Industrial Commission of Colorado v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 06 May 1918
• Docket Number: 9237.
• Citation: 64 Colo. 480,174 P. 589
• Parties: INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF COLORADO et al. v. AETNA LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

174 P. 589

64 Colo. 480

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF COLORADO et al. v. AETNA LIFE INS. CO.

No. 9237.

Supreme Court of Colorado

May 6, 1918

Rehearing Denied July 1, 1918.

In Banc. Error to District Court, Denver County; H. P. Burke Judge.

Proceeding by Cora M. Lynch and others, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, to recover compensation for the death of Charles E. Lynch, deceased, opposed by the AEtna Life Insurance Company, a corporation. From a judgment of the district court vacating an award, the Industrial Commission and petitioners bring error. Reversed, with directions.

White and Bailey, JJ., dissenting.

Leslie E. Hubbard, Atty. Gen., and John L. Schweigert, Asst. Atty Gen. (Walter E. Schwed, of Denver, of counsel), for plaintiffs in error.

Milton Smith, Charles R. Brock, W. H. Ferguson and John P. Akolt, all of Denver, for defendant in error.

SCOTT J.

This is an appeal by the Industrial Commission of the state, from a judgment of the district court vacating an award by that commission under the workmen's compensation statute (Laws 1915, p. 515). The claim for compensation is by Cora M Lynch, widow, and Clyde and Orville Lynch, dependent children of Charles E. Lynch, deceased.

The cause was tried upon an agreed statement of fact both before the commission and the district court, as follows:

'Charles E. Lynch, from a time prior to August 1, 1915, when the Workmen's Compensation Act became effective, and until the time of his death, on September 14, 1915, was an employé of the C. E. Walker Contracting Company. Mr. Lynch was a resident of the state of Colorado, and the C. E. Walker Contracting Company was and is a Colorado corporation, with its principal office in the city and county of Denver. The contract whereby Mr. Lynch was originally employed or hired was made in the state of Colorado.

'The C. E. Walker Contracting Company has a general contract with the Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Company for the construction of telephone exchange buildings at different points in the states of Colorado, Wyoming, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Arizona, and New Mexico. Lynch was employed to act as foreman in connection with the construction of these buildings.

'On September 13, 1916, Lynch had just completed his work as foreman in connection with the erection of a telephone exchange at Afton, in the state of Wyoming. He intended to leave Afton that day by the regular stage running to Montpelier, Idaho, where he was to undertake the work of foreman on a similar job. For some reason, however, he missed the stage and was invited to ride to Cokeville, Wyo., in a Ford automobile and there catch a train for Montpelier, the only way out of Afton. The automobile was privately owned and operated by an acquaintance residing at Afton, and he was invited to take the trip as a guest; no payment of compensation being expected. In addition to the owner of the machine and Mr. Lynch, there were two other passengers. When the machine approached Cokeville, it skidded for some reason and turned absolutely over. When the car was lifted, Mr. Lynch was unconscious. He was taken to the hospital at Montpelier on the first train and there operated on. It developed that the base of his skull was fractured and that nothing could be done for him. He died approximately 24 hours later and on the 14th day of September, 1915. The accident which resulted in his death happened in the state of Wyoming.

'That the average weekly wage of the said Lynch exceeded $16.00.'

The defendant in error, having complied with the statute, in that respect admits its liability, if the award was properly allowed under the workmen's compensation statute.

The judgment of the trial court is based on the conclusion that the facts do not support an award by the commission to the dependents of the deceased workman.

It is contended by defendant in error that the judgment should be sustained for the reasons: (a) That it does not appear that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment; and (b) that the Workmen's Compensation Act of this state has no extraterritorial effect.

