Ingram v. Beneficial Fin., Inc.
| Decision Date | 30 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:13-CV-4037-L |
| Parties | VANESSA INGRAM, individually and as Executor of the Estate of Roy Ingram, Plaintiff, v. BENEFICIAL FINANCIAL, INC., successor by merger to BENEFICIAL, TEXAS, INC.; and HOUSEHOLD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Before the court are Beneficial Financial Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 17), filed June 17, 2014; and Defendant Household Life Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 7), filed June 25, 2014. After considering the motions, responses, replies, evidence, pleadings, and applicable law, the court grants Beneficial Financial Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 17); grants Defendant Household Life Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 7); and dismisses with prejudice this action.
In her Original Petition ("Petition"), which is verified, Plaintiff asserts the following claims: (1) violations of the Texas Insurance Code, (2) breach of contract, (3) negligence, (4) negligent misrepresentation, (5) unjust enrichment, (6) breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, (7) violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("DTPA"), (8) violations of the Texas Debt Collection Practices Act ("TDCPA"), and (9) intentional infliction of emotional distress.Additionally, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment, an accounting, actual damages, exemplary damages, damages for mental anguish, attorney's fees and costs. Plaintiff's claims are based on her contention that: (1) she and her husband purchased Credit Life Insurance from Defendant Household Life Insurance Company ("Household") in May 2007 to pay off their mortgage in the event of her husband's death; and (2) the insurance policy was subsequently canceled by Defendants without written notice. Plaintiff alleges that, after her husband died in April 2008, she contacted Beneficial Financial I Inc. ("Beneficial") in June 2009 to inquire about life insurance proceeds and was informed that her husband did not have Credit Life Insurance. Plaintiff alleges that she stopped making mortgage payments in 2010, after being informed that she was not on the mortgage and Beneficial refused her requests to put the mortgage in her name or respond to the documents she submitted regarding the insurance policy. According to the Petition, Beneficial applied for a court order to foreclose on the property at issue. Plaintiff contends that the posting of the property for foreclosure was unlawful.
Plaintiff originally brought this action in County Court at Law No. 2, Dallas County, Texas. The case was removed to federal court on October 7, 2013. On June 17, 2014, Beneficial filed its summary judgment motion. On June 25, 2014, Household filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court converted Household's motion to a summary judgment motion and directed the parties to supplement their briefing and evidence in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Plaintiff filed separate responses to the summary judgment motions but did not respond to all of Defendants' contentions regarding her claims. Defendants contend that Plaintiff's failure to respond with respect to certain claims constitutes a waiver of those claims.
Summary judgment shall be granted when the record shows that there is no genuine dispute d refund was ever sent to [her husband]." Pl.'s Resp. 6-7. To establish that the insurance premium as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986); Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). A dispute regarding a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005). Further, a court "may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence" in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254-55.
Once the moving party has made an initial showing that there is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). On the other hand, "if the movant bears the burden of proof on an issue, either because he is the plaintiff or as a defendant he is asserting an affirmative defense, he must establish beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim or defense to warrant judgment in his favor." Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original). "[When] the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine [dispute] for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at587. (citation omitted). Mere conclusory allegations are not competent summary judgment evidence, and thus are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996). Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not competent summary judgment evidence. See Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir. 1994).
The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her claim. Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458. Rule 56 does not impose a duty on the court to "sift through the record in search of evidence" to support the nonmovant's opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Id.; see also Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915-16 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1992). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing laws will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Disputed fact issues that are "irrelevant and unnecessary" will not be considered by a court in ruling on a summary judgment motion. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
Plaintiff responded to some but not all of Defendants' contentions regarding her claims. This failure, of course, does not permit a court to enter a "default" summary judgment. Eversley v. MBank Dallas, 843 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1988). When no response is filed, such failure does permit the court to accept as undisputed the evidence set forth in support of a movant's motion for summary judgment. Id. Normally, "[a] summary judgment nonmovant who does not respond to the motion is relegated to her unsworn pleadings, which do not constitute summary judgment evidence."Bookman v. Schubzda, 945 F. Supp. 999, 1002 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (citing Solo Serve Corp. v. Westowne Assocs., 929 F.2d 160, 165 (5th Cir. 1991)). Allegations in a verified complaint, however, may serve as competent summary judgment evidence. Stauffer v. Gearhart, 741 F.3d 574, 581 (5th Cir. 2014); Hart v. Hairston, 343 F.3d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 2003). As noted, Plaintiff's pleadings in her Petition are verified. She may therefore rely on the facts alleged in her pleadings on summary judgment. Id.
3. On May 23, 2007, Plaintiff and her husband obtained a home equity loan from Beneficial to help pay bills after Plaintiff's husband became ill. In conjunction with the home equity loan, Plaintiff and her husband executed a security instrument payable to Beneficial to secure payment of the note. Plaintiff's husband also applied for life insurance, which would have paid off the loan in the event of her husband's death.
4. On June 25, 2007, Plaintiff's husband was notified by letter that his application for life insurance was denied and that a refund check for the initial premium paid would be mailed to him under separate cover.
5. Plaintiff's husband died on April 30, 2008.
6. In June 2008, Plaintiff inquired about the insurance policy and insurance proceeds, and was informed that there was no life insurance policy.
7. Plaintiff continued making monthly payments on the home equity loan until 2010.8. Beneficial sent Plaintiff letters regarding her past due account. Plaintiff in response retained counsel, who made a formal claim on April 20, 2012, to Household for benefits under the insurance policy. On November 20, 2012, Plaintiff's counsel also disputed in writing to Beneficial the validity of Plaintiff's debt based on the insurance policy. On April 24, 2012, Household denied Plaintiff's claim for benefits and explained that no policy on Plaintiff's loan existed; that the application for insurance was denied by its underwriter by letter dated June 25, 2007; and that a refund check in the amount of $65.62 for the initial premium paid was issued June 28, 2007.
9. On July 19, 2013, Beneficial filed in state court an Application for Court Order Allowing Foreclosure on the lien securing Plaintiff's home equity loan.
10. Plaintiff has continued to reside in the property without making payments since 2010.
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