Infanger v. City of Salmon
| Decision Date | 17 January 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 25843.,25843. |
| Citation | 137 Idaho 45,44 P.3d 1100 |
| Parties | Ray E. INFANGER and Vera S. Infanger, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross Respondents, v. The CITY OF SALMON, The City Council of the City of Salmon, Defendants-Respondents-Cross Appellants, and Charles E. Bender and Denise Bender, husband and wife, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Jim Jones & Associates, Boise, for appellants. Jim Jones argued.
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC, Idaho Falls, for respondents-cross appellants City of Salmon. Dale W. Storer argued.
Milton A. Slavin, Salmon, for respondents Charles and Denise Bender.
Ray and Vera Infanger appeal from summary judgment entered against them in their action challenging the vacation of a city street.
William Guth owned Lots 6 and 7 in Block 8 of the Shoup Subdivision in the City of Salmon, Idaho. On September 1, 1993, he sold Lots 6 and 7 to Simon and Susan Bowland (herein "Bowlands"), who executed a deed of trust to secure their payment of the purchase price. Lots 6 and 7 were adjoining lots, and they were bordered on the south by a platted but unimproved city street. The Bowlands also owned Block 10, a small, triangular piece of land located immediately south of the unimproved street.
In the fall of 1985, the City and the Bowlands began discussions about the City vacating Edwards Street and acquiring from Bowlands the eastern half of Block 10 in order to reconfigure a hazardous intersection at the eastern end of that block. As the discussions proceeded, the City proposed exchanging Edwards Street for the eastern half of Block 10.
On April 7, 1986, the City Council voted to proceed with the proposed land exchange. The City drafted Ordinance No. 494-86 (herein "Ordinance") and published notice of a public hearing on the Ordinance and the City's intent to exchange the parcels of land. The public hearing was held on May 5, 1986, and the City Council adopted the Ordinance at the close of the hearing. The Ordinance stated that the City intended to exchange that portion of the unimproved street located south of Lots 6 and 7 (herein "Edwards Street") for the eastern half of Block 10 owned by the Bowlands. On March 31, 1987, the City quitclaimed Edwards Street to the Bowlands, and they quitclaimed the eastern half of Block 10 to the City.
In early 1988 the Bowlands defaulted in making the payments due on Lots 6 and 7, and on July 5, 1988, Mr. Guth regained title to the lots through a non-judicial foreclosure of the deed of trust. On December 16, 1988, Guth sold Lots 6 and 7 to Ray and Vera Infanger (herein "Infangers"), who still own that property.
On November 23, 1993, the Bowlands sold Edwards Street and the remainder of Block 10 to Charles and Denise Bender (herein "Benders"). The Benders own Lots 4 and 5 of Block 8, which are located immediately west of Lots 6 & 7. They have a warehouse on Lots 4 and 5, and in 1995 they constructed on Edwards Street an addition to the warehouse and a concrete loading ramp. The ramp was built along the northern edge of Edwards Street, blocking Infangers' access to Edwards Street through the rear door of their building.
The Infangers commenced this action on June 28, 1996. They alleged in their complaint that the Ordinance was invalid, that they had an easement to use Edwards Street, that title to Edwards Street should be quieted in them, and that they had been damaged by the actions of the City and the Benders. The City answered and alleged various defenses including the statute of limitations, waiver and estoppel. The Benders also answered and asserted the same defenses that were alleged by the City. The Infangers also named the Bowlands as defendants, alleging that they may claim some interest in Edwards Street. The Bowlands were later dismissed by agreement of the parties.
The City and the Infangers each filed a motion for summary judgment. The City contended that the Infangers were not damaged by any action of the City; that as a matter of law the Infangers did not have a claim for damages against the City; that the Infangers had no standing to assert a claim for damages against the City; that any claim of the Infangers for liability created by statute or trespass was barred by the statute of limitations; that the Infangers' challenge to the Ordinance was not timely under Idaho Code § 50-1323; and that when enacting the Ordinance the City complied with Idaho Code §§ 50-311 and 50-1321. The Infangers countered the arguments made by the City and contended that the Ordinance was an invalid exchange of a city street for other property rather than the vacation of a city street. The district court characterized the Ordinance as the vacation of Edwards Street and granted partial summary judgment in favor of the City. It held that when enacting the Ordinance, the City had substantially complied with the statutory requirements for vacating a city street.
The district court then tried the issue of the Infangers' claimed easement, and concluded that they did not have an easement on Edwards Street. The Infangers appealed the grant of partial summary judgment, and the City cross-appealed alleging that the statute of limitations barred the Infangers from challenging the validity of the Ordinance.
In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Eagle Water Company, Inc. v. Roundy Pole Fence Company, Inc., 134 Idaho 626, 7 P.3d 1103 (2000). All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Id. If there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review. Post v. Idaho Farmway, Inc., 135 Idaho 475, 20 P.3d 11 (2001).
The district court characterized the Ordinance as vacating Edwards Street. It is clear from the record, however, that the City did not vacate Edwards Street. Rather, it attempted to exchange Edwards Street for a parcel of land owned by the Bowlands. The validity of the Ordinance must be based upon what the City actually did, not what, in hindsight, it wishes it would have done.
The City Council minutes of October 7, 1985, reflect that Mr. Bowland initially asked the City Council to vacate Edwards Street. The minutes of the meeting show the following:
Simon Bowland appeared before the Council to request the City to vacate that portion of Edwards St. that bisects his property on S. Daisy and Union Avenue. Motion by Jack Nelson, seconded by Stan Davis: The City Attorney to present the Council with the proper procedures necessary to vacate a public right-of-way and the City send a letter to the adjoining property owners of this request from Mr. Bowland. Motion passed 5 ayes 0 nayes.
The City Council discussed the matter again at its meeting on February 18, 1986. Again, it referred to the matter as the vacation of Edwards Street. The minutes reflect the following:
Motion by Stan Davis, seconded by Denny Hawley: Authorization be given to the City Engineer to proceed with the evacuation [sic] of a portion of Edwards Street and the reconstruction of S. Daisy Street in order to straighten the latter. The Public Works Committee shall meet February 25, 1996 at 5:30 p.m. to consider the recommendation from the Planning and Zoning Commission to rename specific streets.
By April 7, 1986, however, the transaction was characterized as a land exchange rather than a street vacation. The minutes of that meeting reflect the following:
The Ordinance was then drafted. It was drafted as a land exchange, not as a street vacation. The ordinance provided as follows:
Be it ordained by the Mayor and the City Council of the City of Salmon, Idaho:
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