcar standing on a siding, to unload some steel rails. The plaintiff was ordered by Wilson to bring an implement from the tool-car. In the plaintiff's absence, Wilson superintended the placing of some skids on the side of the flat-car, down which to slide the rails, and upon plaintiff's approach to the car Wilson ordered him to step up and, with the implement he had, turn the rails off the car onto the skids. In obedience to the order plaintiff turned a rail off, and when it dropped onto the skids, one of the skids slipped off the car, and caused the rail to drop upon and injure the plaintiff.

The complaint is in a single paragraph, and rests on the second subdivision of § 8017 Burns 1908, Acts 1893, p. 294, § 1, known as the employers' liability act. It is alleged: "That while so employed on June 15, as aforesaid, this plaintiff was directed and instructed by John Wilson, foreman of the work gang, who had power and control over said plaintiff, and to whose orders and directions he was bound to conform, and did conform; * * * that said Wilson directed the construction of, and saw to the placing of, certain skids to be used in moving said rails from said car, but in such a careless and negligent manner as to make them unsafe and dangerous to use; * * * that the falling of said skids was caused wholly and entirely by the negligence and carelessness of said defendant and of said John Wilson in the erection of said skids, and by the negligence and carelessness of said defendant and John Wilson in not furnishing sufficient men to handle, control and carry the irons at the time being moved; * * * that at the time of said accident said plaintiff was obeying the orders of said Wilson, to whose orders, by reason of his employment, he was bound to conform and did conform." Knowledge on the part of the defendant and Wilson of the unsafe and dangerous condition of the skids is averred, and on the part of the plaintiff is denied.

There was no demurrer to the complaint. The answer, so far as material in this appeal, was the general denial. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant's motion for a new trial having been overruled, it appeals.

The errors assigned call in question the sufficiency of the complaint and the overruling of the motion for a new trial.

The court instructed the jury, over defendant's objection, in substance, that if they found from the evidence that the plaintiff was in the employ of the defendant, and under the direction of another employe of the defendant in charge of the work, and if such other employe, or superintendent, negligently constructed or placed the skids, and if plaintiff had no knowledge, or means of knowledge, of such condition, and, while performing the work he was directed to perform by said superintendent, said skids fell, by reason of said negligence, and injured the plaintiff, then they should find for the plaintiff, unless the plaintiff himself was negligent.

The complaint and instruction each presents the same question, and assumes that the employers' liability act applies to the facts stated. Is appellee correct in this assumption?

Appellant, in maintaining the negative, contends that the statute referred to, contravenes the 14th amendment to the federal Constitution, in that it denies to the appellant the equal protection of the law, in its capacity as an employer. This question received the consideration of the court in Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Montgomery (1898), 152 Ind. 1, 49 N.E. 582, 69 L.R.A. 875, 71 Am. St. 300, and has been before the court in a number of cases since (Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Hosea [1899], 152 Ind. 412, 53 N.E. 419; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Lightheiser [1907], 168 Ind. 438, 78 N.E. 1033; Bedford Quarries Co. v. Bough [1907], 168 Ind. 671, 80 N.E. 529, 14 L.R.A. [N.S.] 418); but in no subsequent case has any reason been suggested to impair our confidence in the rule on this point, as laid down in Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Montgomery, supra, and, being satisfied therewith, we deem it unprofitable to repeat the reasons for such holding.

It has always been held in this State that section twenty-three of the bill of rights, in spirit and meaning, did not forbid the making of such classification of subjects for legislative purposes as are demanded by reasons of economy, convenience and the best interests of the public, and it is found that any such classification can be made as will treat all alike and bring within its influence all who are under the same conditions. To illustrate: It would be found burdensome, wasteful, and even impracticable for our cities of the smaller class to be compelled to maintain the expensive municipal machinery found necessary to the successful government of our larger cities.

The constitutionality of the employers' liability act is upheld on the ground that the inclusion of railroads only is a proper classification, because it relates to the peculiar hazards inherent in the use and operation of railroads, and refers to the character of the employment and not to the employer. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Lightheiser, supra; Bedford Quarries Co. v. Bough, supra; Johnson v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (1890), 43 Minn. 222, 45 N.W. 156, 8 L.R.A. 419; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Haley (1881), 25 Kan. 35; Potter v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (1877), 46 Iowa 399.

The peculiar and superlative dangers to which employes are necessarily exposed in the running of trains form the basis of such classification, and it is not, therefore, material whether the employer in railroad service is a corporation, partnership or an individual. The liability is the same. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Lightheiser, supra.

To separate railroading from all other kinds of business is not an unconstitutional discrimination, because no other business is beset with so many and severe dangers as those encountered by employes, in preparing for, and during, the movement and operation of railroad trains. Indianapolis Union R. Co. v. Houlihan (1901), 157 Ind. 494, 60 N.E. 943, 54 L.R.A. 787. Such classification cannot be arbitrarily made. There must exist some good and natural reason for it.

We said in Bedford Quarries Co. v. Bough, supra, touching this subject: "Such legislation must not only operate equally upon all within the class, but the classification must furnish a reason for, and justify the making of, the class; that is, the reason for the classification must inhere in the subject-matter, and rest upon some reason which is natural and substantial." See a large line of authorities collated on pages 674 and 675 of said case.

Laws are general and uniform, not because they operate on all alike, for they do not, but because everyone who is brought within the circumstances and conditions provided by the law is affected thereby.

Notwithstanding the language of the statute is "that every railroad or other corporation, except municipal, operating in this State, shall be liable for damages for personal injury suffered by any employe while in its service," it must not for a moment be understood that the benefits of the statute are extended to all employes of a railroad corporation, or to any other class of employes than those whose duties expose them to the peculiar hazards incident to the use and operation of railroads. There is no reason, in fact or fancy, why the benefits of the statute should be extended to the office and shop employes of railroad corporations, or to others removed from the dangers of train service, and denied to the multitude of other workmen engaged in businesses of like and equal hazard.

So far as our researches have gone, no court has attempted to set up an arbitrary line of demarkation by which the application of the statute may be determined. It is apparent that no reliable test can be established by any general rule. Each case must be decided upon its own facts, the court bearing in mind that to keep within constitutional limitations the statute must be construed as designed exclusively for the benefit of those who are, in the course of their employment exposed to the particular dangers incident to the use and operation of railroad engines and trains, and whose injuries are caused thereby. Bedford Quarries Co. v. Bough, supra. By this, we do not mean that it is essential to the bringing of an employe within the statute that he should be connected in some way with the movement of trains, but it seems sufficient if the performance of his duties brings him into a situation where he is, without fault, exposed to the dangers and perils flowing from such operation and movement, and is by reason thereof injured by the negligence of a fellow servant described in the act. Williams v. Iowa Cent. R. Co. (1903), 121 Iowa 270, 96 N.W. 774, and cases cited; Frandsen v. Chicago, etc....