Ingles v. Ingles

Decision Date06 December 2022
Docket NumberAC 44151
Parties Juan B. INGLES v. Maribel C. INGLES
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals

Randi L. Calabrese, with whom, on the brief, was Mohan Sreenivasan, Southbury, for the appellant (defendant).

Joseph A. DiSilvestro, East Haven, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Suarez, Clark and Sheldon, Js.

SUAREZ, J.

The defendant, Maribel C. Ingles, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dissolving her marriage to the plaintiff, Juan B. Ingles, and denying her motion for contempt. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court (1) misapplied the law when it found that the plaintiff was not in contempt for allegedly failing to comply with a pendente lite order, (2) abused its discretion in awarding her alimony in the amount of $250 per week for a period of two years, (3) improperly failed to value the parties’ pensions and equalize their distribution, and (4) abused its discretion in declining to award her attorney's fees. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, which were either found by the court or are otherwise undisputed, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff and the defendant were married on August 7, 1999, and have two children together.1 In January, 2019, the plaintiff commenced a dissolution action. At the time of the dissolution proceeding, the plaintiff was fifty years old and working as a detective with the New Haven Police Department, where he had been employed since 2002. The plaintiff had been involved in a serious accident while working and had a pending civil action and a workers’ compensation claim arising from that accident. Although he experienced some medical issues as a result of the accident, he had returned to working full-time by the time of the dissolution proceeding. The defendant was fifty-three years old and working as a social worker case aide with the Department of Children and Families, where she had been employed since 1998. The defendant was in good health, although she was "dealing with several medical issues, at least one of which involve[d] workers’ compensation." She was working toward obtaining a bachelor's degree in psychology from Albertus Magnus College, which she hoped to complete in the spring of 2021.

On March 18, 2020, after a trial that lasted for three days, the court, Hon. James G. Kenefick , Jr. , judge trial referee, issued a memorandum of decision dissolving the parties’ marriage and issuing certain financial orders related to alimony and the division of the parties’ marital property. The court concluded that the parties’ marriage had broken down irretrievably and found the plaintiff to be more at fault than the defendant for that break-down, as he "had several affairs of a somewhat brief nature a number of years ago and, although [the parties] had reconciled at times, [the defendant had] lost trust in him."

The court awarded the defendant the marital home, located in East Haven, which had been purchased by the parties in 2007, and, at the time of trial, had a value of $305,000, with $71,000 in equity. The court ordered the plaintiff to quitclaim his interest in the property to the defendant and ordered the defendant to refinance the mortgage within two years. The court ordered that, if the defendant could not refinance the mortgage within two years, the property was to be sold and the defendant was to retain any net proceeds or be responsible for any deficiency. The court further ordered, among other things, that the plaintiff transfer 75 percent of his 457 (b) retirement plan to the defendant, that both parties retain their respective pensions, that each party retain his or her own personal injury claims, lawsuits, and workers’ compensation benefits, and that each party be responsible for the outstanding balances owed to his or her own attorneys in connection with the dissolution proceedings. The court ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant periodic alimony in the amount of $250 per week for a period of two years, in order to provide support to the defendant while she refinanced the mortgage on the marital home.

In its memorandum of decision dissolving the parties’ marriage, the court also denied motions for contempt that the defendant had filed on December 11, 2019, and February 6, 2020, related to the plaintiff's continued obligation to make mortgage payments on the marital home while the dissolution action was pending.

On April 7, 2020, the defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, reargument, and clarification of the court's decision regarding, in relevant part, the duration and amount of the alimony award, the division of the parties’ retirement assets, and attorney's fees. The court summarily denied the defendant's motion. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly denied her December 11, 2019 motion for contempt. Specifically, the defendant argues that the court improperly placed the burden on her to demonstrate that the plaintiff's alleged noncompliance with the court's order was wilful and, in doing so, failed to shift the burden to the plaintiff to demonstrate, as a defense, his inability to comply with the order. We disagree.

The following additional facts are relevant to our resolution of the defendant's claim. During the parties’ marriage, the plaintiff paid the mortgage on their marital home and the defendant paid for most of their remaining household expenses, such as for utilities and food. During the pendency of the dissolution action, the parties entered into a pendente lite stipulation, in which the plaintiff agreed, among other things, to "continue making all mortgage payments, ongoing, as they come due." The stipulation also provided that the plaintiff was responsible for any fees associated with late payments, as well as past due payments not paid to date.2 The stipulation was approved by the court and entered as an order. On July 25, 2019, the defendant filed a motion for contempt, alleging that the plaintiff had wilfully violated the court's order by failing to pay the past due mortgage payments and associated late fees, which amounted to $7724.44.

On October 9, 2019, after a hearing, the court denied the defendant's July 25, 2019 motion for contempt, finding that "the mortgage for the marital home is currently in arrears for the month of September, 2019, and is in the payment grace period for the month of October, 2019, as of the date of this order entering. However, the court does not find the [plaintiff's] failure to pay the mortgage during this period to be wilful." In addition, the court ordered that "[t]he [plaintiff] shall pay the September and October, 2019 mortgage payments no later than [October 16, 2019], and shall continue to pay the mortgage each month until further order of the court. The [plaintiff] shall make his best effort to make all future mortgage payments on time."

The defendant subsequently filed a motion for contempt on December 11, 2019, regarding the plaintiff's alleged wilful noncompliance with the terms of the court's October 9, 2019 order. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff had failed to make the November and December, 2019 mortgage payments in a timely manner and, therefore, a balance of $5672.39 remained past due.

The December 11, 2019 motion for contempt was heard together with the underlying dissolution action. With respect to the motion for contempt, the defendant offered as evidence letters from the parties’ mortgage subservicing company, dated November 4, 2019, and December 4, 2019, advising the parties that their mortgage was two months past due. The plaintiff testified that he made a payment on December 10, 2019, which was reflected in a subsequent statement from the parties’ mortgage servicing company. The plaintiff acknowledged that he previously made late mortgage payments but explained that he was currently up to date on those payments, apart from a "past due amount" of approximately $749 in certain fees and charges. The plaintiff testified concerning his expenses, including his credit card bills and the $1100 in rent that he paid monthly for his current residence,3 in addition to the approximately $2400 in monthly mortgage payments on the marital home. The plaintiff testified that he "struggle[s]" to pay his bills each month, asserting that "I don't have enough [money] to manage to pay them all on time." The plaintiff further testified that "[t]he mortgage was getting paid as soon as I possibly could and then the rent," as he asked his landlord to allow him to be behind on the rent payments in order to prioritize the mortgage payments.

In its memorandum of decision dissolving the parties’ marriage, the court denied the defendant's December 11, 2019 motion for contempt.4 The court reasoned: "Although the [plaintiff] has been late in making [mortgage] payments, the [defendant] has not met her burden of proof that these late payments were wilful." The court ordered, in its property division of the marital home, that "the [plaintiff] shall be responsible for the March, 2020 mortgage payment and any outstanding fees and charges which shall be promptly paid."

We begin with the following legal principles that guide our analysis of the defendant's claim. "[C]ivil contempt is committed when a person violates an order of court which requires that person in specific and definite language to do or refrain from doing an act or series of acts. ... In part because the contempt remedy is particularly harsh ... such punishment should not rest upon implication or conjecture, [and] the language [of the court order] declaring ... rights should be clear, or imposing burdens [should be] specific and unequivocal, so that the parties may not be misled thereby. ...

"To constitute contempt, it is not enough that a party has merely violated a court order; the violation...

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