Infante v. Whidden
| Decision Date | 30 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:12-cv-41-FtM-29UAM |
| Parties | IDALBERTO INFANTE and JAMES WHITE, Plaintiff, v. SHERIFF STEVE WHIDDEN, in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Hendry County, DETECTIVE ALLEN DAVIES, individually, RENE GARCIA, SHEILA CORNELL, RENE J. GARCIA, JR., in their individual capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This matter comes before the Court on three sets of motions to dismiss: (1) Defendants Rene Garcia, Sheila Cornell, and Rene Garcia Jr.'s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #63), to which plaintiffs filed a Response (Doc. #68); (2) Defendant Sheriff Steve Whidden's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for a More Definite Statement (Doc. #65), to which plaintiffs filed a Response (Doc. #69), and with leave of Court defendant Sheriff Steve Whidden (the Sheriff) filed a Reply (Doc. #77) and plaintiffs filed a Sur-Reply (Doc. #79); and (3) Detective Allen Davies' Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint, or in the Alternative, Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #66), to which plaintiffs filed a Response (Doc. #75). Various other housekeeping motions will also be addressed which relate to one or more of the motions to dismiss.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a Complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This obligation "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(citation omitted). To survive dismissal, the factual allegations must be "plausible" and "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555. See also Edwards v. Prime Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010). This requires "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(citations omitted).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), but "[l]egal conclusions without adequate factual support are entitled to no assumption of truth", Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011)(citations omitted). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "Factual allegations that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability fall short of being facially plausible." Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11thCir. 2012)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, the Court engages in a two-step approach: "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
As discussed below, the Court declines to consider Detective Davies's motion for summary judgment at this stage of the proceedings. Therefore, the summary judgment standard need not be discussed.
On December 26, 2012, the Court issued an Opinion and Order (Doc. #50) granting or granting in part defendants' motions to dismiss without prejudice. More specifically, as relevant here, the Court quashed service of process as to Sheriff Whidden but declined to address the other issues and granted additional time to perfect service of process. (Id., pp. 5-7, § III.) The Court also dismissed the two counts alleged against Rene Garcia (Garcia), Rene J. Garcia Jr. (Garcia Jr.) and Sheila Cornell (Cornell) because legal cause and malice were insufficiently pled to support a claim of malicious prosecution and the claim of abuse of process was voluntarily withdrawn. (Id., pp. 14-17, § V.) On January 10, 2013, plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #60), which is now the operative pleading.
At this stage of the proceedings, the Court takes all the factual allegations in the Second Amended Complaint as true. Plaintiffs Idalberto Infante (Infante) and James White (White)(collectively plaintiffs) are licensed by the State of Florida as surety agents. (Id., ¶ 5.) After conducting an investigation and surveillance of the wife of Jorge Manso, a fugitive who had secured a bond with plaintiffs and subsequently failed to appear, they were led to believe that Manso could be at the residence of defendants Garcia and Cornell. Manso's RV was parked on their property, Manso's wife had visited the house, the address was listed on the application for bond, and witnesses had seen Manso in the area. (Id., ¶ 13.) Plaintiffs stopped at a Shell gas station in Hendry County to organize their team before attempting to seize Manso from the residence of defendants Garcia and Cornell. (Id., ¶ 14.) At the gas station, plaintiffs encountered two Hendry County Sheriff's Office deputies and fully disclosed their intent and the location of the planned seizure. (Id., ¶ 15.) Plaintiffs were wearing black tactical gear, with shirts proclaiming "Surety Agent" in day/night glow letters on the sleeves and body, as well as identifying badges. (Id., 16.) The deputies notified dispatch of plaintiff's intent and presence in Hendry County, plaintiffs were given permission to proceed, but the deputies declined an invitation to accompany plaintiffs. (Id., ¶ 15.)
