Ingersoll v. Randall

• Decision Date: 01 January 1869
• Citation: 14 Minn. 304
• Parties: S. D. INGERSOLL v. MILES RANDALL.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

14 Minn. 304

S. D. INGERSOLL

v.MILES RANDALL.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court, Dodge county, sustaining a demurrer to part of answer.

Action upon a quantum meruit for threshing 1,658 bushels of grain.The answer, as one defence, alleged that the threshing was done with a threshing-machine, the horse-power and separator of which were connected by a tumbling-rod, without having the knuckles and tumbling-rod boxed or covered and enclosed.The plaintiff demurred to this part of the answer on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a defence.

S. L. Pierce, for appellant.

A. J. Edgerton, for respondent.

BERRY, J.

Section 1, c. 60, p. 99,Laws 1868, makes it the duty of any person having and operating a threshing-machine the horse-power and separator of which are connected by a tumbling-rod, to box or cover and enclose the knuckles and rods between the outside horse and the machine with a board box, so that no part thereof shall be exposed whereby persons shall be liable to be injured when the machine is in operation.

Section 2 provides that any person who shall refuse or neglect to comply with the foregoing requirement shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be finable in a sum not exceeding $50.The complaint states that the plaintiff, in the fall of 1868, at the request of and for the use of the defendant, threshed 1,658 bushels of grain; that said threshing was reasonably worth $69.84, and that the defendant promised to pay the plaintiff that sum.The threshing was, then, the consideration of the promise.One defence set up in the answer is that the threshing was done with a threshing-machine, the knuckles and rods appertaining to which were not covered as the law requires.This is a good defence.

As remarked in Solomon v. Dreschler,4 Minn. 279, (Gil. 197,)"where a statute inflicts a penalty for doing an act, although the act is not prohibited in terms, yet it is thereby rendered unlawful, because the infliction of a penalty implies a prohibition."See, also, White v. Buss,3 Cush. 449;Griffith v. Wells,3 Denio, 226;Miller v. Post,1 Allen, 434;Cundell v. Dawson,4 Man., G. & S. 376.

The statute before cited not only makes it a duty to cover the knuckles and rods, but it makes neglect or refusal so to do a misdemeanor to which a penalty is affixed.The plaintiff, then, in operating his threshing-machine in threshing for the defendant without covering the knuckles and rods was doing that which is prohibited by law.The threshing, which was the consideration of the defendant's promise, was unlawful, and therefore will not support the promise.Bensley v. Bignold,5 Barn. & Adol. 335;Cunard v. Hyde,105 E. C. L. 1; Chit.Cont. 658, and note h;Armstrong v. Toler,11 Wheat. 272, and casessupra;Emery v. Kempton,2 Gray, 257.

The statute was doubtless enacted in view of the loss of life and severe personal injuries frequently resulting from the use of these machines with exposed rods and knuckles.And the object (as the law shows upon its face) was to prevent such accidents by prohibiting and preventing these machines from being operated unless the precautions prescribed were taken.It was a matter of public policy that such precautions should be taken, and the law is based, as are many other penal laws, upon the interest of the state in the personal safety and welfare of the citizen.It stands upon the same principles as the law treated of in Solomon v. Dreschler,4 Minn. 278, (Gil. 197.)

It was said by Lord Tenterdon in Wetherell v. Jones,3 Barn. & Adol. 221, that "where a contract which a plaintiff seeks to enforce is expressly or by implication forbidden by the statute or common law no court will lend its assistance to give it effect, and there are numerous cases in the books where an action on the contract has failed, because either the consideration for the promise or the act to be done was illegal, as being against the express provisions of law or contrary to justice, morality, and sound policy.But when the consideration and the matter to be performed...