Indus. Trust Co. v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 08 March 1943
• Docket Number: No. 1617.,1617.
• Citation: 30 A.2d 853
• Parties: INDUSTRIAL TRUST CO. v. TAYLOR et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

30 A.2d 853

INDUSTRIAL TRUST CO.

v.TAYLOR et al.

No. 1617.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 8, 1943.

Appeal from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Philip C. Joslin, Judge.

Bill of interpleader by Industrial Trust Company against Edward F. Taylor, administrator of the estate of William Taylor, deceased, and Martha McNabb, to determine the ownership of a bank account with the complainant. From a decree for Martha McNabb, Edward F. Taylor, administrator, appeals.

Appeal denied, decree affirmed, and cause remanded.

Huddy & Moulton, of Providence, for complainant.

Martin M. Zucker and F. Harlan Flint, both of Providence, for respondent Martha McNabb.

Frank G. Shea and Francis J. O'Brien, both of Providence, for respondent Edward F. Taylor.

CONDON, Justice.

This is a bill of interpleader to determine the ownership of a bank account with the complainant, Industrial Trust Company, in the names of William Taylor and Martha McNabb. The superior court entered its decree ordering the respondent Edward F. Taylor, administrator of the estate of the aforesaid William Taylor, deceased, hereinafter referred to as the appellant, and the aforesaid Martha McNabb, only daughter of the deceased, hereinafter referred to as the appellee, to interplead. The appellant and appellee accordingly filed answers and the cause was thereupon heard orally by a justice of the superior court who duly entered a decree that the appellee was entitled to the account. From that decree the appellant has appealed to this court.

The appellant sets out in his reasons of appeal that such decree is against the law and the evidence and the weight of the evidence. In support of such reasons he contends that the justice of the superior court failed to follow the law applicable to the case; that the evidence fails to show that William Taylor made a completed gift to the appellee of a joint interest in the disputed bank account to take effect in his lifetime; and, finally, that the trial justice's rescript shows that his decision is clearly contrary to the great weight of the evidence. These contentions may be reduced to two: First, that the trial justice committed an error of law in not applying the correct rules of law to the case; and, second, that his decision on the evidence is clearly wrong and should be reversed. We shall consider those points in that order, but before doing so it may be helpful if we state briefly the substantial facts out of which this cause arose.

William Taylor died suddenly at his place of employment on September 3, 1940. He left surviving him four sons, Edward F., John, James and William Taylor, and a daughter, Martha McNabb. Only William and Martha were living with their father at his home in Phillipsdale, East Providence. The other children were married and maintained their own homes.

Martha McNabb gave up her own home in Pawtucket and also her employment late in 1932, at her father's express request, and came to live at his home, in order to care for her mother, who was then in the last stages of a long illness, of which she died on March 7, 1933. Martha's husband had died in 1929, leaving her and a daughter Mary surviving him. After her mother's death, she continued to live with her father and took care of his home until his death. During this period, she, herself, was not always in good health and her father appears to have shown concern about her future. It also appears that he was interested in the future of her daughter Mary and assisted her financially in obtaining a business education, and later helped her to obtain a position in the office of the industrial plant where he was employed.

William Taylor manifested his interest in the financial welfare of his daughter in a more substantial way a short time after his wife's death. On May 29, 1933, he opened the bank account in dispute here in the names of William Taylor and Martha McNabb, “payable to either or to the survivor.” A little later he accompanied his daughter to the bank and asked her to sign her name to a card on which the bank kept the items of the account. She signed the card and he then handed her the bankbook and told her it was hers. She took it home and kept it for several years thereafter in the drawer of a dresser in her room. Later, at his suggestion, it was kept in a safe deposit box belonging to him. This box was in his den and each of them had access to it. Martha never deposited any of her own money in the account and she never withdrew any therefrom for her own purposes. She did, however, make two withdrawals for other purposes. Her father made a number of withdrawals which were used to pay premiums on life insurance which he had taken out for her benefit.

What her father intended by these acts is the controversy which the justice, who heard this cause in the superior court, was called upon to determine. To aid him in the performance of this duty the parties introduced a great deal of testimony and some documentary evidence. Much of it, however, appears to be of very little, if any, value in deciding what was the intention of William Taylor at the time he opened the account and gave the bankbook to his daughter. The trial justice seems to have sensed this and, as a consequence, confined his consideration to such evidence as had some probative value in the determination of the precise question before him.

It also appears that, in his consideration of the evidence, he recognized that it was incumbent upon him to weigh all of such evidence against as well as that in support of the form of the account. In other words, he correctly conceived the law to be that the form of the account subsisting at the death of the alleged donor was entitled to weight in determining the donative intent, although it was not controlling in the face of competent evidence tending to show a contrary intent. Moreover, it is clear from his rescript that he recognized that the burden was upon the appellee to prove a gift to her of an interest in the account. Those rules of law are not disputed here and are well established by our decisions most of which were recently reviewed in Peoples Savings Bank v. Rynn, 57 R.I. 411, 190 A. 440.

The contention of the appellant that the trial justice did not apply these rules is not borne out by a careful reading of his rescript. On the contrary, we are of the opinion that he not only acknowledged their applicability to the evidence before him but that he also...