On May 5, 2009, plaintiffs, with the assistance of fellow surety agents and while armed, went to the residence of defendants Garcia and Cornell to secure Manso. (Id., ¶¶ 12, 17.) Upon arrival, plaintiffs secured entry by cutting the lock on the gate and surrounding the residence. Plaintiff White knocked on the front door and announced by "shouting" "surety agents". (Id., ¶ 17.) Defendant Cornell opened the door, was shown the bond paperwork, and was provided an opportunity to verify plaintiff White's credentials by calling the local Sheriff's office or police department. She declined to do so and granted permission to enter the residence. Plaintiff Infante also entered to translate for defendant Garcia and a third surety agent entered to secure a gun cabinet at the residence. (Id., ¶ 18.) When shown a picture, defendant Cornell initially denied knowing Manso, but recanted. Plaintiffs did not locate Manso after a room by room search. (Id., ¶ 19.) Defendants Garcia and Garcia Jr. then gave permission to search all containers located in the porch area, but Manso was not located. Plaintiffs also searched the RV located on the neighbor's property, which had been bought by the neighbor. (Id., ¶ 21.) Upon leaving the residence, plaintiffs provided their business card, gave Garcia and Cornell a printout regarding Manso, and indicated that they would be paid in exchange for information if they knew of Manso's whereabouts. Defendants Cornell and Garcia expressed no knowledge of Manso's location. (Id., ¶ 22.)
The next morning, on May 6, 2009, defendant Cornell called plaintiff White seeking payment for the damage to her property and a copy of Manso's bond application. She was referred to plaintiff Infante as lead agent for both requests, who denied the requests and denied liability for damage, which angered defendant Cornell. (Id., ¶¶ 24, 25.) After talking to plaintiffs, defendant Cornell contacted Hendry County Sheriff's Office. (Id., ¶ 26.) A deputy declined to file a report but directed defendant Cornell to call back later to talk to the sergeant on duty. When defendant Cornell called back, she contacted Detective Davies who went to the residence and filed a report after hearing from Garcia, Garcia Jr. and Cornell that plaintiffs had represented themselves to be police officers. (Id., ¶¶ 27, 28.) The following day, on May 7, 2009, defendants Garcia and Cornell pressed charges against plaintiffs. (Id., ¶ 2 9.)
A month later, on June 8, 2009, Detective Davies obtained an arrest warrant based upon his affidavit and the false reports of defendants Garcia and Cornell. Detective Davies fabricated the affidavit, designated plaintiff White as a convicted felon, falsely stated that plaintiffs were unlicensed, and contrived witness testimony. (Id., ¶ 32.)
On June 10, 2009, plaintiffs surrendered themselves in Monroe County based upon the Hendry County arrest warrant. (Id., ¶¶ 9, 30, 33.) Plaintiffs were charged with aggravated assault with adeadly weapon, criminal mischief for over $200, first degree armed burglary, and impersonating an officer. (Id., ¶ 10.) Defendants Garcia, Cornell and Garcia Jr. continued their false account by giving false depositions and false testimony during the criminal proceedings. (Id., ¶ 34.) On May 20, 2010, plaintiffs were both found not guilty on all charges. (Id., ¶ 11.)
The Second Amended Complaint alleges the following claims. Count I alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Detective Davies in his individual capacity for violation of the Fourth Amendment. Count II alleges a violation of § 1983 against Sheriff Whidden in his official capacity. Count III alleges a claim under Fla. Stat. § 768.28 against Sheriff Whidden in his official capacity for negligent hiring, training, supervision, control, and retention. Count IV alleges a claim under Fla. Stat. § 768.28 against Sheriff Whidden in his official capacity and Detective Davies in his individual capacity for false imprisonment/false arrest. Count V alleges a claim under Fla. Stat. § 768.28 against Sheriff Whidden in his official capacity and Detective Davies in his individual capacity for malicious prosecution. Count VI alleges a claim of malicious prosecution against Garcia, Garcia Jr. and Cornell.
Sheriff Whidden seeks dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint for various reasons, or in the alternative, a more definite statement. The Court rejects the Sheriff's argument that the Second Amended Complaint is...
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