E. Ingraham Co. v. Town and City of Bristol
| Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
| Citation | 132 A.2d 563,144 Conn. 374 |
| Decision Date | 17 May 1957 |
| Parties | The E. INGRAHAM COMPANY v. TOWN AND CITY OF BRISTOL. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut |
Page 563
v.
TOWN AND CITY OF BRISTOL.
[144 Conn. 375] Frederick W. Beach and Wallace Barnes, Bristol, with whom, on the brief, were Joseph
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M. Donovan, George T. Calder, Bristol and Walter F. Torrance, Jr., Waterbury, for plaintiff.Neil F. Murphy, Bristol with whom were Harry F. Pergoda, Bristol, and, on the brief, Louis F. Hanrahan, Corp. Counsel, Bristol, for defendant.
Before [144 Conn. 374] O'SULLIVAN, C. J., and BALDWIN, WYNNE, DALY and KING, JJ.
[144 Conn. 375] O'SULLIVAN, Chief Justice.
The stipulated facts essential to this reservation are these: On October 1, 1954, the plaintiff, a manufacturing concern, was the owner of real estate and personalty located in the town of Bristol. The personalty consisted of machinery, raw materials, goods in process, finished products and motor vehicles. The assessors determined that the actual value of the plaintiff's real and personal property on October 1, 1954, was $2,496,460 and $6,119,672, respectively. The assessors further determined that all of the taxable real estate in Bristol had as of the same date, an actual value of $145,650,320, and the personalty an actual value of $48,382,958, or a total of $194,033, 278. The assessors [144 Conn. 376] then set in the tax list of that year the plaintiff's real estate at $1,248,230; its personalty other than motor vehicles at $5,501,770; and its motor vehicles at $6600; the three amounts being 50 per cent, 90 per cent and 100 per cent, respectively, of the actual values previously determined. These listings made a total assessment against the plaintiff of $6,756,600.
Using comparable methods and percentages, the assessors set in the tax list all of the taxable realty within the town at $72,825,160; all of the taxable personalty other than motor vehicles at $33,755,930; and all of the motor vehicles at $10,876,370. After legal exemptions of $3,951,220 had been applied to these three classifications and after minor adjustments had been made on the application of property owners not parties to this action, the grand list totaled $113,314,360.
The sum of $8,616,132, the actual value of all of the plaintiff's property as determined by the assessors, was 4,447 per cent of the actual value of all the taxable property in the town. The sum of $6,756,600, the assessed value of all the plaintiff's property, was 5.962 per cent of the grand list of the town.
Within the time prescribed by law, the plaintiff appealed to the board of tax review for a reduction in the assessment of its personalty, but the appeal was dismissed. Thereupon the plaintiff instituted this proceeding, which has been briefed and argued as an application in the nature of an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas under General Statutes § 1800 and we so construe it. The parties having stipulated in the Court of Common Pleas as to the foregoing facts, the case has been reserved for advice upon the four questions. 1 Essentially these
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[144 Conn. 377] questions present the single issue whether or not the assessors can, by using a higher percentage of the actual value of personalty than they do of real estate in making assessments, impose upon the plaintiff the obligation of paying a greater proportionate amount of taxes than those assessed, let us say, for only real estate.The assessing of property at a fraction of its actual value undoubtedly is so widespread that most, if not all, of the municipalities in the state pursue the practice. This rule of assessment has been tolerated for so long a time that it has acquired the respectability of assumed legality. The practice, however, is clearly improper. Section 1738 of the General Statutes provides that taxable realty 'shall be liable to taxation at its present true and actual valuation,' and § 1047d of the 1955 Cumulative Supplement provides that all items of taxable personalty [144 Conn. 378] shall be set in the list of the owner 'at their then actual valuation.' Since a municipality has no authority to tax except as granted by the General Assembly, statutes conferring authority to tax must be strictly observed. Thames Mfg. Co. v. Lathrop, 7 Conn. 550, 556. The unambiguous language of the two statutes just mentioned gives assessors no warrant to utilize as a tax base any value other than the actual value of the property. Indeed, the language impliedly forbids the adoption of any different base.
The impropriety of fractional valuation is manifest from the history of §§ 1738 and 1047d. Prior to 1860, the General Assembly specifically authorized assessments of real estate and personalty at percentages of their valuation. For example, in 1821 the statute provided that '[d]welling-houses, with the buildings and lots appurtenant thereunto * * * shall be valued at the rate which each separate dwelling-house and lot, with the appurtenances thereof, are worth in money, and * * * shall be set in the list of the owner, at two per cent of such value. Lands and separate lots * * * shall be valued and assessed by the acre * * * and shall be set in the list, at three per cent of such value. * * * All horses,...
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Killen v. Logan County Com'n, CC931
...analogous to those in West Virginia require assessment at 100 percent of property's market value. E. Ingraham Co. v. Town of Bristol, 144 Conn. 374, 132 A.2d 563 (1957) (statute); McNayr v. State, 166 So.2d 142 (Fla.1964) (statute); Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694 (Ky.1965) (constitution......
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...administrative forums." The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors similarly stated in E. Ingraham Company v. Town and City of Bristol, 144 Conn. 374, 132 A.2d 563, 565 "The assessing of property at a fraction of its actual value undoubtedly is so widespread that most, if not all, of the munic......
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Pepin v. City of Danbury
...156 Conn. 33, 36, 238 A.2d 410, and 'statutes conferring authority to tax must be strictly observed.' E. Ingraham Co. v. Bristol, 144 Conn. 374, 378, 132 A.2d 563; Thames Mfg. Co. v. Lathrop, 7 Conn. 550, 556. See 14 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed.) § 38.06. Further, any doubt as ......
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