Ingarra v. Ross Educ., LLC

Decision Date21 February 2014
Docket NumberCase No. 13-cv-10882
PartiesVIRGINIA INGARRA, Plaintiff, v. ROSS EDUCATION, LLC, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

HON. MARIANNE O. BATTANI

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)

Before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 10). Plaintiff Virginia Ingarra filed a complaint on March 6, 2013, against her former employer, Defendant Ross Education, LLC, ("Ross") alleging gender discrimination in violation of Title VII and Michigan's state law counterpart, the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act. At oral argument on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the Court granted Ingarra leave to amend her complaint. The Court heard oral argument on Defendant's second motion to dismiss on November 4, 2013, and at the conclusion of the hearing took this matter under advisement. Upon review of the pleadings, briefs, and arguments, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Ingarra began working for Ross in March 2010 as a dental instructor, and was promoted to Lead Dental Instructor in July 2011. (Doc. No. 9 at 2). In March 2012 she notified her supervisor that she would be undergoing in-vitro fertilization ("IVF") to try to become pregnant. (Doc. No. 9 at 2). While receiving IVF, Ingarra's supervisor told her that she had to work as a "teaching assistant" instead of as lead instructor to accommodate the procedure and allow her to sit. (Doc. No. 9 at 2-3). Ingarra alleges she never requested accommodations or asked to sit down while working. (Doc. No. 9 at 3). Her supervisor told her to work sitting down "because you are being pumped with so many hormones." (Doc. No. 9 at 3). Ingarra completed the procedure in late April 2012 and used accrued vacation time to take one week off after the procedure. (Doc. No. 9 at 3). Documents she sent to her employer while on leave indicated that her position was still listed with Ross as "Lead Dental Instructor." (Doc. No. 9 at 3).

Ingarra returned to work on May 2, 2012, but suffered a miscarriage that day. (Doc. No. 9 at 3). Ingarra was demoted the next day, her job title officially changed the next week, and her job status changed from full-time to part-time. (Doc. No. 9 at 3). In July 2012, Ingarra alleges that she had a conversation with her supervisor during a scheduling meeting. While reviewing Ingarra's survey results at this meeting, the supervisor said that "you are not a good cheerleader in the classroom and more focused on babies." (Doc. No. 9 at 4). Her supervisor asked if she intended to have additional medical procedures "regarding her desire to bear children." (Doc. No. 9 at 4). Ingarra objected to this question, but her supervisor pressed her to answer. (Doc. No. 9at 4). Ingarra alleges that her supervisor was specifically concerned with whether Plaintiff planned to become pregnant again. (Doc. No. 9 at 4).

Her supervisor also told her that she was emotionally unstable to teach because of the increase in hormones from IVF and her pregnancy. (Doc. No. 9 at 4). Ingarra objected that the IVF did not alter her mood, but her supervisor claimed that other employees asked about Ingarra and said she was moody and acting weird. (Doc. No. 9 at 4). Ingarra only worked occasionally from May through August 2012, and the last day she worked for Ross was August 20, 2012. (Doc. No. 9 at 4). Ingarra alleges that Ross's stated reasons for her demotion and termination were untrue and a pretext to cover up the real reasons, which were because of her gender and pregnancy. (Doc. No. 9 at 6).

Ross disputes many of Ingarra's factual allegations. According to Defendant, Ross Medical Education Center provides post-secondary certificate programs at multiple campuses in Michigan and other states. (Doc. No. 10 at 2). Ross agrees that it hired Ingarra in March 2010 as a dental instructor at its Madison Heights campus (Doc. No. 10 at 2). It contends that because Ingarra did not obtain the proper certification, it moved Ingarra to a "Teaching Assistant/Substitute" position on May 8, 2012. (Doc. No. 10 at 3). According to Ross, Ingarra did not object to this change in position at the time and signed a contract to become a Teaching Assistant. (Doc. No. 10 at 3). Ross states that another woman replaced Ingarra as Lead Instructor. (Doc. No. 10 at 3).

Ross also states that it never terminated Ingarra's employment; rather, shesimply refused to accept scheduling assignments beginning in August 2012. (Doc. No. 10 at 4). Ross maintains that Ingarra's efforts to become pregnant had no impact on the decision to remove her from the Lead Instructor position. (Doc. No. 10 at 4).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To properly state a claim, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." In order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must allege facts which, if proven, would entitle the plaintiff to relief. First Am. Title Co. v. DeVaugh, 480 F.3d 438, 443 (6th Cir. 2007). "A complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations with respect to all material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Weiner v. Klais & Co., 108 F.3d 86, 88 (6th Cir. 1997).

When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court "must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all factual allegations as true, and determine whether the complaint contains enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although the federal procedural rules do not require that the facts alleged in the complaint be detailed, "'a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements will not do.'" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."). A complaint's factual allegations must"allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.

Plaintiff is not required to plead all elements of a prima facie case of discrimination in order to survive a motion to dismiss, but still must convince the Court that her claim is plausible. See Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 609-10 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying Swierkiewicz to Twombly and Iqbal, concluding that the district court improperly required the plaintiff to plead all elements of a prima facie discrimination case to state a claim). Plaintiff's allegations must allow the Court to draw the reasonable inference that Defendant unlawfully discriminated against Plaintiff. Id. Prima facie elements that are impossible for Plaintiff to meet without further discovery need not be supported with specific factual allegations. Id.

III. APPLICABLE LAW

Plaintiff brings gender discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and under Michigan's analogous state law, the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act ("ELCRA"), Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2201, et seq. Both are analyzed under the same framework and require the same factual allegations. See Ondricko v. MGM Grand Detroit, LLC, 689 F.3d 642, 652 (6th Cir. 2012); see also White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 391 (6th Cir. 2008). The Title VII and ELCRA claims will be analyzed together, using the elements of a prima facie discrimination case for the framework. In addition, she brings a claim under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.

The first step in a Title VII gender discrimination claim is to establish a prima facie case. Texas Dept. Of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981);McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a protected group; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she was subjected to adverse employment action; and (4) was replaced by someone outside of the protected class, or similarly situated, non-protected employees were treated more favorably. Grace v. USCAR, 521 F.3d 655, 677 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Peltier v. United States, 388 F.3d 984, 987 (6th Cir. 2004)).

The analysis complicates when considering pregnancy discrimination claims under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA") of 1978. This law amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to protect against pregnancy discrimination by further defining Title VII's provision "on the basis of sex" as "because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k). The PDA overturned a Supreme Court case that held that pregnancy discrimination did not constitute gender discrimination.

The Sixth Circuit applies slightly different prima facie elements to a pregnancy discrimination claim, even though such a claim is analyzed "in the same manner" as other Title VII gender discrimination claims. Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 658 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Boyd v. Harding Acad. Of Memphis, Inc., 88 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 1996)). The plaintiff making a pregnancy discrimination claim must show that (1) she was pregnant; (2) she was qualified for her job; (3) she was subjected to an adverse employment decision; and (4) there is a nexus between her pregnancy and the adverse employment decision. Cline, 206 F.3d at 658 (citing Boyd, 88 F.3d at 413). In a termination case, a plaintiff meets the second prong by showing that shewas performing "at a level which met [her] employer's legitimate expectations." Id. (citing McDonald v. Union Camp Corp., 898 F.2d 1155, 1160 (6th Cir. 1990)).

The majority of lower c...

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