Ingram v. Chater

Decision Date25 February 1997
Docket NumberNo. 96-2533,96-2533
Parties, Unempl.Ins.Rep. (CCH) P 15673B Luebertha INGRAM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

E. Gregory Wallace, Buies Creek, NC (Anthony W. Bartels, Jonesboro, AR, on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Pamela M. Wood, SS Regional Counsel, Dallas, TX, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before WOLLMAN, BRIGHT, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

Luebertha Ingram appeals from the district court's order affirming the denial of disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (Commissioner). The district court found substantial evidence to support the determination that Ingram was not disabled and granted the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Luebertha Ingram filed an application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income on March 9, 1993. She asserted an inability to work since 1990 due to back and leg pain and migraine headaches. Ingram, who is in her late forties, was previously employed as a factory worker and, until the onset of her health problems, had a consistent work record.

Three doctors examined Ingram. Dr. D.J. Brewer, a chiropractor, examined Ingram prior to her claim for benefits. At the request of the Commissioner, Ingram saw Dr. Richard L. Hester on April 13, 1993. Ingram also saw Dr. Ramon Lopez on July 27, 1993. Finally, Dr. Hester treated Ingram on at least a dozen occasions after April 13, 1994.

The Commissioner denied Ingram's initial claim for benefits, as well as her claim on reconsideration. Ingram then received a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) and the ALJ affirmed the denial of Ingram's claim. The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's determination, thereby making the ALJ's decision the final ruling of the Commissioner. The district court then affirmed the ALJ and Ingram brought this appeal.

DISCUSSION

"Our review of the denial of benefits is limited to determining whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole." Groeper v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1234, 1237 (8th Cir.1991). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Smith v. Shalala, 987 F.2d 1371, 1374 (8th Cir.1993). "In assessing the substantiality of the evidence, we must consider evidence that detracts from the Secretary's decision as well To receive disability benefits, Ingram must establish a physical impairment lasting at least one year that prevents her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Smith, 987 F.2d at 1373. Ingram bears the burden of proof on this issue. Id. In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner utilizes a five-step sequential evaluation:

as evidence that supports it." Id. We may also reverse the Secretary's findings if the Secretary applies an erroneous legal standard. Nettles v. Schweiker, 714 F.2d 833, 835-36 (8th Cir.1983). Finally, the ALJ "must minimally articulate his reasons for crediting or rejecting evidence of disability." Scivally v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir.1992).

First, the Secretary determines whether the claimant is presently engaged in a 'substantial gainful activity.' Second, the Secretary analyzes whether the claimant has a severe impairment--one that significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities. Third, the Secretary determines whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals an impairment listed in the regulations; if so, the Secretary finds that the claimant is disabled without considering the claimant's age, education, and work experience. Fourth, the Secretary considers the claimant's residual functional capacity and the physical and mental demands of the claimant's past work to determine whether the claimant can still perform that work. If the claimant has the residual capacity to perform that work, the Secretary finds that the claimant is not disabled. Finally, if the Secretary determines that the claimant cannot perform the past work, the Secretary determines whether any substantial gainful activity exists in the national economy which the claimant can perform.

Id. (citations omitted).

There is no dispute that Ingram meets the first two prongs of the test, so only the third and fourth steps are at issue here. Specifically, the ALJ determined that Ingram did not meet the criteria of a listed impairment for purposes of step three. Add. at 19. Under step four, the ALJ concluded that Ingram "has the residual functional capacity to perform work-related activities except for work involving lifting and carrying more than 20 pounds .... [and her] impairments do not prevent [her] from performing her past relevant work." Id. Ingram contests both findings, as well as the ALJ's credibility determinations.

I.

Ingram first argues that she is entitled to benefits because she is disabled due to obesity. A woman is presumed to be disabled due to obesity when she establishes the following medical listing:

9.09 Obesity: Weight equal to or greater than the values specified in Table ... II for females (100 percent above desired level), and ...:

A. History of pain and limitation of motion in any weight-bearing joint or the lumbosacral spine (on physical examination) associated with findings on medically acceptable imaging techniques of arthritis in the affected joint or lumbosacral spine....

20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 § 9.09. We first consider whether Ingram meets the Table II requirements of obesity, then determine whether she meets the criteria outlined under § 9.09A.

A.

During the ALJ hearing, Ingram testified that she weighed 240 pounds and that her height was 5'5". These measurements are insufficient for purposes of establishing obesity under Table II, and the ALJ found that "there is no evidence that the claimant has met the height and weight requirements ... for more than twelve consecutive months...." Add. at 11. It is undisputed, however, that every examining doctor placed Ingram's height and weight in the obesity category under Table II and that these reports extend over a twelve-month period. In addition, no medical evidence suggests Ingram ever failed to meet the requirements of Defendant relies on the fact that plaintiff testified that she was 5'5" and weighed 240 pounds. However, the medical evidence always shows that she was shorter and, usually, heavier. The Step 3 determination is based on medical evidence. Clearly, the ALJ would have been entitled to discount her testimony if she testified that she was shorter than medical records indicated; it would be unfair to hold plaintiff to the height that she testified to when medical records clearly show that her testimony was incorrect.

                Table II. 1  Indeed, the district court observed
                

Add. at 28 n. 2 (citations omitted). We agree with the district court and conclude that there is no substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's determination on this issue. Accordingly, we hold that Ingram meets the requirements of Table II and is obese for purposes of § 9.09.

B.

Ingram must also satisfy the criteria of § 9.09A which requires a "history of pain and limitation of motion in any weight-bearing joint or the lumbosacral spine (on physical examination) associated with findings on medically acceptable imaging techniques of arthritis in the affected joint or lumbosacral spine." 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 § 9.09A. The ALJ rejected this portion of Ingram's claim in rather conclusory fashion. The ALJ stated only that Ingram failed to demonstrate "the other required secondary body system effects for the requisite time period with the required clinical and laboratory findings specified for such a body system by the listed impairment found in Section 9.09...." Add. at 11. The district court affirmed, holding that Ingram did not meet any of the criteria under § 9.09A because she failed to produce x-ray evidence of arthritis and did not establish a history of pain or limitation of motion. Ingram challenges these conclusions. 2

As an initial matter, we must first determine the proper legal standard concerning the amount of pain or limitation of motion necessary under § 9.09A because the ALJ and district court did not do so. Section 9.09A, by its plain language, requires only a history of pain and limitation of motion, but does not state that a particular level of pain or limitation must be demonstrated. Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 505 (9th Cir.1990) (requiring claimant to demonstrate "disabling" pain is an "additional requirement" that "flies in the face of the plain language" of § 9.09A); Carnes v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1215, 1219 (11th Cir.1991). At least three circuit courts of appeals agree that, for purposes of § 9.09A, a claimant need only demonstrate a minimal amount of pain and limitation of motion. See Hughes v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 957, 959 (5th Cir.1994) ("There is no requirement that the pain be severely limiting [or] that the limitation of motion be marked.... The listing requires only limitation of motion...."); Carnes, 936 F.2d at 1219 ("The ALJ ... imposed unjustifiable new requirements to Listing [9.09A] by requiring Carnes Indeed, the amount of x-ray evidence of arthritis necessary for purposes of § 9.09A is identical to that necessary to demonstrate a history of pain and limitation of motion. For example, the Eleventh Circuit holds that "an obese claimant need present no more than evidence of minimal degenerative joint changes to meet the required showing of 'X-ray evidence of arthritis....' " Carnes, 936 F.2d at 1219; see also Hughes,...

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