Ingram v. Dallas County, Tex., Civ. A. No. 3-86-2308-H.

• Court: United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. Northern District of Texas
• Writing for the Court: SANDERS, Acting
• Citation: 688 F. Supp. 1146
• Parties: Luella INGRAM, Plaintiff, v. DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS, Defendant.
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 3-86-2308-H.
• Decision Date: 26 May 1988

688 F. Supp. 1146

Luella INGRAM, Plaintiff,
v.
DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 3-86-2308-H.

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division.

May 26, 1988.

688 F. Supp. 1147

Gabriel H. Robles, Dallas, Tex., for plaintiff.

Peter L. Harlan, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dallas, Tex., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SANDERS, Acting Chief Judge.

Before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion and Brief for Partial Summary Judgment, filed October 23, 1987; Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support, filed December 2, 1987; Plaintiff's Motion for Assessment of Costs and Attorneys Fees Against the County Under FRCP Rules 11, 26(g) & 56(g), filed December 21, 1987; Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to the County's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Reply to the County's Brief Opposing Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Assessment of Costs and Attorneys Fees, filed as one document on December 21, 1987; Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Assessment of Costs and Attorneys Fees Under Rules 11, 26(g) & 56(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, filed January 11, 1988; Defendant's Motion for Sanctions Against the Plaintiff and Her Counsel Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Brief in Support, filed January 11, 1988; Plaintiff and Her Counsel's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Sanctions Against Each, filed January 14, 1988; Plaintiff's February 3, 1988 letter further addressing contentions of Defendant, which was filed on February 10, 1988; Defendant's February 8, 1988 letter in response to Plaintiff's letter, which was filed on February 10, 1988; and, finally, Plaintiff's March 10, 1988 letter replying to Defendant's February 8 letter, which was filed on March 11, 1988.

688 F. Supp. 1148

This is a complex case involving, among others, claims of age discrimination and due process arising from Defendant Dallas County's dismissal of Plaintiff Ingram. For the reasons stated below the Court grants Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on her procedural due process claim; denies Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on her substantive due process claim; denies Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on her breach of employment contract claim and grants Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on that same claim; denies Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") claim; dismisses Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim; and dismisses Plaintiff's claim that the County deprived her of her liberty interest in her good name and reputation. The Court also denies both parties' motions for sanctions for the reasons set forth in the last part of the opinion.

I. Background and Contentions of the Parties

Many of the facts in this case are undisputed; therefore, in reciting the facts the Court will note only when the parties disagree. Plaintiff, Luella Ingram, is a 54 year old black female. Defendant is Dallas County, which was Ingram's employer at all times relevant to this lawsuit. Dallas County is a political entity under the laws of Texas. The County is divided into four districts and is governed by a five-member elected Commissioners' Court, comprised of one county judge and four commissioners, one from each district.

On November 1, 1965, Ingram was hired by the County through Jim Tyson, Commissioner of District No. 3, as a clerk for the District No. 3 Road and Bridge Office. On July 16, 1966, Ingram was promoted to the position of bookkeeper for the same office by Commissioner Tyson.

On April 3, 1975, the County established a Civil Service Commission pursuant to Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 2372h-6, which is now codified as Tex.Loc.Gov't Code Ann. §§ 158.001-.015 (Vernon Pamphlet 1988). The Civil Service Commission ("Commission") is comprised of three members of the County Commissioners' Court; the Dallas County Director of Personnel serves as the Secretary to the Commission.¹ The Commission is responsible for making and enforcing personnel rules and regulations governing County employees. On October 4, 1976, the Commission promulgated the Dallas County Personnel/Civil Service Rules and Regulations ("Civil Service Rules"), which set forth the terms and conditions of employment for County employees. Prior to promulgation of those rules, all County employees were subject to termination at will. At all times material to this suit the Civil Service Rules were subject to change at any time by the direction of the Commission with the approval of the Dallas County Commissioners' Court.²

