Indianapolis Union Ry. Co. v. Dohn

• Decision Date: 23 May 1899
• Citation: 53 N.E. 937,153 Ind. 10
• Parties: INDIANAPOLIS UNION RY. CO. v. DOHN.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

153 Ind. 10

53 N.E. 937

INDIANAPOLIS UNION RY. CO.

v.DOHN.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

May 23, 1899.

Appeal from circuit court, Marion county; Henry Clay Allen, Judge.

Suit by the Indianapolis Union Railway Company against Benjamin Dohn. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Baker & Daniels, for appellant. Schuyler Haas, for appellee.

BAKER, J.

Suit to enjoin appellee from entering upon the station grounds of appellant to solicit customers for his hack. The question arises upon appellant's exception to the conclusions of law upon the facts specially found. The facts are briefly these: Appellant is a corporation composed of various railway companies, and organized under the act of March 2, 1885 (Acts 1885, p. 30; Burns' Rev. St. 1894, §§ 5232-5250; Horner's Rev. St. 1897, §§ 3964a-3964s). Appellee is the driver of a public conveyance, commonly called a “hack,” engaged in the business of transporting persons, without discrimination, from place to place, in and about Indianapolis. Appellant owns the Union passenger station at Indianapolis. It acquired the ground partly by condemnation and partly by purchase. The station building faces north. The tracks are south of the building, under a train shed. At the north of the building is an open area, bounded on the north by Jackson Place street, on the east by McCrea street, on the south by the station building, and on the west by Illinois street. The distance from Jackson Place street to the station building is 67 feet. Along the north line of the building is a sidewalk 16 feet wide. The residue of the area is paved, and used as a driveway to and from the entrance, which is at the center of the north front. This condition has continued 10 years. Appellant, by contract, undertook to give the Frank Bird Transfer Company the exclusive right to stand hacks on the area, and solicit business of persons leaving the station. Employés of the transfer company were accustomed to stand their hacks upon the area at all hours of day and night, and for such length of time as they pleased. Intending passengers were allowed to alight at the entrance of the station building from their private conveyances, or from public ones that had been employed to bring them there. Arriving passengers were permitted to be met at the entrance by their private conveyances, or by public ones previously engaged to meet them. All other vehicles except the transfer company's were excluded from the area. Appellant has had rules in force to this effect for many years. The city, by ordinance, permitted hacks to stand along the west side of McCrea street. An ordinance forbade hackmen to approach the station building nearer than 15 feet to solicit business. Appellee, within three weeks before the commencement of this suit, at least a dozen times, drove his hack upon the area outside of the sidewalk, when he had no passenger to be discharged or to be received, and stayed from half an hour to an hour at a time, soliciting business from arriving passengers. Appellant several times told him that he should leave; that he was violating appellant's rules and regulations; and that he was trespassing on private property. Appellee each time refused to leave, stating that he had the right to stand his hack on the area so long as the transfer company was permitted to stand its hacks there, and that he intended to continue to come upon the area so long as the transfer company was given that privilege. From this finding it does not appear that appellee's conduct was boisterous, or that he was interfering with appellant in the discharge of its duties to the passengers of the proprietary and associate railway companies, or that he was annoying or interfering with the passengers, or that he was refusing to comply with any rule or regulation of appellant that applied to all hackmen.

Appellant has the undoubted right to make rules and regulations concerning the use of its station and grounds. Lucas v. Herbert, 148 Ind. 64, 47 N. E. 146. The term “rules and regulations,” however, implies uniformity in operation, not discrimination, for the pecuniary advantage of the promulgator. The...