E. Ingraham Co. v. Town and City of Bristol
| Decision Date | 17 May 1957 |
| Citation | 132 A.2d 563,144 Conn. 374 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | The E. INGRAHAM COMPANY v. TOWN AND CITY OF BRISTOL. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut |
Frederick W. Beach and Wallace Barnes, Bristol, with whom, on the brief, were Joseph M. Donovan, George T. Calder, Bristol and Walter F. Torrance, Jr., Waterbury, for plaintiff.
Neil F. Murphy, Bristol with whom were Harry F. Pergoda, Bristol, and, on the brief, Louis F. Hanrahan, Corp. Counsel, Bristol, for defendant.
Before O'SULLIVAN, C. J., and BALDWIN, WYNNE, DALY and KING, JJ.
O'SULLIVAN, Chief Justice.
The stipulated facts essential to this reservation are these: On October 1, 1954, the plaintiff, a manufacturing concern, was the owner of real estate and personalty located in the town of Bristol. The personalty consisted of machinery, raw materials, goods in process, finished products and motor vehicles. The assessors determined that the actual value of the plaintiff's real and personal property on October 1, 1954, was $2,496,460 and $6,119,672, respectively. The assessors further determined that all of the taxable real estate in Bristol had as of the same date, an actual value of $145,650,320, and the personalty an actual value of $48,382,958, or a total of $194,033, 278. The assessors then set in the tax list of that year the plaintiff's real estate at $1,248,230; its personalty other than motor vehicles at $5,501,770; and its motor vehicles at $6600; the three amounts being 50 per cent, 90 per cent and 100 per cent, respectively, of the actual values previously determined. These listings made a total assessment against the plaintiff of $6,756,600.
Using comparable methods and percentages, the assessors set in the tax list all of the taxable realty within the town at $72,825,160; all of the taxable personalty other than motor vehicles at $33,755,930; and all of the motor vehicles at $10,876,370. After legal exemptions of $3,951,220 had been applied to these three classifications and after minor adjustments had been made on the application of property owners not parties to this action, the grand list totaled $113,314,360.
The sum of $8,616,132, the actual value of all of the plaintiff's property as determined by the assessors, was 4,447 per cent of the actual value of all the taxable property in the town. The sum of $6,756,600, the assessed value of all the plaintiff's property, was 5.962 per cent of the grand list of the town.
Within the time prescribed by law, the plaintiff appealed to the board of tax review for a reduction in the assessment of its personalty, but the appeal was dismissed. Thereupon the plaintiff instituted this proceeding, which has been briefed and argued as an application in the nature of an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas under General Statutes § 1800 and we so construe it. The parties having stipulated in the Court of Common Pleas as to the foregoing facts, the case has been reserved for advice upon the four questions. 1 Essentially these questions present the single issue whether or not the assessors can, by using a higher percentage of the actual value of personalty than they do of real estate in making assessments, impose upon the plaintiff the obligation of paying a greater proportionate amount of taxes than those assessed, let us say, for only real estate.
The assessing of property at a fraction of its actual value undoubtedly is so widespread that most, if not all, of the municipalities in the state pursue the practice. This rule of assessment has been tolerated for so long a time that it has acquired the respectability of assumed legality. The practice, however, is clearly improper. Section 1738 of the General Statutes provides that taxable realty 'shall be liable to taxation at its present true and actual valuation,' and § 1047d of the 1955 Cumulative Supplement provides that all items of taxable personalty shall be set in the list of the owner 'at their then actual valuation.' Since a municipality has no authority to tax except as granted by the General Assembly, statutes conferring authority to tax must be strictly observed. Thames Mfg. Co. v. Lathrop, 7 Conn. 550, 556. The unambiguous language of the two statutes just mentioned gives assessors no warrant to utilize as a tax base any value other than the actual value of the property. Indeed, the language impliedly forbids the adoption of any different base.
The impropriety of fractional valuation is manifest from the history of §§ 1738 and 1047d. Prior to 1860, the General Assembly specifically authorized assessments of real estate and personalty at percentages of their valuation. For example, in 1821 the statute provided that Statutes, 1821, p. 446, § 2. This legislative policy of requiring the assessment of property at fractional valuation remained in effect for forty years more, although the percentages were changed from time to time and eventually were stabilized at 3 per cent for both personalty and realty. 2
In 1860, the General Assembly passed an act reciting '[t]hat all property on which, by the laws of this state, taxes may be laid, shall be set in the list at its actual valuation, and not as heretofore at three per cent. of such valuation.' Public Acts 1860, c. 15, § 1. The assembly thus abandoned in the clearest sort of manner, the previous method of fractional valuation and directed the rule of assessment to be the actual value of the taxable property. This important change in legislative policy was continued and is to be noted in the Revisions of 1866 and 1875. Rev.1866, p. 708 § 7, p. 709 § 8; Rev. 1875, p. 155 § 13, p. 156 § 14. The direction found in the two sections of the latter citation is to set real estate at its 'true and actual valuation' and personalty at its 'actual valuation.' It should be stated, parenthetically, that the expressions 'true and the actual valuation' and 'actual valuation' mean the same thing, and they are also synonymous with 'market value,' 'market price' and 'fair value.' Sibley v. Town of Middlefield, 143 Conn. 100, 106, 120 A.2d 77. The sections in the Revision of 1875 were continued in almost identical form, and appear in the 1949 Revision as §§ 1738 and 1745. 3 The latter section was amended in 1953 (Cum.Sup.1953, § 848c) in a particular not material to this case and is now § 1047d. Thus, the history of the statutes discloses the unequivocal legislative intent, as expressed in the public act of 1860 and followed ever since, that all taxable property 'shall be set in the list at its actual valuation, and not as heretofore at [a] per cent of such valuation.'
Nor can we overlook a further matter in demonstrating the impropriety of pursuing the rule of fractional valuation. When assessors adopt such a rule, they indirectly assume a role which rightfully is not theirs to play. For, if such a rule is applied, the grand list will obviously be smaller in amount than it would be if the mandate of the statute were carried out. Under such circumstances, the borrowing power of the municipality is affected, since its indebtedness may not exceed specified percentages of the grand list. Cum.Sup.1955, § 363d, as amended, Nov. 1955 Sup., §§ N8, N119. Assessors who use fractional valuation to determine their assessments therefore interfere, perhaps unwittingly but nonetheless effectively, with a power which legally belongs to others.
It is apparent, then, that the Bristol assessors acted contrary to the statutes, and hence illegally, in listing the plaintiff's real estate at 50 per cent of its actual value and the personalty, other than motor vehicles, at 90 per cent of that value. Slosberg v. Town of Norwich, 115 Conn. 578, 162 A. 772; Dennis' Appeal, 72 Conn. 369, 372, 44 A. 545; Ives v. Town of Goshen, 63 Conn. 79, 82, 26 A. 845; White v. Town of Portland, 63 Conn. 18, 22, 26 A. 342. It does not, however, necessarily follow that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Section 1800 of the General Statutes provides for such an appeal as was taken in the case at bar to the Court of Common Pleas from the action of the board of tax review in denying the plaintiff the relief it sought from the doings of the Bristol assessors. 4 The...
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Killen v. Logan County Com'n
...provisions analogous to those in West Virginia require assessment at 100 percent of property's market value. E. Ingraham Co. v. Town of Bristol, 144 Conn. 374, 132 A.2d 563 (1957) (statute); McNayr v. State, 166 So.2d 142 (Fla.1964) (statute); Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694 (Ky.1965) (c......
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