On or about January 13, 1981, Ingram was shown a job description titled "Bookkeeper/Office Manager," which she initialed. The parties dispute the purpose of this exercise and its effect. Ingram claims to have initialed the job description to verify the accuracy of the duties that she had performed since 1966. She claims that neither her duties nor her job title changed at this time. The County contends that Ingram's job description changed from bookkeeper to bookkeeper/office manager on or about January 13, 1981 and that

688 F. Supp. 1149

Ingram initialed the job description to indicate her acceptance of the change and approval of the job description as being descriptive of her duties

On January 1, 1985, John Wiley Price replaced Jim Tyson as District 3 Dallas County Commissioner. On April 29, 1985, Commissioner Price transferred Ingram from the Road and Bridge Office to his administrative office in downtown Dallas. Defendant County contends that Commissioner Price did so because Ingram was unable to adequately perform the essential duties of her position as bookkeeper/office manager of the District No. 3 Road and Bridge Office. Plaintiff Ingram contends that she performed her job in a satisfactory manner. Ingram's personnel file, which is attached to Defendant County's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment as Exhibit Five, shows that she received no job deficiency performance notices at anytime while employed by the County until November 8, 1985, the date of her discharge. While she was employed in Commissioner Price's administrative office, Ingram performed general office or receptionist's work. Defendant County contends, and Ingram disputes, that her work in this area was also unsatisfactory.

On September 24, 1985, Ingram was directed by Commissioner Price to take accumulated leave time. On November 8, 1985, Commissioner Price discharged Plaintiff Ingram. The County contends that Commissioner Price discharged Ingram because of her demonstrated inability to perform her job duties. Plaintiff Ingram contends that she was fired to make room for a 26 year old black female friend of Commissioner Price.

On November 11, 1985, Ingram filed a charge of age discrimination against the County under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). The charge was filed jointly with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Texas Commission on Human Rights. On December 2, 1985, Ingram was rehired by the County and assigned to duty in the Dallas County Tax Office as a telephone operator at a much lower rate of pay than she had earned in her previous position. On March 18, 1986, Ingram withdrew her age discrimination charge from EEOC. Ingram filed this lawsuit on September 9, 1986 and amended her complaint on June 10, 1987. Ingram's original complaint was filed against both the County and Commissioner Price. Her amended complaint did not list Price as a Defendant and her claim against Price was dismissed without prejudice in an agreed order filed June 29, 1987.

In her amended complaint Ingram alleges six causes of action. Her first and second causes of action allege respectively that the County violated her procedural and substantive due process rights by not affording her notice and a hearing prior to taking negative personnel action against her. Ingram's third cause of action alleges that through Commissioner Price's false statements concerning her job skills, the County deprived her of her liberty interest in her good name and reputation without due process of law. In her fourth cause of action Ingram claims that the County discriminated against her on the basis of age in violation of the ADEA when it fired her at the age of 52 and replaced her with a 26 year old woman. Ingram's fifth cause of action alleges that the County breached its implied employment contract with her when it reclassified her position. Finally, in her sixth cause of action Ingram claims that Commissioner Price intentionally humiliated her and that his actions constitute tortious intentional infliction of emotion distress on the part of Defendant County.

In her Motion for Summary Judgment, Ingram seeks summary judgment on her first, second, and fifth causes of action: that the County violated her procedural and substantive due process rights and that the County breached its implied employment contract with her. In her response to the County's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Ingram stipulates to the dismissal without prejudice of her sixth cause of action, her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against the County.

In its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, the County claims that all of Ingram's

688 F. Supp. 1150

claims against it are completely without merit in either fact or law. Accordingly, the County seeks the summary dismissal of Ingram's entire suit

II. Due Process Claims

Ingram claims that under the Dallas County civil service system she had a property interest in her employment with the County because under the Civil Service Rules she could only be fired for just cause. She claims that the County violated her procedural and substantive due process rights by depriving her of that property interest without due...