Ingols v. Plimpton

Citation16 P. 155,10 Colo. 535
PartiesINGOLS v. PLIMPTON et al.
Decision Date07 December 1887
CourtSupreme Court of Colorado

Error to superior court of Denver.

Francis E. Ingols, plaintiff, sued George E. Plimpton et al., defendants, for rent. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appealed.

E. Miles, for plaintiff in error.

No appearance for defendants in error.

BECK C.J.

Francis E. Ingols, plaintiff in error, sued the defendants in error before a justice of the peace residing in the city of Denver to recover the sum of $40, alleged to be due and owing her for one month's rent of a house. On the tenth of March 1883, she recovered a judgment for the amount demanded whereupon defendants appealed to the superior court of the city of Denver. Plaintiff's counsel moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the superior court did not have jurisdiction to entertain or try appeals from justices of the peace in civil actions. The motion was overruled by the court, and case tried to a jury, who rendered a verdict for the defendants.

The ruling of the court on the motion to dismiss said appeal is made the basis of the first four assignments of error. This raises the question whether the act of the legislatute providing for the organization of superior courts, approved February 10, 1883, gives to these courts jurisdiction of appeals from justices of the peace in civil actions. Section 17 of the act is as follows: 'Appeals from any final decision of a justice of the peace in a city or incorporated town where a superior court is held, or from the decision of any police magistrate of such city or town, in any case involving the violation of a city ordinance, may be allowed to the superior court of such city or incorporated town, and may be taken in the same manner as appeals from justices of the peace in other cases.' The counsel for plaintiff in error lays down the proposition that the foregoing section invests the superior courts with jurisdiction of appeals from justices of the peace and police magistrates only in cases involving violation of city or town ordinances. We are of opinion that the phraseology and structure of the section will not admit of this interpretation. Two classes of appeals are clearly provided for,--one, 'from any final decision of a justice of the peace in a city or incorporated town where a superior court is held;' the other, 'from the decision of any police magistrate of such city or town in any case involving the violation of a city ordinance.' The only qualification of the language employed is found in that clause of the act which limits the jurisdiction of the superior courts to civil actions.

But counsel argues that superior courts are constructed, by sections 1 and 3 of the act, courts of the same class and grade as the district courts, and that, since the latter courts are not vested with jurisdiction of appeals from justices of the peace in civil actions, it would render the act unconstitutional to hold that the former are vested with such jurisdiction. Two constitutional objections are specified: First, that the constitutional provision requiring the jurisdiction and practice of courts of the same class and grade to be uniform would be violated; second, this construction would give advantageous remedies to citizens of cities and incorporated towns not given to other citizens of the state. The first objection is answered by the case of Darrow v. People, 8 Colo. 417, 8 P. 661, wherein it is decided that the district and superior courts are not courts of the same class or grade. As to the second objection, we observe that cities and incorporated towns enjoy many advantages of the character referred to, which are not given to other citizens of the state; and we are not advised that any clause of the constitution is violated thereby. The creation of superior courts for such cities and towns is an example, and this example exposes the fallacy of the latter objection.

Referring now to the errors alleged in the proceedings of the trial in the superior court, and the exceptions taken, it is apparent that the judgment must be reversed for the error of the court in its second instruction. The real controversy was...

To continue reading

Request your trial
8 cases
  • Boykin v. People
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • 18 Mayo 1896
    ...in one instruction of this language is not sufficient to work a reversal. Gorman v. People, 17 Colo. 596, 31 P. 335; Ingols v. Plimpton, 10 Colo. 535, 16 P. 155; Salomon v. Webster, 4 Colo. 6. The sixth instruction to the jury was as follows: 'The law presumes that the defendant is innocent......
  • Karg v. Mitchek
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • 9 Julio 1998
    ...and were not parties to the promissory note case. It is true that setoff generally requires mutuality of parties. See Ingols v. Plimpton, 10 Colo. 535, 16 P. 155 (1887); J. Crane & A. Bromberg, supra, at § 63. However, the trial court found Gerald J. Karg had admitted that all of the accoun......
  • Thalheimer v. Crow
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • 8 Noviembre 1889
    ... ... Code, §§ 62-64; Gen. St. 1883. A separate demand ... cannot be set off against a joint demand. Thatcher v ... Rockwell, 4 Colo. 375; Ingols ... [22 P. 781.] ... v. Plimpton, 10 Colo. 535, 16 P. 155 ... The ... sixth defense is an attempt to avoid responsibility upon the ... ...
  • Gill v. Schneider
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • 5 Julio 1910
    ... ... 'and, in a case where the evidence is quite evenly ... balanced, might be a ground of reversal.' In Ingols v ... Plimpton, 10 Colo. 535, 539, 16 P. 155, 156, it was said that ... an instruction beginning 'if you believe,' without ... adding the words ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT