Ingersoll v. Palmer

• Decision Date: 19 December 1985
• Citation: 193 Cal.App.3d 617,221 Cal.Rptr. 659
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Previously published at 193 Cal.App.3d 617 193 Cal.App.3d 617 William INGERSOLL et al., Petitioners, v. Alfred PALMER et al., Respondents. A029680.

Page 659

221 Cal.Rptr. 659

Previously published at 193 Cal.App.3d 617

193 Cal.App.3d 617

William INGERSOLL et al., Petitioners, v. Alfred PALMER et al., Respondents.

A029680.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

Dec. 19, 1985.

Review Granted April 3, 1986.

Margaret C. Crosby, Alan L. Schlosser, Amitai Schwartz, Donna J. Hitchens, ACLU Foundation of Northern California, San Francisco, Paul L. Hoffman, Mark D. Rosenbaum, Joan W. Howarth, ACLU Foundation of Southern California, Los Angeles, for petitioners.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Martin S. Kaye, Linda Ludlow, Ronald E. Niver, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE

SCOTT, Associate Justice.

This petition, brought by taxpayers, challenges establishment of roadblock sobriety checkpoints in several California counties. At the time the petition was filed, most such roadblocks were only threatened, and petitioners sought to stay their operation. We denied the request for a stay, but issued an alternative writ to examine the legality of the proposed roadblocks. We have concluded that those roadblock sobriety checkpoints conducted according to guidelines which we will outline are permissible under the United States and California Constitutions.

I

In 1984, California's Attorney General rendered an opinion announcing that "California law enforcement agencies may lawfully utilize checkpoints in the detection and apprehension of persons driving under the influence of intoxicating substances if sufficient safeguards are taken to minimize the intrusion on motorists." (67 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 471 (1984).) The opinion suggested in some detail how checkpoints should be operated to satisfy constitutional requirements.

The Burlingame Police Department was the first to institute a sobriety checkpoint in this state. The California Highway Patrol then set up checkpoints at several locations around the state, and other police agencies announced their intention to follow suit. For purposes of this opinion, we need describe only the Burlingame checkpoint, which was expected to serve as a model for others. Based upon street layout, traffic patterns, and frequency of drunk driving arrests, an intersection on El Camino Real was selected for the checkpoint. With the approval of the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), and in accordance with Caltrans guidelines for lane closure, Burlingame officers placed warning signs (including one announcing a sobriety checkpoint) and used cones to taper the three northbound lanes into a one-lane traffic control point.

At the control point, the officers selected every fifth vehicle for sobriety screening. That car was diverted to another officer who handed an information letter and a self-addressed and stamped survey postcard to the driver. The officer shined his flashlight into the interior of the vehicle looking for open containers or other evidence of alcoholic beverage use. The officer observed for alcohol on the breath, slurred speech, glassy and/or bloodshot eyes, and other symptoms of impairment. If signs of impairment were observed, the officer would direct the driver to another officer, who would conduct a field sobriety test. If a motorist chose to avoid the checkpoint he or she would not be stopped for the act of avoiding the checkpoint.

The sobriety checkpoint was given extensive advance publicity including its date and general location. It operated from 10 p.m. to 3 a.m. the night of November 16-17, 1984. During that period, a total of 233 motorists were screened. Ten were asked to perform field sobriety tests, and all passed. According to the follow-up report, several cars contained sober drivers and intoxicated passengers. The average period of detention was 28 seconds for each motorist, and the 10 who took the field sobriety tests were detained for an average of 6.13 minutes. Of the 29 percent of the drivers who responded to the survey, about 91 percent said they were not significantly delayed and 80 percent approved of sobriety checkpoints to remove drunk drivers from the highways.

II

As the Attorney General's opinion points out, implicit in the nature of sobriety checkpoints is the fact that officers will stop vehicles without probable cause or individualized suspicion that the drivers are under the influence or are otherwise violating the law. Petitioners argue that in the absence of individualized suspicion, such detentions are prohibited by both the United States and the California Constitutions.

We first consider the requirements of federal law. There is as yet no United States Supreme Court decision squarely addressing this question. Nevertheless, Fourth Amendment principles articulated in several decisions of that court lead to the conclusion that a properly conducted roadblock would not violate the federal Constitution.

Although ordinarily the Fourth Amendment requires "some quantum of individualized suspicion" as a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure, it "imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion." (United States v. Martinez-Fuerte (1976) 428 U.S. 543, 560-561, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3084, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116.) Individualized suspicion has not been required in a series of United States Supreme Court decisions relating to "administrative searches." In general, these cases involve entry or attempted entry by an administrative official into residential or business premises, without a warrant, to inspect for compliance with statutory or regulatory standards such as housing or safety codes. (See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court (1967) 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930; See v. City of Seattle (1967) 387 U.S. 541, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943; Colonnade Corp. v. United States (1970) 397 U.S. 72, 90 S.Ct. 774, 25 L.Ed.2d 60; United States v. Biswell (1972) 406 U.S. 311, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 32 L.Ed.2d 87; Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. (1978) 436 U.S. 307, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 56 L.Ed.2d 305; Donovan v. Dewey (1981) 452 U.S. 594, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 69 L.Ed.2d 262.)

These housing and business inspection cases are not the only situations in which the United States Supreme Court has upheld a seizure not based on individualized suspicion. In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, supra, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116, the court held that a vehicle may be stopped at a fixed checkpoint operated away from the International Border by the border patrol for brief questioning of its occupants, without any reason to believe the particular vehicle contains illegal aliens. (Id., at p. 545, 96 S.Ct. at p. 3077.) The court reached that conclusion by weighing the government's interest advanced to justify the stop against the nature of the stop's intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests. It concluded that the need for routine checkpoint stops was great, because the flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled effectively at the border. (Id., at pp. 556-557, 96 S.Ct. at pp. 3082-83.) In contrast, it described a checkpoint stop as a "quite limited intrusion" on Fourth Amendment interests. Such a stop entailed only a brief detention, requiring no more than a response to a question or two and possible production of a document. Neither vehicle nor occupant was searched. The court also concluded that the "subjective instrusion" of a fixed checkpoint stop was minimal, unlike that of a random or roving stop. Motorists could see that other vehicles were being stopped, could see visible signs of the officers' authority, and were much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion. (Id., at pp. 557-558, 96 S.Ct. at pp. 3082-83.)

Nor did the court consider routine checkpoint stops a great interference with legitimate traffic. First, "[m]otorists using these highways are not taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second, checkpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity. The regularized manner in which established checkpoints are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by officials responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources. We may assume that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class. And since field officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case of roving patrol stops. Moreover, a claim that a particular exercise of discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop judicial review." (Id., at p. 559, fn. omitted, 96 S.Ct. at p. 3083 fn. omitted.)

Martinez-Fuerte was followed by Delaware v. Prouse (1979) 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, in which the court considered a random auto stop by a policeman to check a driver's license and registration. The officer had not observed any traffic or equipment violations, or any suspicious behavior, and was not acting pursuant to any standards, guidelines, or procedures pertaining to document spot checks promulgated either by his department or the State Attorney General. (Id., at p. 650, 99 S.Ct. at p. 1394.)

Although the court acknowledged the state's "vital interest" in ensuring that only qualified persons are permitted to drive and that vehicles are safe, it found the stop unconstitutional. A random stop is more than a minimal intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests, and there are more effective alternative mechanisms to enforce the state's highway safety program. (Id., at pp. 658-659, 99 S.Ct. at pp. 1398-99.) On balance, the contribution to highway safety of the random spot check did not...