Ingle v. Adkins, 1160671
Decision Date | 09 November 2017 |
Docket Number | 1160671 |
Citation | 256 So.3d 62 |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Parties | Sheila Mote INGLE v. Jason Frank ADKINS et al. |
* Note from the reporter of decisions: Judge Tompkins, retired circuit judge, Colbert County, was appointed to preside over this case upon the recusal of the circuit judges in the 14th Judicial Circuit.
J. Kenneth Guin, Jr., Jasper, for appellant.
Mark S. Boardman and Clay R. Carr of Boardman, Carr, Petelos, Watkins & Cole, P.C., Chelsea; and Edward R. Jackson of Jackson, Fikes & Brakefield, Jasper, for appellees.
Sheila Mote Ingle ("Ingle") appeals from an order entered by the Walker Circuit Court dismissing her claims against Jason Frank Adkins, individually and in his capacity as superintendent of the Walker County School System; the Walker County Board of Education ("the Board"); and Bradley Glenn Ingle, William Edward Gilbert, Dennis Dale Reeves, James Lynn Rigsby, and Sonia Marie Waid, members of the Board (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Board members") (Adkins, the Board, and the Board members are hereinafter referred to collectively as "the defendants").1 We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
On August 4, 2016, Ingle filed in the Walker Circuit Court a "verified petition for writ of mandamus or in the alternative for declaratory judgment" against Adkins in his individual and official capacities, the Board members in their individual and official capacities, and the Board.
According to Ingle's petition, Adkins was elected superintendent of the Walker County School System on November 2, 2010. At the time of Adkins's election, the Board had set an annual salary of $139,500 for the position of superintendent. During a regularly scheduled Board meeting on July 18, 2013, the Board increased Adkins's salary by 2% effective July 1, 2013. Adkins was reelected on November 4, 2014. On December 11, 2014, the Board entered into an "employment contract" with Adkins that would become effective on January 1, 2015. That contract provided a base annual salary of $159,500, and it provided for increases in salary during Adkins's term of office. That contract also provided an in-county travel stipend of $1,000 per month. The Board modified the contract on November 12, 2015, to increase Adkins's compensation. That modification included providing Adkins with a cellular telephone paid for by the Board, allowing Adkins to participate in outside activities that do not interfere with his duties as superintendent and that are approved by the Board, and guaranteeing that, if "this agreement be permitted to expire," Adkins could return to a tenured position with the Walker County School System. Ingle attached three documents to her petition: (1) a copy of the minutes from the Board's July 18, 2013, meeting, (2) a copy of the December 11, 2014, "employment contract," and (3) a copy of the November 12, 2015, modified contract.
Ingle brought this action "in the name of the State of Alabama on the relation of Sheila Mote Ingle ... in her individual capacity as a resident citizen and taxpayer in Walker County, Alabama." Ingle sought a declaration that Adkins's July 2013 salary increase was unconstitutional, illegal, and void; that the December 2014 "employment contract" was unconstitutional, illegal, and void; and that the November 2015 modification of the employment contract was unconstitutional, illegal, and void. Ingle sought to compel the Board members "to vacate and/or rescind" the "employment contract." Further, Ingle sought to recover for the taxpayers of Walker County the allegedly illegal compensation that had already been paid to Adkins, and she sought to recover on her own behalf attorney fees. Additionally, Ingle alleged that, even if the employment contract was not determined to be unconstitutional and void, the Board had overpaid Adkins's travel stipend, and, thus, Ingle sought to recover that overpayment. Later, Ingle amended her petition to withdraw her claim for attorney fees.
The defendants moved to dismiss Ingle's claims. The defendants argued that Ingle failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, that Ingle's claims were barred by the doctrine of immunity, and that Ingle lacked standing to pursue her claims.
On April 10, 2017, the circuit court issued an order dismissing Ingle's claims, which stated as follows:
(Capitalization in original.) Ingle appealed.
On appeal, Ingle concedes that her claims against the Board are due to be dismissed on the basis of immunity. She also admits that she "may not seek damages or to otherwise impose civil liability on the individual Board members on account of those acts which have already occurred." Ingle's brief, at 19. Further, Ingle acknowledges that she may not have standing "to recover monies which have already been illegally expended," and she does not set forth any argument regarding the circuit court's dismissal of her claims concerning recovery of compensation that has already been paid to Adkins. Id. at 26. However, Ingle continues to seek to enjoin future payments under Adkins's current employment agreement with the Board, which Ingle claims is an illegal contract. Thus, on appeal, the issue is whether Ingle can pursue a claim against the Board members and Adkins in their individual and/or official capacities to declare Adkins's current contract illegal and to enjoin future payments from public funds pursuant to that contract.
First, we hold that the circuit court properly dismissed the claims against Adkins and the Board members in their individual capacities because Ex parte Dickson, 46 So.3d 468, 474 (Ala. 2010).
Now, we must decide whether Ingle can pursue claims against the Board members and Adkins in their official capacities to declare that Adkins's current contract is illegal and to enjoin payments under that contract going forward. Specifically, we must decide whether those claims are barred by the doctrine of immunity and whether Ingle has standing to pursue those claims.
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