Industrial Commission v. Superior Court In and For Pima County

• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: MOLLOY; HATHAWAY, C.J., and KRUCKER
• Citation: Industrial Commission v. Superior Court In and For Pima County, 423 P.2d 375, 5 Ariz.App. 100 (Ariz. App. 1967)
• Decision Date: 03 February 1967
• Docket Number: No. 2,CA-CIV,2
• Parties: The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona, David M. Schreiber and C. E. Singer, Jr., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Arizona IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF PIMA, and the Honorable William C. Frey, Judge thereof, and George Santen and Edith E. Santen, husband and wife, real parties in interest, Respondents. 343.

Page 375

423 P.2d 375

5 Ariz.App. 100

The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona, David M. Schreiber and C. E. Singer, Jr., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Arizona IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF PIMA, and the Honorable William C. Frey, Judge thereof, and George Santen and Edith E. Santen, husband and wife, real parties in interest, Respondents.

No. 2 CA-CIV 343.

Court of Appeals of Arizona.

Feb. 3, 1967.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 27, 1967.

Review Denied March 21, 1967.

Shimmel, Hill, Kleindienst & Bishop, by Merton E. Marks, Phoenix, for petitioners.

William E. Messing, Tucson, for respondents, Santen.

MOLLOY, Judge.

The petitioners have heretofore filed in this court two petitions for extraordinary relief: (a) a petition for a writ of certiorari, seeking review of the superior court's refusal to grant their motion for a change of venue and (b) a petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent the superior court from further proceedings in the action presently pending.

The respondents have urged, among other things, as grounds for denial of extraordinary relief, the fact that both petitions were not filed within a reasonable time, since eleven months intervened between the trial court's rulings herein involved and the filing of the subject petitions. Our statutes and rules do not limit the time within which extraordinary writs may be sought. The doctrine of laches may be applied in a proper case as a bar, but the mere expiration of time is not the controlling factor. The applicability of the doctrine would require an intervening change of position of the respondents induced by the inaction of the petitioner. See Felix v. Superior Court of County of Pima, 92 Ariz. 247, 250, 375 P.2d 730 (1962).

It was the opinion of this court that the eleven months delay in seeking review of the venue ruling by certiorari was prejudicial to the respondent real parties in interest and certiorari was denied. As to the writ of prohibition, we did not believe the doctrine of laches was applicable and accordingly issued an alternative writ of prohibition.

The sole question to be resolved in this original proceeding is the superior court's jurisdiction to proceed to trial as to the Industrial Commission of Arizona, David M. Schreiber, and C. E. Singer, Jr., in Pima County Superior Court action No. 89882, captioned.

'GEORGE SANTEN and EDITH E. SANTEN, Husband and Wife, Plaintiffs,

vs.

STATE OF ARIZONA, INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, DAVID M. SCHREIBER and C. E. SINGER, JR., Defendants.'

This lawsuit was instituted by the filing of a pleading entitled 'Complaint for Damages' by the plaintiffs. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff was injured in the course of his employment and made claims for compensation to the Industrial Commission. After certain proceedings which did not include a hearing on the merits, the claim was denied for 'lack of jurisdiction' in the Industrial Commission to change a previous order denying compensation for the reason the plaintiff did not file a timely motion for rehearing. Thereafter on May 4, 1964, the plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court of Arizona for a writ of certiorari, the Industrial Commission moved to quash the petition which motion was denied, and upon stipulation of the parties the Supreme Court entered the following order:

'The Court having read the Stipulation to Remand filed in the referenced action and being fully advised in the premises,

'IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action be, and the same is hereby, remanded to the respondent Industrial Commission of Arizona to be set for a hearing on the merits.

'Dated this 28th day of July, 1964.'

The complaint goes on to recite that a hearing date was set and then canceled, that all further hearings were canceled until further notice and when plaintiff insisted upon an immediate hearing in January, 1965, the plaintiff '* * * was notified by defendant C. E. Singer that there was a question once again as to jurisdiction.' Finally, according to the complaint, a hearing was held February 23, 1965, at which time evidence of Santen's permanent disability was adduced. The complaint further alleges:

'That despite the allegations hereinabove referred to and in direct defiance of the order of the Supreme Court of this State of Arizona, the defendant, David M. Schreiber, speaking for the Industrial Commission issued a report * * * in which in essence the Industrial Commission once again took up the cry of 'no jurisdiction.' ¹

'That despite the law and the Supreme Court the Industrial Commission has sought to avoid compensation to the plaintiff; that the defendant's behavior is wanton, malicious and oppressive.

