Inge v. Procunier
| Decision Date | 22 February 1984 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 83-0069-L. |
| Citation | 580 F. Supp. 1342 |
| Parties | Earl David INGE, Petitioner, v. Raymond K. PROCUNIER, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
John E. Falcone, Lynchburg, Va., for petitioner.
Thomas D. Bagwell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Richmond, Va., for respondent.
Earl David Inge has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Inge seeks to overturn his conviction for first degree murder entered in the Circuit Court for the City of Lynchburg on November 3, 1975. By memorandum opinion and order entered July 15, 1983, this court determined that Inge has exhausted his available state remedies as to all of the allegations set forth in his petition. The court has conducted an evidentiary hearing as to the merits of one of petitioner's claims. Both sides have presented oral argument and written memoranda as to all three claims now before this court. The case is now ripe for disposition.
On April 26, 1975, one Clifford Smith was shot to death in his apartment in the City of Lynchburg. The death was due to a shotgun blast fired from the rear of the apartment. On June 2, 1975, the petitioner, Earl David Inge, was indicted for murder in the first degree. Inge's court-appointed attorneys sought and received a psychiatric examination so as to determine whether petitioner was competent to stand trial. The psychiatrist found no evidence of abnormal mental processes. Inge then entered a plea of not guilty and the case came to trial before a jury on September 9, 1975.
It seems that on April 8, 1975, almost three weeks prior to the murder, Clifford Smith discovered that his apartment was being burglarized. Smith chased the burglar outside the apartment and soon thereafter, Earl David Inge was apprehended in a wooded area behind the apartment complex. Smith identified Inge as the burglar. Petitioner purportedly threatened Smith at that time. Inge was charged with statutory burglary. At a preliminary hearing on that charge, Smith testified against the petitioner. These circumstances were brought to light during the murder trial.
Testimony was also received at the trial describing the wooded area behind the decedent's apartment. Apparently, a creek runs through that area. The wooded area meets the end of Fleetwood Drive about two hundred yards from the apartment. Immediately following the shotgun blast, someone was heard running through the woods. No one was seen running from the apartment through the parking area in front of the apartment complex, nor were any vehicles seen moving in that area.
A pickup truck with a camper shell was seen on Fleetwood Drive headed toward the creek at approximately 8:30-8:40 p.m. on April 26, 1975. Smith was killed sometime between 9:00 and 9:05 p.m. Another witness testified that a vehicle moved extremely fast out of Fleetwood Drive between 9:30 and 10:00 p.m. on April 26. The witness who saw the pickup truck on Fleetwood Drive identified petitioner's truck as very much like the one he had seen on April 26, 1975. Another witness testified that he had seen Inge behind the apartment complex on April 14, 1975, and that the petitioner was acting in a suspicious manner.
The Commonwealth also introduced evidence relative to two shotguns which were kept at the home of petitioner's parents. It seems that Inge was initially interviewed by police at that home in the early morning hours of April 27, 1975. A police officer testified that at that time, one shotgun was clean and the other was filled with sand around the breech. Later on the same day, both guns were seized pursuant to a search warrant. At that time, both guns were clean. Inge testified that he had used one shotgun to shoot blackbirds at his parents' home on the afternoon of April 26, and that the gun had become dirty at that time. He stated that he had cleaned it at the first opportunity. It is now undisputed that both shotguns remained either on or around the prosecution's counsel table throughout the trial. It is also undisputed that neither shotgun was ever tendered or received into evidence.
Petitioner's evidence at trial was that he was at work by 8:00 a.m. on April 14, 1975 and that he could not have been observed acting suspiciously at the apartment complex. Inge testified that he was fishing on the early evening of April 26, that he went to his parents' house to pick up his son, and that he left at about 9:00 p.m. to return to Lynchburg. The route taken by petitioner took him very near the apartment complex in which Smith resided.
After deliberating for approximately four and one-half hours, the jury found plaintiff guilty of murder in the first degree. Petitioner was later sentenced to life imprisonment by the presiding Circuit Court Judge.
As grounds for relief, petitioner now maintains that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction; that the identification of his truck by the Commonwealth's witness deprived him of a fair trial; and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to preserve reversible error with regard to the exhibition of the two shotguns. The first two grounds are of little moment and need not long detain the court.
In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, the court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Even though the evidence against petitioner was purely circumstantial, the court must conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found Inge guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The Commonwealth's evidence established a motive. Inge's own testimony put him near the scene of the crime on the day in question. A witness identified petitioner's truck as having been the one at the scene of the crime at about the time of the shooting. The appearance of one of two shotguns at the Inge home shortly after the shooting indicated that it could very well have been transported through the muddy area behind Smith's apartment complex. The prosecution presented evidence suggesting that Inge's cleaning of this gun was suspicious.
It is not necessary for this court to agree that petitioner was guilty of the crime of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. It is only necessary to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have made that determination under the evidence presented. From the evidence presented in Inge's case, a rational trier of fact, choosing to believe the Commonwealth's witnesses, could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The court concludes that the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, supra has been satisfied.
The court must also conclude that the testimony relative to the identification of petitioner's truck did not deprive him of a fair trial. The witness who identified the truck viewed it in the parking lot of petitioner's place of employment sometime after the shooting. The truck was, at that time, surrounded by policemen. Although no other trucks like petitioner's were in the lot, the identification was not impressibly suggestive. The identifying witness testified that there was no suggestion by the police that petitioner's truck was the one on Fleetwood Drive at the time in question. The witness merely testified that the truck appeared to be the one he had observed on Fleetwood Drive. The trial judge carefully considered the witness' testimony before such testimony was presented to the jury.
Vehicles are not as distinctive and individual as are people. The court declines to extend all the requirements of a line-up identification of a defendant to the identification of an object. Viewed in this context, the court is unaware of any authority which would indicate that the admission of the testimony relative to the vehicle violated plaintiff's right to a fair trial. Because the admission of the identification did not violate the fundamental rights of petitioner, the admissibility, as a matter of state law, is not reviewable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. See Chance v. Garrison, 537 F.2d 1212 (4th Cir.1976); Grundler v. North Carolina, 283 F.2d 798 (4th Cir.1960).
Petitioner's final contention concerns the effectiveness of his defense counsel in responding to the prosecution's treatment of the two shotguns seized from the residence of petitioner's parents. As previously noted, it is undisputed that both firearms remained on or around counsel table, in full view of the jury, throughout the trial. While two police officers and the petitioner made reference to the guns in their testimony, no effort was made by either side to have either shotgun admitted into evidence. Petitioner now urges that the presence of the shotguns was most prejudicial in impact, and that his attorneys clearly erred in failing to take steps to exclude those particular firearms from the jury's view and consideration.
Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a criminal defendant, subject to incarceration, must be afforded the right to assistance of legal counsel. The right to legal counsel implies a right to effective assistance of counsel. Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir.1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 1885, 56 L.Ed.2d 394 (1978). In Marzullo, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit took explicit departure from the "farce and mockery" test which had long governed the determination of adequacy of defense counsel in this Circuit. See, e.g., Root v. Cunningham, 344 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1965). The Fourth Circuit took the occasion in Marzullo to state the applicable rule in terms of the normal range of competency test which had been enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25...
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Inge v. Procunier
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