Ingersoll v. State
| Decision Date | 01 September 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 376,376 |
| Citation | 65 Md.App. 753,501 A.2d 1373 |
| Parties | John Dennis INGERSOLL v. STATE of Maryland. , |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
John L. Kopolow, Asst. Public Defender (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant.
Carmina Szunyog Hughes, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, MD., Sandra A. O'Connor, State's Atty. for Baltimore County and Sue Schenning, Asst. State's Atty., for Baltimore County on the brief, both of Towson), for appellee.
Submitted before GILBERT, C.J., and MOYLAN and ROBERT M. BELL, JJ.
Once again we are presented squarely with an issue--when is a decision to enter a plea of not guilty upon an agreed statement of facts not the functional equivalent to a guilty plea?--which we thought we laid to rest in Ward v. State, 52 Md.App. 664, 451 A.2d 1243 (1982). Perhaps because of the factual context in which the issue arose in Ward, the feeling persists, in some quarters, that except as limited by Ward, this "hybrid plea" 1 is always the functional equivalent of a guilty plea. In affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, we once again endeavor to make clear that this just is not so.
John Dennis Ingersoll, appellant, was found guilty in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, sitting without a jury, of failure to drive within a single lane, driving while intoxicated, driving on a suspended license, driving on a foreign license, and displaying expired Maryland license registration plates. He was sentenced to a total of one year's incarceration at the Baltimore County Detention Center and to pay fines. Appellant entered pleas of not guilty and proceeded upon an agreed statement of facts. There was no plea agreement. Prior to the State's recitation of the statement of facts, appellant's counsel and the court advised him as follows:
The prosecutor, with the assistance of the arresting officer, then recited the statement of facts, to which appellant's counsel made one "minor" correction and one addition. The addition, that appellant did have a valid California driver's license, prompted the court to inquire directly of the arresting officer as to the status of that license. Following the denial of his motions for judgment of acquittal the following sequence of events occurred: appellant's counsel spoke in mitigation of sentence; and the court inquired about and received information concerning appellant's past record for similar offenses; appellant exercised his right of allocution; and findings of guilt were announced by the court.
Correctly observing that he was not asked whether his election to proceed on an agreed statement of facts "was the product of coercion, terror, inducements, or threats", nor told the maximum penalty for each charge, and further alleging that "[t]he hearing was tantamount to the entering of a guilty plea," appellant argues that he is entitled to a new trial. He relies upon Sutton v. State, 289 Md. 359, 424 A.2d 755 (1981).
Maryland Rule 4-242(c) provides:
The court may accept a plea of guilty only after it determines, upon an examination of the defendant on the record in open court conducted by the court, the State's Attorney, the attorney for the defendant, or any combination thereof, that (1) the defendant is pleading voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea; and (2) there is a factual basis for the plea. The court may accept the plea of guilty even though the defendant does not admit guilt. Upon refusal to accept the plea of guilty, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
The rule requires that the court accept a guilty plea only after it has made the determination set forth therein. It follows that any plea, including a plea of not guilty under an agreed statement of facts, which is the functional equivalent of a guilty plea, must fully comply with this rule. Sutton v. State, 289 Md. at 366, 424 A.2d 755; Yanes v. State, 52 Md.App. 150, 155, 448 A.2d 359 (1982). The focus of our inquiry, then, is when is a plea of not guilty under an agreed statement of facts, not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea?
Although it has been referred to as a "new species of plea", Stevenson v. State, 37 Md.App. 635, 636, 378 A.2d 209 (1977), and as "a peculiar animal", Covington v. State, 34 Md.App. 454, 455, 367 A.2d 974 (1977) aff'd 282 Md. 540, 386 A.2d 336 (1978) and is not specifically sanctioned by the Maryland Rules of Procedure, the plea of not guilty under an agreed statement of facts has been found, and continues, to have viability in the criminal practice in the courts of this State. See Sutton v. State, supra; Covington v. State, 282 Md. 540, 386 A.2d 336 (1978); Ward v. State, supra; Yanes v. State, supra; Barnes v. State, 31 Md.App. 25, 354 A.2d 499 (1977).
This plea, which has two components, a not guilty plea and an agreed statement of facts, was considered in Barnes. There, this Court defined the essential nature of the agreed statement of facts component:
Under an agreed statement of facts both State and defense agree as to the ultimate facts. Then the facts are not in dispute, and there can be, by definition, no factual conflict. The trier of fact is not called upon to determine the facts as the agreement is to the truth of the ultimate facts themselves. There is no fact-finding function left to perform. To render judgment, the Court simply applies the law to the facts agreed upon. If there is agreement as to the facts, there is no dispute; if there is a dispute, there is no agreement. (Emphasis supplied)
Id. at 35, 354 A.2d 499. It was again before us in Stevenson. There, we were asked to determine whether a trial court must accept such a plea, an issue we found that we were estopped to entertain. In the process, we neither endorsed, nor condemned the plea, but we did have occasion to comment:
There is a variety of reasons why counsel use such a plea, e.g., it is less time consuming than a plea of guilty, minimizes post conviction attack on counsel, and provides the possibility that if an essential element of a charged offense is omitted from the statement that the "evidence" will be insufficient to convict.
Id. 37 Md.App. at 637, n. 5, 378 A.2d 209.
Despite the State's concession that "the proceedings were the functional equivalent" of guilty pleas and that the court erred in not conducting the inquiry required by Maryland Rule 731(c), 2 this Court found that the not guilty under an agreed statement of fact plea in Ward was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea. In Ward, appellant entered the plea to preserve for appellate review the denial of his pre-trial suppression motion. On appeal, however, he specifically and directly attacked it as the functional equivalent of a guilty plea. We disagreed, finding that the preservation for appellate review of a pretrial suppression motion was a purpose of significant importance to distinguish that plea from a guilty plea.
Neither Sutton nor Yanes, cases in which a not guilty plea under an agreed statement of facts, under the facts presented, was held, to be the functional equivalent of a guilty plea, condemned such a plea. That this is so is starkly demonstrated by the holding of the Court of Appeals:
Trying a case on an agreed statement of facts ordinarily does not convert a not guilty plea into a guilty plea. See Covington v. State, 282 Md. 540, 542, 386 A.2d 336, 337 (1978); Stevenson v. State, 37 Md.App. 635, 636, 378 A.2d 209, 210 (1977). But here the totality of the circumstances, and in particular, the facts that the petitioner's plea was entered at the direction of the trial court and that she was aware that she would be placed on probation, shows that the proceeding was not in any sense of a trial and offered no reasonable chance that there would be an acquittal. Under these particular circumstances, the petitioner's plea was the functional equivalent of a guilty plea.
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