'That due to the malfeasance and misfeasance of the defendants, hereinabove set forth, the plaintiff has been unable to secure employment and as a result of the malicious conduct of the defendants and each of them, the family of the plaintiff have been sorely in need and want of funds for daily living.'

The prayer for damages, in addition to asking for fair and just damages, requested:

'* * * the sum of $100,000.00 punitive and exemplary damages as will actually punish these defendants and set them forth as an example to the State and Nation and show the people that the laws relating to Workmen's Compensation were made to protect the public from injuries due to Industrial Accidents; that the Industrial Commission was not set up to gather in funds and withhold the same from injured employees.'

The jurisdictional allegation recited:

'* * * that the Industrial Commission of Arizona is an administrative body politic of the State of Arizona; that the defendants David M. Schreiber and C. E. Singer, Jr., are employees of the Industrial Commission of Arizona.'

The petitioners, in lieu of answering the complaint, responded by individual motions to dismiss on certain enumerated grounds, including (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and (2) failure of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Both attacks are predicated upon the assertion that the authority to make an award in workmen's compensation cases is vested in the Industrial Commission, subject to appellate review by certiorari proceedings, that in the matters alleged in the complaint the defendants were acting in a judicial capacity, and are therefore cloaked with an immunity from civil action.

Before considering the propriety of the extraordinary relief sought by the petitioners, we shall address ourselves to consideration of the sufficiency of the complaint. It is well settled that a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted admits the truth of the facts therein alleged, for purposes of the motion. Blecick v. School District No. 18 of Cochise County, 2 Ariz.App. 115, 406 P.2d 750 (1965). In reviewing a ruling on such motion, an appellate court likewise must accept the well-pleaded facts of the complaint as true. Davis v. State, 1 Ariz.App. 264, 401 P.2d 749 (1965).

Affirmative defenses may be raised and determined on a motion to dismiss where the facts constituting the defense appear on the face of the complaint. Ross v. Ross, 96 Ariz. 249, 393 P.2d 933 (1964); Ginsburg v. Black, 192 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied 343 U.S. 934, 72 S.Ct. 770, 96 L.Ed. 1342, rehearing denied 343 U.S. 958, 72 S.Ct. 1050, 96 L.Ed. 1358 (1952).

Applying the foregoing principles governing Rule 12(b), 16 A.R.S., motions of dismissal for failure to state a claim, we believe that the petitioners' motions should have been granted. Accepting the factual allegations of the complaint as true, the posture of plaintiffs' claim for relief was that the Supreme Court of Arizona ordered the Commission to hold a hearing on the merits of Santen's compensation claim, that defendant Singer notified Santen that '* * * there was a question once again as to jurisdiction,' that defendant Schreiber, speaking for the Industrial Commission, issued a report which in essence alleged 'no jurisdiction' on the part of the Commission and that the Commission was seeking to avoid compensation to the plaintiff.

The specific conduct of the administrative body and its hearing officers, of which the plaintiffs complained, was clearly relative to determination of an employee's claim for workmen's compensation benefits. The referees raised the question of the Commission's jurisdiction of the claim--and act within the scope of their functions. The Industrial Commission, in making compensation awards, acts as a quasi-judicial body of limited jurisdiction. Edwards v. Industrial Commission, 3 Ariz.App. 290, 413 P.2d 800 (1966); Bailey v. Industrial Commission, 2 Ariz.App. 518, 410 P.2d 140 (1966); Jones v. Industrial Commission, 1 Ariz.App. 218, 401 P.2d 172 (1965); Butler v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 57 Ariz. 119, 111 P.2d 628 (1941); Alabam's Freight Co. v. Hunt, 29 Ariz. 419, 242 P. 658 (1926). Administrative agencies and their officers, when acting in relation to matters committed to their control or supervision, are immune from civil liability for the consequences of their acts. 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedures § 15; 43 Am.Jur. Public Officers § 274; Wilson v. Hirst, 67 Ariz. 197, 199, 193 P.2d 461 (1948). The rule of immunity applies despite the fact that the officer may have acted maliciously or corruptly. Davis v. Burris, 51 Ariz. 220, 75 P.2d 689 (1938); Wilson v. Hirst, supra.

It is argued by the respondent real parties in interest that this rule of immunity does not afford protection as to the acts complained of here. Liability for nonfeasance may attach when the duty is ministerial, i.e., when it is in obedience to the mandate of legal authority and the act is to be performed in a prescribed manner without the exercise of the officer's judgment as to the propriety of the act. 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedures § 15; 43 Am.Jur. Public Officers § 278.

We cannot agree that the...