Individually v. Luzerne Cnty.
| Decision Date | 25 April 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. 3:17-CV-1443,3:17-CV-1443 |
| Parties | M.J. individually and as parent and natural guardian of G.S. and C.J., minors, Plaintiffs, v. LUZERNE COUNTY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(JUDGE CAPUTO)
Presently before me are three motions: (1) a motion to dismiss (Doc. 35) filed by Luzerne County (the "County"), Luzerne County Children and Youth Services ("LCCYS"), Jesse Goshert ("Goshert"), and Maryann Rambus ("Rambus") (collectively, where appropriate, "County Defendants"); (2) a motion for partial dismissal (Doc. 37) filed by Concern-Professional Services for Children, Youth, and Families ("Concern"), Lisa Ross ("Ross"), and Kathy Sheridan ("Sheridan") (collectively, where appropriate, "Concern Defendants"); and (3) a motion to dismiss (Doc. 38) filed by Kathy Ryan ("Ryan"). M.J., individually and as parent and natural guardian of G.S. and C.J. ("Plaintiffs"), commenced this action against the County/LCCYS, and two employees, a private foster care agency and two employees, and a foster mother asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law related to alleged abuse and sexual assault of G.S. and C.J. while they were in foster care. Because Plaintiffs fail to plead sufficient factual matter to support a finding that Concern and Ryan are in a master-servant relationship and because the County and LCCYS are immune from liability with respect to Plaintiffs' state law claims asserted here, these vicarious liability claims will be dismissed. In all other respects, the motions to dismiss will be denied.
The facts as alleged in the Amended Complaint are as follows:
M.J. is the parent of minor children/Plaintiffs G.S. and C.J. (See Doc. 29, ¶¶ 4-5). Goshert was an LCCYS caseworker at all relevant times. (See id. at ¶¶ 7, 18). Rambus was Goshert's supervisor. (See id. at ¶¶ 8, 18). Concern is an agency that provides foster care placement and adoption services, and it had a contract with the County/LCCYS to place children into foster homes. (See id. at ¶ 9). Ross and Sheridan were employed by Concern as caseworkers. (See id. at ¶¶ 10-11, 19).
In May 2014, LCCYS had custody of G.S. and C.J. and they were placed in foster care at Ryan's home, but M.J. and her family had visitation rights. (See id. at ¶¶ 15-16). G.S. was three years old and C.J. was almost seventeen months old at the time. (See id. at ¶ 16). Goshert and Rambus were the LCCYS employees responsible for the placement of G.S. and C.J. in Ryan's home, while Ross and Sheridan were the Concern employees responsible for that placement. (See id. at ¶¶ 98, 100). Goshert was G.S. and C.J.'s LCCYS caseworker, and Ryan's Concern caseworkers were Ross and Sheridan. (See id. at ¶¶ 18-19).
Shortly after they were placed with Ryan, M.J. and her family noticed that G.S. and C.J. wore dirty clothing, smelled like they had not been bathed, and had various scrapes and bruises. (See id. at ¶¶ 22-28). M.J. and her family also noticed that Ryan refused to buckle the children into car seats, and instead had her minor adopted son E.R. perform that task. (See id. at ¶¶ 29-30). There were also times where G.S. would show up for visitations dressed inappropriately because she was dressed by E.R. (See id. at ¶ 37). E.R. was thirteen or fourteen years old at the time. (See id. at ¶ 33).
M.J. and her family spoke to Goshert and Concern about the injuries to G.S. and C.J., but they did nothing and refused to investigate these complaints. (See id. at ¶¶ 40-46). After Goshert began to ignore their phone calls and hang the phone up on M.J. and her family, they raised their concerns to Rambus, but, just like Goshert, she did nothing. (See id. at ¶¶ 47-49).
In the spring of 2015, G.S. told M.J. that E.R. "does this to me" while inserting her fingers into her vagina. (See id. at ¶ 51). M.J. also observed G.S. touch C.J.'s private area when the children were in the bathtub together. (See id. at ¶ 52). M.J. reported these events to Goshert, but he responded that it was Concern's problem. (See id. at ¶¶ 53-54). After M.J. reported these events to Concern, G.S. was taken for an interview and examination at the Children's Advocacy Center, but the results of that examination were never provided to M.J. (See id. at 55-57).
