Ingersoll v. Coram
| Decision Date | 22 March 1905 |
| Docket Number | 1,757. |
| Citation | 136 F. 689 |
| Parties | INGERSOLL v. CORAM et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Hollis R. Bailey, E. N. Harwood, and John H. Hazelton, for complainant.
Louis D. Brandeis, for defendants Coram and Root.
Thaddeus D. Kenneson, for defendant Root.
F. N Wier, for defendants Coram, Root, Cummings, and Palmer.
H. G Allen, for defendants Davis and Leyson.
L. S Dabney, for defendant Leyson.
Adler & Hall, for defendants Coram, Root, and Palmer.
This case was heard on demurrers which were disposed of by an opinion passed down on December 30, 1903 (127 F. 418), accompanied with an order which directed that on final decree the bill should be dismissed as to certain parties respondent, and which determined all the other issues in favor of the complainant. It was again heard on motion for interlocutory injunction, and an opinion passed down on August 15, 1904. 132 F. 168. The case has now been heard on bill answer, and proofs. The substantial conditions on the present hearing are so little changed from what they were at the hearing on the demurrers, and the order on the demurrers so far disposed of the issues in the case, that we have occasion to discuss only a very few topics. Some propositions were argued somewhat more fully by the respondents than when the case was submitted on the demurrers; but, with the following exceptions, we do not think it advantageous to attempt to review the questions which we then disposed of.
The respondents especially urge on us that the remedy must be limited to assets which are localized within this district by the proceedings in the probate court for Suffolk county, in Massachusetts, all of which were intended to be described in the decree for an interlocutory injunction which was entered on the 6th day of September, 1904. As this proceeding is under section 738 of the Revised Statutes, and can only be sustained in that aspect, it is very plain that the position of the respondents in this respect is correct, and the decree to be entered hereon must be framed accordingly, subject only to the necessity of entering personal judgments to which the liens asserted herein are incidental.
The respondents also claim that John A. Davis, who was the principal legatee in the will of Andrew J. Davis as the same was offered for probate, has deceased, and that no person has been appointed by the probate court within the jurisdiction as the legal representative of his estate, so that, therefore, there is an inevitable lack of necessary parties on the present bill. Under the circumstances of the case, however, John A. Davis, or his estate, stands, so far as these proceedings are concerned, in the same position as Mrs. Ellen S. Cornue, as explained in our opinion passed down on December 30, 1903, already referred to. If any representatives of the estate of John A. Davis had been joined as a respondent in this bill, he would necessarily be dismissed therefrom, so that the proposition of the respondents in this particular is wholly ineffectual.
The respondents urge again on us the fact that the probate court for the county of Suffolk formally probated the will of Andrew J. Davis as a will, so that, whatever the nature of the proceedings in Montana may be, the relations is the state of Massachusetts are those of legatees; and, also, so that, according to the probate records of Massachusetts, the estate of John A. Davis as principal legatee represents, and must be the sole representative of, all the interests sought to be reached by this bill. It is, therefore, maintained that, on a distribution made by that probate court, no apparent interest would be vested in any of the present respondents. This, however, is all a matter of form, with which equity does not seriously trouble itself. It may be that, inasmuch as the probate proceedings in Massachusetts are purely ancillary, and so appear on their face when taken altogether, the probate tribunals in that state will regard the proceedings in Montana as dominant, and make decrees of distribution accordingly, if they order distribution. Of course, we do not presume to undertake to determine what they ought to do in this respect, nor do we know what they ought to do; but, again whatever may be the result of their proceedings in distribution, and whosoever may be regarded by them as the proper nominal distributees, such result involves a mere question of form so far as we are concerned. Our only duty is to reach the beneficial interests as they must finally rest.
It is now urged on us for the first time that the agreement made with Mr. Ingersoll, which forms the basis of this bill created no lien,...
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White v. Keown
...undivided shares of heirs at law (the Ingersoll Case (C.C.) 127 F. 418; Id. (C.C.) 132 F. 168; Id., 133 F. 226, 66 C.C.A. 280; Id. (C.C.) 136 F. 689; Id., 148 F. 169, 178, C.C.A. 303; Id., 211 U.S. 335, 29 Sup.Ct. 92, 53 L.Ed. 208; Id. (C.C.) 174 F. 666; Id., 176 F. 194, 99 C.C.A. 548), and......
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Cornue v. Ingersoll
...211 U.S. 335, 29 Sup.Ct. 92, 53 L.Ed. 208; opinion of Circuit Court November 17, 1909, 174 F. 666. See, also, 148 F. 169, 78 C.C.A. 303; 136 F. 689. were originally commenced in the state courts of Massachusetts, and were removed to the Circuit Court of the United States upon the ground of ......
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