As relates to the first question raised, section 8, c. 179, Laws 1915, provides:

'The right to the compensation provided for in this act, in lieu of any other liability whatsoever, to any and all persons whomsoever, for any personal injury or death accidentally sustained on and after August 1, 1915, shall obtain in all cases where the following conditions concur: (1) Where, at the time of the accident, both employer and employé are subject to the provisions of this act. (2) Where, at the time of the accident, the employé is performing service arising out of and in the course of his employment. (3) Where the injury is proximately caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and is not intentionally self-inflicted or intentionally inflicted by another.'

The agreed statement limits the inquiry to that of whether or not, under the law applicable, is this a case where the injury was proximately caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. At the time of his employment and at the time of the accident and death, Lynch was a resident of the state of Colorado. The employment was to act as foreman for his employer in the construction of telephone exchange buildings for a telephone company, operating and erecting buildings in the several states of Colorado, Wyoming, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Arizona, and New Mexico. To do this he must necessarily proceed from one point to another within these several states, and it must be assumed that he was to so proceed to and from such places as directed by his employer. He had just completed a duty within his employment at the town of Afton, Wyo. He was proceeding under direction of his employer to the town of Montpelier in the state of Idaho, to perform a like duty. He was proceeding to the railroad station at Cokeville by automobile, the only way provided to reach the railroad station. There is no indication of any unnecessary loss or waste of time. Was he then acting in the course of his employment at the time of the accident?

Workmen's compensation laws are comparatively new in the United States, and it is but natural that in this early period of judicial interpretation there should be divergent views as between the courts of the several states in some respects. The difficulty in this particular seems to have arisen because of an apparent failure in some cases to clearly recognize the distinction in principles to be applied in such cases, and those applicable in negligence cases.

Under the principle of compensation awarded and commanded by the state, the question of negligence is in no sense involved. The validity of these statutes, in so far as has been determined by our courts, rests upon the basis of a proper exercise of the police power, as being in the interest of the public welfare. The purpose primarily is to relieve the public of the burden of supporting injured workmen and their dependents, who may by reason of such injuries become objects of charity. The expense is to be treated as an additional cost of the operation of business, and under our statute is collected by the state from the employer in the nature of premiums, based upon the number of employés, wages paid, the character of employment, and other consideration calculated to establish a reasonable charge for accident insurance. This fund is designated as an insurance fund, from which the commission is required to make allowances to the workman and his dependents according to nature and character of the injury as provided and detailed in the statute.

It is quite apparent that it was not the purpose of the law to hold the right of compensation to such strict construction of the term 'scope of employment,' as in cases of tort where the employer may be held to compensation for his own negligence. In fact the term 'in the course of employment,' used in the statute, may well be said to differ in meaning from the term 'scope of employment' as used in judicial determinations in negligence cases. In truth, the payment of compensation does not fall upon the employer at all, but is to be charged to the expense of operation of the business, and is therefore made a part of the cost of the product, as much so as the cost of labor, materials, and other actual expenses of operation, so that this expense of insurance becomes ultimately and in fact a part of the price to the purchaser of the product and to that extent is paid by the public.

Our courts are in agreement that these acts should be broadly and liberally construed, to the end that their beneficent intent and purpose may be reasonably accomplished. Upon this point it was said in Zappala v. Industrial Ins. Comn., 82 Wash. 314, 144 P. 54, L.R.A. 1916A, 295:

'In construing the language of the act, we must have in mind the evident purpose and intent of the act to provide compensation for workmen injured in hazardous undertakings reaching 'every injury sustained by a workman engaged in any such industry; and make a sure and certain award therefor, bearing a just proportion to the loss sustained, regardless of the manner in which the injury was received.' State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 P. 1101, 37 L.R.A. (N. S.) 466, and that the act should be liberally interpreted, to the end that the purpose of the Legislature in suppressing the mischief and advancing the remedy be promoted even to the inclusion of cases within the reason although outside the letter of the statute, and that every hazardous industry within the purview of the act should bear the burden arising out of injuries to its employés regardless of the cause of the injury. Peet

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