M.J. also informed Ryan of the inappropriate touching. (See id. at ¶ 58). Ryan subsequently initiated G.S. and C.J's removal from her home due to problems she was having with E.R. (See id. at ¶ 59).
Thereafter, J.B., M.J.'s cousin, applied for kinship custody for G.S. and C.J., which she obtained in August 2015. (See id. at ¶¶ 61, 70). J.B. observed G.S. and C.J. engaging in concerning behavior, including: (1) G.S. attempting to urinate while standing because E.R. "would pee standing up"; (2) C.J. inserting her finger into G.S.'s anus while they bathed together; (3) G.S. trying to insert a toy snake into her vagina; and (4) G.S. and C.J. attempting to enter the bathroom when occupied by a male. (Id. at ¶ 73). G.S. also told J.B. that E.R. "put his pee pee in my mouth and then peed in it." (Id. at ¶ 74). J.B. was also told by G.S. that she had informed Ryan about this behavior and Ryan "just yelled at E.R., but the abuse did not stop." (Id. at ¶ 75).
J.B. alerted officials about this conduct, and G.S. was again taken to the Children's Advocacy Center for an interview in the fall of 2015. (See id. at ¶¶ 76-79). Following that interview, J.B. was told by a counselor that the allegations were "unfounded." (Id. at ¶ 79).
The following summer, G.S. told both M.J. and another individual about the instances where E.R. put his privates in her mouth. (See id. at ¶¶ 80-83). In addition, C.J. told M.J. that E.R. touched her privates. (See id. at ¶ 84).
E.R., prior to being adopted by Ryan, was involved with Loftus-Vergari and Associates ("Loftus-Vergari"), a private foster care agency. (See id. at ¶¶ 88-89).That agency conducted an evaluation and "determined that E.R. should not be placed in foster homes with other children because of his abuse history," which included sexual abuse. (Id. at ¶¶ 87, 90). In a child profile prepared for E.R.'s adoption by Ryan, Loftus-Vergari recommended that E.R. not be placed in foster homes with other children. (See id. at ¶ 91).
The County, LCCYS, and Concern were aware of E.R.'s history of abuse and of the evaluation and report recommending that E.R. not be placed with other children. (See id. at ¶¶ 35-36, 94). Goshert and Rambus had access to E.R.'s LCCYS file, including his child profile and information about his history of abuse. (See id. at ¶ 95). Ross and Sheridan had access to Ryan's file, including information about E.R.'s history of abuse. (See id. at ¶ 96). Goshert, Rambus, Ross, and Sheridan placed G.S. and C.J. "in a household with E.R., an individual with a known history of severe abuse, including sexual abuse, and who was not supposed to be placed with other children." (Id. at 141).
Based on the foregoing, M.J., individually and as parent and natural guardian of G.S. and C.J., commenced the instant action on August 14, 2017. (See Doc. 1, generally). Plaintiffs subsequently filed an Amended Complaint on November 20, 2017. (See Doc. 29, generally). Therein, Plaintiffs assert the following causes of action: (1) "State Created Danger/Substantive Due Process Violation" against Goshert, Rambus, Ross, and Sheridan (Count One); (2) "Unconstitutional Policies and Customs" against the County, LCCYS, and Concern (Count Two); (3) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against Goshert, Rambus, Ross, Sheridan, and Ryan (Count Three); (4) Vicarious Liability against the County, LCCYS, and Concern (Count Four); and (5) Negligence against Ross, Sheridan, Ryan, and Concern (Count Five). (See id.).
All Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. (See Docs. 35, 37-38, generally). Those motions have all been fully briefed and are now ripe for disposition.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "Under the 'notice pleading' standard embodied in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must come forward with 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
When resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "a court must consider no more than whether the complaint establishes 'enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary elements' of the cause of action." Trzaska v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 865 F. 3d 155, 162 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016)). In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, a court must take three steps: (1) identify the elements of the claim; (2) identify conclusions that are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and (3) assume the veracity of the well-pleaded factual allegations and determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. See Connelly, 809 F.3d at 787 (citations omitted). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)).
County Defendants, Concern Defendants, and Ryan have each moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. I will address the Counts in order.
Count One of the Amended Complaint asserts a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim against Goshert, Rambus, Ross, and Sheridan pursuantto 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth...
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